Speaking Where the Bible Does

Speaking Where the Bible Does
Taking on Befuddling Doctrines

Charles Robert Davis
© 2020
With Revisions, Corrections and Clarifications [June 2022]

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 Dedicated to my Teacher and Mentor

Dr. James Dean Strauss
From whom I not only learned lessons from important thinkers,
but how to assess their thinking in terms of a comprehensive
Christian Weltanschauung.

Copyright © 2020
Charles Robert Davis
ISBN: 9-798621-028206
All rights reserved.

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 Table of Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................ 3
PREFACE ........................................................................................................................................ 6
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 10
CHAPTER ONE—THE SOTERIOLOGICAL PROBLEM ...................................................... 15
COGNITIVE DISSONANCE .......................................................................................................... 15
THEORIES OF THE ATONEMENT ................................................................................................ 18
A DIFFERENT SOTERIOLOGICAL PARADIGM ........................................................................... 21
CHAPTER TWO—THE QUALITATIVE SUPERIORITY OF AN EXPIATORY
PARADIGM .................................................................................................................................. 23
THE ONTOLOGICAL DOCTRINE ................................................................................................ 23
ALIENATION AS A MORAL PROBLEM ....................................................................................... 27
GOD’S PROBLEM, GOD’S OPTIONS .......................................................................................... 29
REPENTANCE: THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS ......................................................................... 35
1. Non-compatibilistic Free-will........................................................................................ 35
2. Precipitate Moral Self-assessment ................................................................................ 44
3. Experience Remorse for Sins ........................................................................................ 55
4. Repudiate and Eradicate Sin-oriented Character Traits ............................................... 56
5. Resolve to Comply with Holiness Expectations .......................................................... 57
CHAPTER THREE — EXPIATION IN APOSTOLIC ARGUMENT..................................... 59
THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE APOSTOLIC ARGUMENT ................................................ 59
Peter’s Pentecost Argument—Acts 2:22-41 ..................................................................... 63
The Beggar’s Healing—Acts 3:12-26............................................................................... 66
The 1st Sanhedrin Interrogation—Acts 4:8-12.................................................................. 66
The 2nd Sanhedrin Interrogation—Acts 5:27-34............................................................... 68
Stephen’s Argument—Acts 7:51-53 ................................................................................. 69
Peter at Cornelius’ House—Acts 10:37-43....................................................................... 71
Paul at Pisidian Antioch—Acts 13:16-41 ......................................................................... 72
The Thessalonica Comment—Acts 17:2 .......................................................................... 74
Paul’s Areopagus Speech—Acts 17:22-31 ....................................................................... 75
Corinth—Acts 18:4-6 ......................................................................................................... 78
Persuasiveness of Apollos—Acts18:28 ............................................................................ 79
Events in Ephesus—Acts 19:4-10 ..................................................................................... 79
SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................. 79
CHAPTER FOUR—MISTAKES OF OPTION #3 THEORIES ............................................... 81
PREDESTINATION AND ELECTION/REPROBATION ................................................................... 82
FOREKNOWLEDGE ..................................................................................................................... 84
GOD AND AN OPEN UNIVERSE?................................................................................................ 95
TOTAL DEPRAVITY.................................................................................................................. 102
SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................ 106
CHAPTER FIVE—THESIS 1) “THE RIGHTEOUS MAN SHALL LIVE BY FAITH”—
ROMANS 1:17 ............................................................................................................................ 107
EIGHT THESES ON ROMANS.................................................................................................... 108
THESIS ONE: “THE RIGHTEOUS MAN SHALL LIVE BY FAITH”............................................. 109
The Problem of Non-cognitive “Faiths” ......................................................................... 111
The Problem of Faith as Objective Theo-Historical Dogma ......................................... 114
The Problem of Faith as an Enabling Gift ...................................................................... 115
Faith as a Cognitive Moral Principle............................................................................... 120
HN"WMA/ AS INTEGRITY, HONESTY ................................................................................................. 123
THE CENTRAL IDEA—HABAKKUK 2:4 .................................................................................. 125

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 CRITIQUE AND CLARIFICATION OF HABAKKUK 2:4 ............................................................. 126
SUMMARY CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 139
CHAPTER SIX—THESIS TWO: “THE WRATH OF GOD IS JUSTIFIED”— ROMANS
1:18-3:20 ...................................................................................................................................... 141
INFERRING THE PROPERTIES OF GOD FROM THE PROPERTIES OF THE UNIVERSE .............. 141
Cosmological Arguments ................................................................................................ 142
Teleological Arguments .................................................................................................. 144
Axiological Arguments.................................................................................................... 146
INFERRING GOD’S MORAL PROPERTIES FROM THE UNIVERSAL MORAL ORDER ............... 148
The Passing Judgment Test— ......................................................................................... 149
Golden Rule Test ............................................................................................................. 156
The Teaching Test— ....................................................................................................... 158
CHAPTER SEVEN—THESIS THREE: “A RIGHTEOUSNESS APART FROM THE
LAW”— ROMANS 3:21-31 ...................................................................................................... 162
ROMANS 3:22-26—TRANSLATION OF GENITIVES AND DATIVES, ETC. .............................. 162
JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH AS GOD’S FREE GIFT .................................................................... 165
ON THE ATONEMENT .............................................................................................................. 167
BOASTING, GRACE AND LAW ................................................................................................ 170
FAITH AND GENTILES ............................................................................................................. 180
CHAPTER EIGHT—THESES FOUR & FIVE: “FAITH CREDITED TO HIM AS
RIGHTEOUSNESS”—ROMANS 4:1-25................................................................................. 186
“RECKONED RIGHTEOUS IN VIRTUE OF FAITH”— HN"WMA/ ........................................................ 186
AN INSIGHT FROM KIERKEGAARD ......................................................................................... 189
FAITH VIS-À-VIS WORKS ........................................................................................................ 196
CHAPTER NINE—THESIS SIX: “WHILE WE WERE YET SINNERS” ROMANS 5:1-8:39
...................................................................................................................................................... 206
ROMANS 5:12-21—“THE MANY WERE MADE SINNERS.” ..................................................... 206
ROMANS 6:19—“BECAUSE OF THE WEAKNESS OF YOUR FLESH ” ....................................... 219
The Argument from Baptism—Romans 6:1-14............................................................. 219
The Argument from Slavery—Romans 6:15-23............................................................ 220
The Argument from Marriage—Romans 7:1-6 ............................................................. 222
ROMANS 7:7-25—“INDWELLING OF SIN” ............................................................................. 225
ROMANS 8—SAR, X AND THE NOTION OF “THE SINFUL NATURE” ....................................... 234
CHAPTER TEN—THESIS SEVEN: “GOD DIDN’T REJECT HIS PEOPLE, DID HE?”—
ROMANS 9-10-11 ...................................................................................................................... 240
ROMANS 9:14-18—“IT IS NOT AS THOUGH GOD’S WORD HAD FAILED, IS IT?” .................. 240
ROMANS 9:19-10:21—"WHY THEN DOES GOD FIND BLAME US, IF NO ONE CAN RESIST HIS
WILL?” ..................................................................................................................................... 241
ROMANS 11:1-36—“GOD MOST CERTAINLY DID NOT REJECT HIS PEOPLE HAS HE?” ....... 247
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................... 261
CHAPTER ELEVEN—THESIS EIGHT: “STOP CONFORMING YOURSELVES…BEGIN
TRANSFORMING YOURSELVES.”—ROMANS 12:-15:33 ............................................... 263
RESPONSIBILITY, REFLEXIVE PRONOUNS AND REFLEXIVE VOICE ..................................... 265
Cases of NIV Preference for the Passive ........................................................................ 266
Unambiguous Cases for Reflexive Interpretations ........................................................ 267
LIVING SACRIFICES—REASONABLE WORSHIP..................................................................... 272
Holiness as Humility [12:3-8] ......................................................................................... 272
Holiness as Agape [12:9-21] ........................................................................................... 273
Holiness in Citizenship [13:1-8] ..................................................................................... 273
Holiness and Weaker Brothers [14:1-15:13].................................................................. 273
CHAPTER TWELVE—WARNINGS: THE HEBREW EPISTLE ........................................ 275
THE WARNINGS OF HEBREWS................................................................................................ 277
Warning 1—If the warnings of angels is binding, the warning of God is more so. .... 278
Warning 2—“See to it that none of you has a sinful, unbelieving heart.” ................... 282
Warning 3—Impossibility of being restored to repentance while sinning is willful. .. 285
Warning 4—“It is a terrible thing to fall into the hands of the living God.” ............... 291

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 Warning 5—“Without holiness no one will see the Lord.” ........................................... 294
CHAPTER 13—THE APPEAL OF GOD TO REPENT IN EZEKIEL 18 ............................. 295
SOME HERMENEUTICAL POINTS ON INERRANCY .................................................................. 295
THE FREE-WILL AND EFFECTIVE CALLING IN THE WESTMINSTER CONFESSION:............... 298
FIVE THESES OF AUGUSTINE .................................................................................................. 300
The Dual Guilt of Infants Thesis ..................................................................................... 303
The Divine Judgment Thesis ........................................................................................... 305
The Regeneration Thesis.................................................................................................. 307
David’s Contrition Thesis ................................................................................................ 310
Actual Sins Premise.......................................................................................................... 316
EXEGESIS OF EZEKIEL ............................................................................................................. 319
Suppositions on Responsibility ....................................................................................... 319
A Principle of Justice—“The soul that sins will die.”—Ezekiel 18:20 ........................ 322
Suppositions on Repentance—Ezekiel 18:21-23 ........................................................... 323
Suppositions on Turning from Righteousness to Sin—Ezekiel 18:24 .......................... 324
Defense against the Charge that God is Unjust—Ezekiel 18:25-29 ............................. 325
God’s Appeal: “Repent and Live”—Ezekiel 18:30-32 .................................................. 326
SUMMARY CONCLUSION......................................................................................................... 326
A GOSPEL CREED .................................................................................................................... 327
ARTICLE 1: OF GOD AS HOLY SPIRIT..................................................................................... 327
ARTICLE 2: OF MANKIND ....................................................................................................... 327
ARTICLE 3: OF MORAL DEVIANCE/SIN ................................................................................. 328
ARTICLE 4: OF JUST EXPECTATIONS...................................................................................... 328
ARTICLE 5: OF THE INCARNATION ......................................................................................... 329
ARTICLE 5: OF GOD’S SOTERIOLOGICAL POLICIES .............................................................. 330
EPILOGUE .................................................................................................................................. 332

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 Preface
After very many years, even decades, of grappling with the
cognitive dissonances Christians have had to address, and address
them such that the Biblical claims are treated as cognitively
consistent, I am left with a serious question. What Bible have I been
reading? If what people throughout the centuries, indeed for
millennia, have been saying that the Bible says is indeed what the
Bible says, then I have been reading the wrong Bible.
As I write this, I am also reading the autobiography of Mohandas
K. Gandhi. I have always been captivated by him ever since the
biographical movie appeared in the 1980’s. I always wondered how
so many of Jesus’ ideas and values found their way into his personal
philosophy, in his quest for the Truth. I wondered how he could have
so succinctly characterized the basic values of Jesus. My admiration
for him increased exponentially when he recounts his interaction with
Christians in South Africa. Their characterization of Christianity
follows the Christianity to which I, like him, have taken so much
exception. He was willing to read their books and meet with them
for prayer every afternoon at 1:00 PM. In particular, he recounts an
exchange that was initiated by a Plymouth Brethren man. Here is
Gandhi’s narrative on this exchange. Please pardon my reciting this
rather long passage.
Many of the contacts for which Mr. Coates was responsible were
good. Most struck me as being God-fearing. But during my
contact with this family, one of the Plymouth Brethren
confronted me with an argument for which I was not prepared:
“You cannot understand the beauty of our religion. From what
you say it appears that you must be brooding over your
transgressions every moment of your life, always mending them
and atoning for them. How can this ceaseless cycle of action
bring you redemption? You can never have peace. You admit
that we are all sinners. Now look at the perfection of our belief.
Our attempts at improvement and atonement are futile. And yet
redemption we must have. How can we bear the burden of sin?
We can but throw it on Jesus. He is the only sinless Son of God.
It is His word that those who believe in Him shall have
everlasting life. Therein lies God’s infinite mercy. And as we

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 believe in the atonement of Jesus, our own sins do not bind us.
Sin we must. It is impossible to live in this world sinless. And
therefore Jesus suffered and atoned for all the sins of mankind.
Only he who accepts His great redemption can have eternal
peace. Think of what a life of restlessness is yours, and what a
promise of peace we have.”
The argument utterly failed to convince me. I humbly replied:
“If this be Christianty acknowledged by all Christians, I cannot
accept it. I do not seek redemption from the consequences of
my sin. I seek to be redeemed from sin itself, or rather from the
very thought of sin. Until I have attained that end, I shall be
content to be restless.”
To which the Plymouth Brother rejoined: “I assure you, your
attempt is fruitless. Think again over what I have said.”
The Brother proved as good as his word. He knowingly
committed transgressions, and showed me that he was
undisturbed by the thought of them.
I already knew before meeting with these friends that all
Christians did not believe in such a theory of atonement. Mr.
Coates himself walked in the fear of God. His heart was pure,
and he believed in the possibility of self-purification. The two
ladies also shared this belief. Some of the books that came into
my hands were full of devotion. So, although Mr. Coates was
very much disturbed by this latest experience of mine, I was able
to reassure him and tell him that the distorted belief of a
Plymouth Brother could not prejudice me against Christianity.
My difficulties lay elsewhere. They were with regard to the
Bible and its accepted interpretation.1
I have finished, for the present, my basic objection to the nearly
universal consensus on how Biblical soteriology works. I think I have
done so by allowing the Bible to speak. At least I have tried to do so.
I have developed very many entailments which occur in virtue of
what the Bible clearly says. If there are illicit entailments that occur
in virtue of what the Bible says, then it necessarily follows that the

1
Mohandas K. Gandhi An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments
with Truth Translated by Mahadev Desai [Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1957
(Reprinted 1993)], pg. 124-5
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Bible cannot be inspired and so it cannot be inerrant or else God as
Holy Spirit does not care much about cognitive consistency. If a
doctrine entails a falsehood, then the doctrine from which such a
falsehood follows is necessarily flawed. It may be flawed due to
ambiguity, imprecision or due to some fault or other. It nevertheless
remains flawed. This is a consequence with which I am entirely at
odds.
What is the role of theology? Is it a framework in virtue of which
a certain set of special religious documents may be interpreted? If so,
then the theology must exist before one may approach the documents.
I think Gandhi has erred here, for he was somewhat reluctant to
undertake a study of Christianity until he had come to comprehend
his Hindu heritage. Those who sought his conversion thought that
for him to do so would interfere with his believing their form of
Christianity. If this is the role of theology, then the documents
themselves have value only to the extent that the theological
paradigm allows. Nevertheless, Gandhi had reservations about
Christianity based on the paradigm with which he was presented. In
other words, the paradigm itself was defective. I suspect Gandhi will
have agreed that it had failed what I will shortly call the ontological
doctrine. On the other hand, if the set of special religious documents
is primary then the theology is secondary. Theology is derivative of
the documents, not vice versa.
Theology exists in virtue of the primary documents.
Unfortunately, this contains another problem. How does one choose
the set of religious documents from which one derives the theology?
I suspect that Gandhi preferred the Bhagavat Gita, just as we prefer
the Judeo-Christian Scriptures. Gandhi, to his credit, was more than
willing to engage other people’s religions and their Scriptures. What
places the Judeo-Christian Scriptures in the priviledged position to
which we have assigned it and to which people of alternative faiths
take so much exception when their belief that their’s is primary comes
under attack? Are Christians afraid of their competiters in the
religous arena of ideas?
In any event, provided that there is some basis for establishing
that the Judeo-Christian Scripture is qualitatively superior to the
others, if one can formulate a theology that is consistent with the
Scripture, or perhaps is not inconsistent with it, then it qualitatively
trumps any other theology, whether Christian or not, which entails
inconsistencies or is indifferent to them. There can be no doubt at all
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that the tenor of “Christian” theology throughout the millennia has
either not dealt with or dealt inadequately with the cognitive
dissonances that persist notwithstanding conclaves, councils,
conferences and synods which have been convened to address them.
I have not undertaken to address the problem of deciding on which of
the competing world religions has the preeminent scripture. My
attempt here is based on calling into question the very tenets in
popularized Christianity, seminarily reinforced, that have rarely been
seriously questioned. If the cognitive dissonances dissipate in virtue
of alternative tenets and such tenets are exegetically consistent with
the text of the Scriptures as we have them, then the other tenets will
have been sufficiently falsified.
I doubt that this analysis is altogether correct. I only maintain
that it is closer to a comprehensive understanding of the Christian
Scriptures than the dominant alternative readings. This too is subject
to falsification. I hope its errors can be found and corrected. I hope
that the principle of Biblical inerrancy is not subject to falsification
due to anything I have said.

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 Introduction

Once, when I thought I was smart enough to get some kind of
doctorate, I enrolled in a post-graduate class on soteriology. One of
the discussions we had was on the notion of Faith. It seemed then, as
it still does, that this concept is quite amorphous. I have given it much
thought. There are parts of it that conceptually elude me, as, for
example, what the connection is between Jesus’ healing and the
“faith” of the one healed. On some occasions, upon performing a
miracle, Jesus comments “Your [sg.] faith has made you [sg.] whole.”
The Gospel authors mention at least one case of Jesus’ not being able
to perform miracles in Nazareth because he found no faith there [Matt
13:58 = Mark 6:5]. There is also the case of the demon possessed
boy whom the disciples could not heal while Jesus was on the mount
of transfiguration. The boy seems not to have faith in any sense
whatsoever. When Jesus arrived on the scene, He was angry with his
disciples because, it seems, He expected that they should have been
able to heal the boy [Matt 17:14-23]. What is the connection between
faith and miracle? I’m just not very clear about this dimension of
faith.
On the other hand, I am relatively clear about faith in another
respect. It is a point I strove to make in my soteriology seminar. It
was a point the professor summarily rejected. I wanted to argue that
faith is more about the ethical dimension of belief than it is about the
epistemological dimension of belief. The professor, seeking to put
me in my place, dismissed my argument, which he had not yet heard,
in support of this view by claiming that if I were correct, then I will
have reduced the Faith to a species of “Christian” Stoicism. I tried to
respond that the major issue with which Christian soteriology must
contend is the problem of sin and not whatever species of doctrine to
which one gives cognitive assent. If one is saved by faith, as Paul
says [Romans 1:17], then faith has to be inherently connected to
righteousness and thence to repentance. Repentance in turn had to be
inherently connected to free-will, because only in such a case does it
make any sense to rationally discuss moral responsibility,

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notwithstanding various compatibilistic theories.2 My view cannot
be a species of “Christian Stoicism” because all forms of Stoicism of
which I am aware are fatalistic and, so, deterministic.3 This book is
an extended argument in defense of the argument I would have
proffered had the Professor Dr. allowed me.
I am also concerned about whether or not philosophical-theology
is at all epistemologically useful. There is a presumption on the part
of most secular thinkers, that religion and ethics have little or no
cognitive value. The argument often runs like this: Religion used to
be used to explain what we, in our primitive phase, could not
otherwise comprehend. Since these more primitive epochs, science
has come to provide a methodology and an explanatory framework
that is said to adequately circumscribe reality without any reference
to any supposed deity. From this it is said to follow that no appeal to
this supposed deity is epistemologically necessary. This argument,
although quite widespread, is a bald non-sequitur. It does not follow
from the fact, supposing for the moment that it is a fact, that the
proposition that science, in virtue of its methodology, discovers the
laws in virtue of which the universe functions is logically
incompatible with the proposition that God created the universe
according to natural order, and that He may from time to time interact
with it.4 Both propositions could be true at the same time, inasmuch

2
Compatibilists are those who argue that the notion of metaphysical
determinism is compatible with the notion of moral responsibility, or at least
the two notions are not incompatible
3
It is, of course, true that the Stoics compensated for this determinism
by encouraging their adherents to exercise the only domain of free-will that
they would acknowledge, namely the inner world of their own volition. The
problem remains for Stoicism that if their atomistic determinism is the case
it becomes impossible to account for this so-called inner volitional freedom.
It matters not how “fine” the atoms may be. In another regard, the attempts
of Democritus and the other Atomists to wrestle with the compatibility of
moral responsibility and atomistic determinism now seems quite prescient
in virtue of the developments in quantum theory. See: Seneca Letters from
a Stoic: Epistulae Morales ad Lucilium Translated by Robin Campbell[New
York, NY: Penguin Books, 1969]
4
Classical physics was deterministic in a Laplacean sense. Laplace
claimed that from the knowledge of the position and momentum of every
atom and a comprehensive set of Newtonian natural laws, some omniscient
demon could, in theory at least, accurately predict the position of every atom
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as if there were a God, especially a sufficiently powerful one, He may
have quite easily created the laws that science has discovered. In such
a case, science would be reading the writing of God. It does not
follow from, say, an archeologist’s discovery of an artifact or a
document, that the maker of either becomes epistemologically or
ontologically irrelevant in virtue of the archeologist’s ability to infer
its use or its meaning. It may even be true that the archeologist’s
interpretation is actually incorrect, but the error cannot be exposed as
such since there is no way to test the claim. It does not follow from
any belief, even internally consistent and exceedingly elegant ones,
that reality conforms to that belief. This is the fallacy committed in
virtue of every form of epistemological idealism. For the life of me,
I cannot understand why such a simple refutation is neither
considered nor promulgated.
Generally, secular science is not interested in theological
incursions into domains over which it has staked its claim. Theology
is unwelcome and viewed as an illegal alien having surreptitiously
crossed the borders of science violating its sovereignty. Science is
not likely to give theology, especially its Christian varieties, amnesty
or legal status. Notwithstanding this Christophobic, or perhaps
theophobic, attitude, an epistemology that explores whether there are
other kinds of beings or other kinds of worlds than purely material
ones is as legitimate as asking whether there are realities, even
alternate ones, such as parallel universes, worm holes, extraterrestrial
alien creatures, black holes or dark matter/energy, theses regarding
which science is perfectly willing to entertain.
But this is not the most important dimension of the
epistemological limbo to which science has consigned theology. The
most important is the ethical dimension. Science has a problem with

at any subsequent time with any particular degree of precision. Since the
emergence of quantum theory, however, we now know that this Laplacean
programme is not just untenable, but false. Indeed, with the advent of
quantum physics, determinism in the classical sense is dead. See: Sir Karl
Popper The Open Universe: An Argument for Indeterminism (New York,
NY: Routledge, 1956 [reprinted 1988]) as well as his Quantum Theory and
the Schism in Physics edited by W W Bartley III, (New York, NY:
Routledge, 1982 [reprinted 2000]). See also: Arthur H Compton The
Freedom of Man: Terry Foundation Lectures of 1931 [New York,
Greenwood Press, 1969], pg. 9-11.
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morality, largely due to the influences of David Hume and his Logical
Positivist and Postmodernist disciples. They argue that morality is
not science because its propositions are neither true nor false. They
say that moral pseudo-statements reflect subjective states, not
objective ones. Statements of morality are merely representations of
personal emotive states. This has resulted in the psychologization of
every university discipline. No explanation is adequate, according to
this paradigm, unless there is a reductionist link to psychology which
in turn links to an explanation in chemistry and then from these
explanations one must provide explanations of chemistry in terms of
physics, particularly physics of the Classical ilk. No room exists in
the world of science for anything so subjective, although (and this is
quite surprising to me) in virtue of quantum physic’s adoption of
Neils Bohr’s Copenhagen Interpretation, the epistemology du jour is
subjective idealistic empiricism, because everything depends on the
subjective state of the knower/observer.5 Now, physics has become
psychologized, completing the vicious circle.
My thesis is that notwithstanding the dominance of this
paradigm, morality is both objective and critical. Both science and
ethics need to be governed by critical realism. If I am right about this,
science governs a merely parochial domain, and is not, therefore, pan-
applicable. If so, there is a meta-domain that includes both science
and ethics. Since both are areas of knowledge, we should perhaps
pursue each, or both, in terms of logic and a viable critical realist
epistemology because subjective idealism entails solipsism in
epistemology and psychologism in logic. In other words, logic and
epistemology govern both realms of science and ethics. If there is a
viable ethical epistemology and ethics is amenable to being used in
deductive as well as a sufficient range of inductive arguments, then
both science and ethics can present conjectures subject to refutation,
to borrow from Popper. Further, if this can be established, there is
every reason to believe that, in Richard Swinburne’s words, “It is
more probable that God exists than not”, then we have every reason
to pursue an epistemological course for soteriology.6 I even suspect

5
See: Popper’s Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics, cited above,
especially the opening comments on the crisis in physics.
6
See: Richard Swinburne The Existence of God 2nd Edition [Oxford,
UK: Clarendon Press, 2004]. See also his Coherence of Theism [Oxford,
UK: Clarendon Press, 1977 (Reprinted 2010)]
13
that some of our epistemological endeavors will be the same as those
that science, particularly the social sciences, has used. We shall just
have to see how the argument proceeds.
Here we go!

14
 Chapter One—The Soteriological Problem
Cognitive Dissonance
“Jesus died for our sins.” This is intended as an assurance. “Jesus
paid the price.” I, who am morally destitute, am grateful. But, upon
reflection about these truths, I begin to wonder. How can someone
“die for” the sins of another or even in the stead of another? To whom
is the debt owed, for which one is too destitute to pay? Whom did I
owe for my sin and, so, whom did Jesus pay? It seems that my sin
offended God. On some accounts, however, God seems to have to
pay Satan, driving me to conclude that it is not God that I owe but
Satan, and that God agrees to pay him what I owe him. Of course, if
Satan has no legal or moral claim on me, it becomes difficult to see
what role Satan may play in frustrating God’s soteriological motives.7
Asking these questions presents others, since I have taken other
propositions as true. If Jesus is God, as I take it that He is—I am
vociferously Athanasian on this matter—then it seems problematic to
claim that “God pays God”. That is a bit like the owner of a grocery
store having to pay himself for the milk he takes home. Further, if
other propositions are true, which I may not take as being true, then
if God is angry with me for my sin, then how does God appease
himself with regard to my sin, provided, of course, that the notion of
appeasement is reflexive?8 Does it not seem odd that the One whom

7
There is, of course, an explanation, namely that Satan uses temptation
to create a moral alienation of people from God. This seems to be the point
of Job. If Satan should be successful, then people will choose to act on the
temptation and when repeated often enough their decisions solidify into
character traits, suggesting that further efforts at temptation are no longer as
necessary. Such an explanation, however, does not require that God owes
Satan anything. Satan creates a problem for God because God has to
compensate for the alienation that Satan’s temptations produce. One might
recall this point in C. S. Lewis’ insightful book The Screwtape Letters.
8
See: Karl Rahner The Trinity [New York, NY: Searby Press, 1974],
pg. 12-13, footnote 7.
15
my sin has angered (recall that Paul says that God’s wrath is justified)
must pay the price for my sin, and must do so by paying Himself?
Yet this is exactly what I am expected to believe. How does the death
of an innocent person in anyway transform me from a sinner to
someone who may now have fellowship with God? [See: 1 John 1:5-
7] If God, Who is regarded to be omnipotent, is powerful enough
then He can transform me without having to resort to the
gruesomeness of a flogging followed by a crucifixion. Yet, I am
assured that this is in fact what God does. These assurances are
proclaimed from pulpits, in radio programs, on The Church Channel,
on billboards, and in tracts. But, why are these not also the reasons
for why I should reject God as an incoherent, if not a vindictive,
Deity? Despite these seemingly important and legitimate questions,
I am expected to believe these cognitively dissonant dogmas in the
absence of any reasonable explanations to address these questions.
Apparently, believing in Jesus requires a suspension of rational
cognition.
Is Christian soteriology really a hopeless cognitive mess? Is the
disposal of reason as rubbish the only strategy available to us? Pascal
thought so.9 He thought Reason was an obstacle to be sidestepped.
The Cappadocians seem to think so, ultimately deferring to
mysticism. But, is Reason mere refuse? Aquinas partitioned his
theology between matters discernible by reason and matters requiring
revelation. Reformers also thought so. Luther derided Reason,
calling her a whore. They seem to regard Reason as the sine qua non
for secular humanism. If man has the capacity to use reason to
establish that God exists and that He has specific properties and that
this capacity in man entails that there is a sufficient basis in natural
theology for man to use these cognitive tools, they reason, then man’s

9
Pascal’s Pensees, (New York, NY: E P Dutton & Co, 1958), # 445,
pg. 124: “You must not, then, reproach me for the want of reason in this
doctrine [man’s having original sin], since I admit it to be without reason.
But this foolishness is wiser than all the wisdom of men, sapientius est
hominibus [I Cor 1:25].” Pascal subscribes to the epistemologically accurate
view that one cannot arrive at epistemological certitude predicated on a
posteriori evidence. He understood logic. I think he failed to consider that
there is a domain of logic that allows for coming to conclusions that are more
probable than not. I think he thought that faith was necessary for bridging
the gap between deductive certitude and inductive probabilities.
16
use of “autonomous” reason entails that Divine revelation is
unnecessary. Their reasoning continues that since man is not
autonomous, only God is, then it follows that there is no basis for the
use of Reason or argument.10 In any event, man is putatively totally
depraved apparently entailing that its effects are tainted.
But why should we allow the pontificators of ratio-phobic faith
to use Reason as the chief tool in arguing for the rejection of Reason?
I think we should not, for if Reason is sufficiently reliable to prove
its own unreliability is it not then meta-reliable? Of course, it is. I
see no reason to require of God that He cannot structure his creation,
even extending to the constitution of humankind, such that he can
only miss the writing of God in nature by consciously and willfully
suppressing it, as Paul has argued [Romans 1:18-20]. Paul clearly
maintains that mankind is morally culpable not because his reason is
tainted, but because he consciously suppresses its proper use. So, let
us abandon bad arguments to adopt good ones, or at least better ones.
Postmodernists have also piled on the misological bandwagon.
They suppose that all interpretation is an expression of some
historically contextualized, hidden and tainted agenda. Historical
sources are, therefore, never uncorrupted. All disciplines must be,
not reconstructed, but deconstructed.11 Of course, the

10
Norman Geisler Thomas Aquinas: An Evangelical Appraisal, (Grand
Rapids: Baker Book House Company, 1991), pg. 1-43. Geisler’s summary
of the major Reformed thinkers’ assessment of the work of the great Catholic
theologian and apologist Thomas Aquinas is quite revealing. In general,
there is the supposition that there can be no “natural theology” for that would
entail that man has some autonomous means of knowing God’s will. Given
the basis upon which scholars like Bernard Ramm, Cornelius Van Til,
Gordon Clark and others criticize Aquinas, one can only wonder why they
write books on apologetics at all. If their arguments are valid (a peculiar use
of a term of reason), one can only believe the Bible if and when God
empowers them to believe. Geisler defends Aquinas against these
evangelical criticisms by claiming not that one ought to make use of Reason,
but that these scholars generally misunderstand or misinterpret Aquinas and
that, in most cases, Aquinas is actually holding the same positions as they
do. For example, Aquinas epistemologically separates natural reason from
revealed religion, the latter of which only God’s revelation can provide.
11
See: Jacques Derrida & Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak Of
Grammotology
17
Postmodernists, Jurgen Habermas notwithstanding,12 commit the
same fallacy, for they expect that we should accept their arguments
as entailing their conclusions. This is old fashioned Pyrrhonism
merely dressed up in “new” garb.
Theories of the Atonement
The theories of atonement are varied. Depending on the
classifications of various scholars, there may be as many as nine
theories. I summarize them as follows:
 Recapitulation Theory—Irenaeus of Lyon (125-202 CE)
“[Irenaeus] sees the atonement of Christ as reversing the
course of mankind from disobedience to obedience. He avers
that Christ’s life recapitulated all the stages of human life and
in doing so reversed the course of disobedience initiated by
Adam.”
 Ransom Theory—Origen of Alexandria (185-254 CE) put
this theory forward arguing that Christ offered Himself to
Satan as a ransom for those sinners he held captive. Christ
deceived Satan by keeping the resurrection from him.13
Gregory of Nyssa held the same view and defended the
theory against the criticism that God’s action deceived Satan
and that any deception is contrary to God’s nature.
 Satisfaction Theory—Anselm of Canterbury (c. 1034-1109
CE) developed the Satisfaction Theory arguing that offences
against someone needed to be satisfied. Further, the greater
a person is the greater the satisfaction that is required. Since
sin offends the infinite God and no finite creature could
provide infinite satisfaction, it follows that Christ, who had
not offended God at all, could render the necessary
satisfaction. The problem with this reasoning is that one
must, accordingly, suppose that Jesus is infinite as is God, a

12
See: Jurgen Habermas The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity:
Twelve Lectures translated by Frederick Lawrenece [Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1987 (1990)].
13
This is the view C S Lewis uses in the first book of his Tales of Narnia
The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe. In his space trilogy he names his
chief character Ransom, further indicating his acceptance of the Ransom
Theory of the atonement. He also seems to have some affinity to the
Governmental Theory of Grotius.
18
 Christology that seems compatible with the Athanasian
position. But, if Jesus pays God then we seem to have a
Christology that seems compatible with the Arian position.
It would seem that the Athanasian and Arian Christologies
are mutually exclusive. But, no viable soteriology may
include any propositions that claim or that logically
presuppose or logically entail both Christologies at the same
time. This is a matter of logic, not of theology. Neither will
it be acceptable to alternate between the two Christologies to
satisfy the ad hoc needs of particular parts of any particular
dogmatic agenda.
 Moral-Influence Theory—Abelard of Brittany (1079-1142
CE) argued that by dying on the cross Christ revealed the
greatness of God’s love and that the natural response of man
is to undergo, perhaps to undertake, the necessary moral
change. Pelagius (360-418 CE) follows this reasoning.
Some scholars call Abelard’s theory the Example Theory,
holding that Christ gave men an example of what God
expects from them.
 Governmental Theory—Hugo Grotius (1583-1645 CE), a
Dutch jurist and theologically an Arminian, argued that God
binds Himself to upholding the Law He had established with
the creation of the universe. Since the law requires the death
of sinners, God could not merely forgive sinners because that
would then violate the Law. A death was therefore
necessary. Christ dies on the cross indicating what the
penalty would be for continuing to sin. God may now forgive
those who repent in view of the effects sin has on holiness
itself.14
 Penal Substitution Theory—John Calvin (1509-1564 CE),
following Augustinian’s theological principles, interprets the

14
See: http://www.theopedia.com/governmental-theory-of-atonement.
“The purpose of Christ's death was not to satisfy the demands of God's just
nature so that he might be enabled to do what he otherwise could not have
done, namely, forgive sins. Rather, Christ's death enabled God to forgive
sins or remit punishment in a way that would not have unfavorable
consequences or adverse effects on humans. Christ's suffering serves as a
deterrent to sin by impressing on us the gravity of sin. As we turn from sin,
we can be forgiven.”
19
 Scripture according to the dictates of his Reformed theology.
Man is depraved in virtue of Adam’s disobedience and
incapable of complying with or even responding to the
demands of righteousness due to the curse of the Fall.
Consequently, God chooses some men and not others, all of
whom are equally depraved, for election. Christ is said to
have become the vicarious substitute only for the sins of those
whom God elects for salvation.
There can be no question that the cross stands at the center of
Christian soteriology. These theories are vulnerable to a number of
criticisms. In general, they can be reduced to whether the
interpretation of Christ’s sacrifice is designed to influence God to
change His point of view or whether it is designed to influence the
sinner to alter his point of view.15 In other words, we have not asked
whether the paradigm for understanding the atonement is expiatory
or propitiatory.16 Admittedly, such a question would hardly occur to
anyone who was not trained in theology. Nevertheless, it is an
important question. It is a question of orientation. Is the sacrifice
designed to change the God who is offended or change those whose
sin offended Him?
Although there are many theories of the atonement, they all are
versions of one of these two orientations. Is it the responsibility of
the offender to assuage the anger of the God who has been offended?
Answers to this question I will call a propitiatory paradigm.
Alternatively, is atonement the gracious attempt of the offended God
to use the sacrifice to get the offender to change his moral character?
Answers to this question I will regard as an expiatory paradigm.

15
The Reformed Faith in adopting The Westminster Confession would,
no doubt, deny this way of putting the case, since God has “from all
eternity…, by the most wise and holy counsel of His own will, freely and
unchangeably ordain[ed] whatsoever is to come to pass.” [Chapter III, i
emphasis added] Accordingly, no choices contrary to this predestination are
possible, even by God. Given this dogma, one wonders whether any
crucifixion-based atonement would be at all relevant.
16
See: C. H. Dodd The Bible and the Greeks [London: Hodder &
Stoughton, 1935 (Reprinted 1964)], “Chapter Five: Atonement”, pp. 82-95.
“In any case the meaning conveyed (in accordance with LXX usage, which
is constantly determinative for Paul), is that of expiation, not that of
propitiation. Most translators and commentators are wrong.” [Pg. 94]
20
 My thesis is that the morally appropriate atonement paradigm
ought to be, expiatory rather than propitiatory. I further maintain that
the hermeneutical justifications or rationales for propitiatory
sacrificial theories present God as in violation of one or more
normative moral standards entailing the consequence that God is
unjust, callous and/or insensitive. If this were the view of God
contained in the Bible, this would seem to be adequate moral grounds
to philosophically reject its soteriology. If I am right, then an
expiatory sacrificial paradigm becomes a strong soteriological
recommendation for those who may be called upon to convert to or
offer an apologetic for Christianity.17 In summary, I am going to
argue that:
1. An expiatory sacrificial paradigm is qualitatively superior to
a propitiatory sacrificial paradigm, both morally and
philosophically.
2. Biblical soteriology is decidedly expiatory, notwithstanding
that some passages may have a somewhat propitiatory ring to
them. In these cases, the exegetical task is to discover
whether an expiatory interpretation is available using the
grammatico-historical hermeneutical protocols.
3. Theologians who argue for a propitiatory soteriology have
made a philosophical mistake, which leads inevitably to
hermeneutical errors, and, therefore, a series of exegetical
mistakes.
A Different Soteriological Paradigm
The theologians I mentioned above, as well as their scholarly
advocates, have contributed to the problem by approaching the
meaning of the cross theologically and so their etymological and
exegetical conclusions are colored by their theology rather than
having the exegesis control the theology. Their confusion arises in
virtue of the lack of a meta-paradigm or from the use of an inadequate
or improper one. The establishment of a proper soteriological

17
As I said above, the difference between expiation and propitiation
consists in focusing on what the rationale for the reconciliation is. The
dictionary definitions of these terms are generally not very helpful inasmuch
as they blur this distinction. The only helpful fact is that lay people generally
find the terms quite meaningless.
21
paradigm will help us in rejecting inadequate soteriologies, whether
Biblical or not.
What soteriological paradigm ought to be adopted? I am
advocating some of the conditions that such a paradigm should meet.
In short, I am advocating a meta-paradigm, i.e., a standard in terms
of which one may assess soteriologies in general.
1. The adequate soteriology must establish who is in need of
salvation and why.
2. Inasmuch as soteriology necessarily addresses moral matters,
the adequate meta-soteriology must specify what counts as a
sin and why. This requires an adequate theory of morality, a
project I have undertaken separately.
3. In addition, this specification of what counts as a sin must
necessarily be in what philosophers of ethics would regard as
prescriptive or normative. Stated negatively, no adequate
soteriology may be non-cognitivist or emotivist.
4. Neither may it be meta-ethical, merely describing actual
ethical/religious practices or the uses of ethical/religious
language.
5. Moreover, the adequate soteriological model may be neither
deterministic nor compatibilist. Sin is a function of free-will.
6. The adequate soteriology must provide an explanation of
how sin produces alienation. If alienation was not a human
problem neither could it be a theological one, no redemptive
need would exist, i.e., there would be no need for
reconciliation. Soteriology logically presupposes moral
alienation.
7. The adequate soteriology must specify the conditions under
which reconciliation may justly occur, i.e., it must preserve
justice while providing for mercy.

22
 Chapter Two—The Qualitative Superiority of an
Expiatory Paradigm

The Ontological Doctrine
Let me argue, first, that expiation is qualitatively superior to
propitiation. My first point is that one must reject any theory of
atonement that presents God in violation of what I will call the
ontological doctrine. Let me state what I mean by this comment.
Anselm formulated what has come to be known as the ontological
argument for God’s existence. He argued that it follows from the
concept of God as “that than which nothing greater can be conceived”
that such a God exists as a real-existing-independently-of-the-mind-
thing on the ground that “things that exist both in concept and in
reality are greater than things that exist merely as concepts.”
Although Anselm’s argument has not gone unchallenged, it seems to
resist dismissal.18 Descartes later extended the argument by

18
Kant’s attempt to expose whatever fallacy the ontological argument
may have committed is widely accepted as the strongest, if not the
conclusive argument against Anselm. See: Immanuel Kant The Critique of
Pure Reason translated by Norman Kemp Smith, unabridged edition
[Toronto: Macmillan, 1929 (Reprinted St Martin’s Press 1965)], pp. 501-
507. It seems to me, however, that Kant misses Anselm’s point altogether.
If, as Kant claims, “existence” is not a predicate, then one cannot cognitively
distinguish between clearly contrary claims like the claims that “Centaurs
exist” and “Centaurs do not exist”. Kant would no doubt object to my
simplistic way of putting my case since he is not calling in question claims
of the existence or lack thereof of contingent beings. He is willing to broach
the question of whether synthetic a priori are possible, for example. Perhaps
the concept of God as a necessary being and any of the predicates assigned
to that notion may constitute such a propositional form. According to
Norman Kemp Smith A Commentary to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason 2nd
Edition Revised [New York, NY: Humanities Press, 1962] pp. 527-531,
Kant’s objection centers on whether or not the understanding, which must
be taken from the epistemological specifications of his Transcendental
Analytic, can conceive of a necessary being such that its existence is
inconceivable or impossible as the case may be. According to the
23
combining it with a cosmological argument.19 He argued, similarly
to Aquinas, that one consequence of the ontological argument (be it

Transcendental Analytic the understanding is constituted from the interface
of the sensibilities and the conditions of the Transcendental Aesthetic (space
and time) and the categories of the Transcendental Analytic (Quantity,
Quality, Relation and Modality). Given that Anselm’s argument requires
the truth of the premise “A thing is greater which exists both in concept and
in reality than are things which exist merely as concepts,” Kant’s rejection
of this premise seems not only odd but also false. Platinga, God and Other
Minds, carries out an analysis of this notion very much more completely than
does my observation here. Of course, Kant’s transcendental epistemology
requires that one can never know Das Ding an Sich. So, it is not surprising
for him to object to Anselm’s realism. If, however, Kant’s epistemology is
suspect, then so also is his claim that existence is not a property. It seems I
need “existence” as a property in order to explain to my granddaughters that
there are no centaurs when we discuss Narnia creatures that are half-man
half-horse. In the same way a claim to the effect that there is a being such
that none greater can be conceived is also a claim that deductively entails
that the complement claim is necessarily both impossible and inconceivable.
See also Alvin Platinga’s anthology The Ontological Argument: From St.
Anselm to Contemporary Philosophers (Garden City, NY:
Doubleday/Anchor Books, 1965); God and Other Minds: A Study of the
Rational Justification of the Belief in God, [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1967] and The Nature of Necessity [Oxford: The Clarendon Press,
1974]; Charles Hartshorne, Norman Malcolm as well as Kurt Gödel whose
ontological proof appears to be formally valid, thereby raising the question
of knowing whether the premises are true.
19
Descartes was convinced that he, in particular, and others, in general,
had a clear and distinct idea of God as the being that possessed all possible
perfections and that since such an idea could not be accounted for in virtue
of any possible empirical experience or set of experiences, it had to follow
that God existed as the cause of that idea, since no non-existing thing could
be the cause of any existing thing. Platinga argues in The Nature of
Necessity, using modal logic, that moral perfection is a necessary property
of a being which is such that such a being has this property in virtue of
having the property of being necessary in all possible worlds. This is similar
to one of Thomas Aquinas’ cosmological arguments, his argument from
efficient cause. It seems to be an a priori truth that “nothing” cannot be the
efficient cause of anything. Also, it seems a priori true that no thing can be
the efficient cause itself. One could also compare this to Aristotle’s
argument for his Prime Mover. Although for Aristotle matter is eternal, it is
also inert, i.e., unable to move itself (Aquinas reiterates this argument among
his five arguments), and since all change occurs in virtue of the movement
24
noted that Aquinas vociferously rejected the validity of the
ontological argument) entails that whatever properties God may
possess, He possesses in perfection. It seems to me that the
consequence of this ontological doctrine is that God is morally perfect
as result of His self-determination.20 So, if the ontological doctrine
is satisfied, then God cannot be unjust.21 We will state the ontological
doctrine as requiring that:

of matter, there necessarily must be a non-material agent whose activity is
the cause of the motion of matter.
20
David Hume in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion has his
Cleanthes argue that since the notion that God exists is a concept such that
it is possible to conceive it’s contrary and that nothing the contrary of which
is conceivable is necessary then the notion of God as a necessary being is
“plainly absurd.” Obviously, Hume rejects the ontological argument. But,
in his argument Hume confuses logical necessity, the contrary of which is
plainly impossible, and psychological inconceivability wherein someone
considers or deems something as impossible merely because he cannot
conceive of it. It does not follow from the fact that someone cannot conceive
of the contrary of something, a psychological matter, that the contrary state
of affairs is impossible, an ontological matter, or that conceiving of the
contrary of something vitiates its necessary metaphysical existence. The two
realms, psychology and ontology, are qualitatively different. It is, and
always has been, a serious philosophical mistake to attempt to reduce logic
to psychology—something philosophers have called psychologism.
21
One consequence of Cleanthes’ argument is that it is conceivable for
God to be less than morally perfect. So, the skeptic can ask with some
degree of justification whether Descartes can claim it as necessarily true that
God has all perfections, even moral one’s. There are plenty of mythologies
that characterize gods as morally tainted, capricious or self-serving. How
do we know whether or not God is like these? Of course the doctrine for
which I am arguing is that God has free-will, and that He is free to choose
to act out of either holiness or evil. The consequence of this doctrine is that
God is metaphysically capable of acting in evil. If He should do so, it would
not necessarily mitigate against His existence, although it would mitigate
against His holiness, and, therefore, would require of others that they refuse,
on moral grounds, to worship Him as holy. This would very probably anger
such a hypothetically malevolent Deity. In this case, those who hold a higher
moral standard than God would hold would be more praiseworthy than God.
Notwithstanding this argument, in defense of Anselm’s definition of “God”
as “That than which nothing greater can be conceived” it would follow that
the concept of God as morally perfect is greater than the concept of God as
morally tainted. Accordingly, God would, ontologically speaking, be
25
 Any interpretation of God’s nature or His soteriological
strategy may not include any dogmas that entail propositions to
the effect that God violates any normative moral principle.22
Indeed, many of the arguments for rejecting many of the classical
theories of the atonement rest on the principle that God would be
violating some normative principle(s).
 God’s using an innocent man to appease the devil is morally
unacceptable.
 God’s using deception is morally unacceptable.
 God’s requiring a violent death to assuage His own wrath is
morally unacceptable.
These interpretations have an Arian23 air about them. The
Satisfaction, the Ransom, the Penal-Substitutionary and the
Governmental theories, in addition to logically presupposing
Arianism, commit what I am going to call the ontological doctrine

morally perfect. As a consequence, one can use this result to differentiate
God from gods.
22
Of course, the question of in what does the normative moral standard
consist arises. Many disagreements occur over whether the normative
standard is a deontic results-oriented teleological standard or a deontic duty-
oriented deontological standard, or even a non-deontic aretaic character-
oriented standard. As ethicists have defined their theories many or most of
them create mutually exclusive states of affairs. That is to say that they
assert that the correct theory must be either results oriented or duty oriented.
Since neither paradigm seems adequate in itself, this provides non-
cognitivists with reasons to suppose that prescriptive theories are
unworkable. I think that one can specify that a genuine moral action is an
action 1) undertaken by someone with requisite moral virtues and 2) the
action is such that its results tend to promote generalized well-being and 3)
it is an action that one could will that all men could/should undertake while
treating rational beings as ends in themselves rather than as merely means to
an end. See my Advocating for the True, Right & Good: Secular Ethics and
the Christian Faith, [Amazon.com: Kindle Direct Publishing, 2020], argues
this thesis.
23
Arius maintained that although Jesus Christ may be the Son of God,
He is not God. Jesus and God are not identical. They are such that one has
at least one property that is logically incompatible with a property that the
other has. These two entities are not therefore identical. This is the 4 th
Century version of certain Gnostic heresies.
26
fallacy, i.e., any doctrine or set of doctrines whose logical structure
entails a conclusion that is logically incompatible with the
ontological doctrine. Things are different, however, if one takes an
Athanasian position.24 In this case, God would not use another person
for these purposes. God would be the sacrifice in virtue of His being
Jesus. Thus, the atonement is something God voluntarily undertakes.
He would be under no obligation to any other person or thing. No
appeasement is involved at all. For this reason alone it seems that an
Athanasian position on the incarnation is a conditio sine qua non for
an adequate theory of an atonement soteriology.25
Alienation as a Moral Problem
Now, let us consider the phenomenon of alienation. Alienation
allows for, but does not require, an attempt to accomplish
reconciliation, i.e., to re-establish a broken relationship. First,
alienation exists as a moral problem26 because moral agents can be in

24
The Athanasian argument to the Nicene Council (325 A. D.) was that
Jesus and God are identical. In adopting this position, the Council in its
Creed coined the term homoousia, i.e., of the same substance i.e., the same
essence. The properties God has as God and those God has as Jesus, which
appear to undercut this view, have little to do with the essence of God, but
are merely accidental properties God may choose to have from time to time
and may discard at will without damage to His essence as God. This term
allowed them to characterize what they meant, i.e., God’s existing as Jesus
for the duration of the incarnation.
25
If I am right about this then the problem of the Trinity must be
addressed, a project I have undertaken under the title The Gospel According
to Jesus of Nazareth: Book IV—A Philosophical Look at the Incarnation
[Amazon.Com: Kindle Direct Publishing, 2022]. It seems to me that every
form of defense for the doctrine of the Trinity entails subordinationism of
some form or other. If all forms of subordinationism are heresies, then
Trinitarianism is a heresy. This is not a Biblical consequence, but exists in
virtue of adopting the paradigm of the Presocratic metaphysics of substance.
The necessary remedy is the abandonment of the Greek substance paradigm
and the adoption of Biblical one. I reject Athanasius not in his view that
Jesus is God but on the basis that this result does not follow from the use of
the Greek metaphysics. His position is justified notwithstanding that Nicea
had not sufficiently established its justification.
26
There are, of course, other types of alienation, as for example
economic or political alienation, as discussed in Karl Marx and Frederick
Engels. Certainly, there are forms of psychological alienation as well.
27
moral harmony only when each adheres to a shared set of normative
moral values. As long as the parties sustain this moral harmony, no
soteriological problem occurs. There is no need for any
reconciliation since there is no breach of moral values. However,
once one or more of the parties of this moral fellowship deviates from
the normative moral standard alienation occurs. The problem now
presents itself for one or both of the parties. Either the alienation is
permitted to persist or one of the parties must adopt the moral values
of the other. If the original moral values are the normative moral
standard, then the one who deviated from that standard has become
immoral while the other party remains moral. Once alienation occurs,
the question arises, “What is necessary for reconciliation to occur?”
provided, of course, that reconciliation is a moral good. Since
reconciliation requires a moral fellowship based on shared moral
values, either the non-deviating party must abandon the original
moral standard thereby becoming a deviant or the deviating party
must re-adopt, i.e., return to, the original moral standard.27 These
alternatives present a problem for the non-deviating partner. If he
accepts a deviation of the normative moral standard, he becomes a
sinner like the first one, or perhaps accepts deviation from it without
consequence. In the case of God, it becomes a violation of the
ontological doctrine for Him to become a sinner by complying with
the modified standard or to accept deviations from it. So, the only
viable option open to God is to maintain His own holiness and require
the deviating partner to return to the original normative moral
standard. In more traditional theological terminology, the sinner

27
There is a third possibility for reconciliation, the compromise option.
Each of the parties may agree to a set of moral principles that deviates from
the original. In other words, the party that left the moral standard to follow
a lesser moral standard would agree with the party that did not leave it to
follow another lesser moral standard which includes some of the morality of
the original standard if the other party will abandon some of the principles
of the original standard and agree to adhere to the lesser compromised
standard. Of course, this differs only slightly from my point, viz., any
deviation from the moral standard sanctions a violation of that moral
standard and that such a deviation is precluded because it entails that P1:
God abandons moral universals (holiness) in order to agree to the
compromise. P2: Any deviation from moral universals violates the
ontological doctrine. C1: So, God will have violated the ontological doctrine.
C2: P1: is False.
28
must repent as a condition of reconciliation because God is faithful,
i.e., He will not alter His own moral integrity.28
The issue of God’s free-will arises here. I hold the view that God
is a free moral agent. I do so because if God was metaphysically
determined to be holy then He could not be regarded as morally
responsible (just as a robot programmed to act only in “holy” ways
could be neither praised nor blamed for its actions). Further, if God
were not morally responsible because He could not do otherwise, then
He could be regarded as neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy. His
“holiness” becomes morally neutralized. This consequence violates
the ontological doctrine and thus cannot be allowed as a viable
theological principle. Indeed, if God is metaphysically free then He
can be evil, but His always and only choosing to be holy makes Him
both free and holy. This latter consequence complies with the
ontological doctrine. In fact, it makes His holiness all the more
profound in that a being that is both omnipotent and metaphysically
free could engage in any or all evil without fear of any sanction or
reprisal. This makes God’s self-determined holiness superlatively
good.
God’s Problem, God’s Options
God’s problem consists in deciding on what to do with people
who have chosen to become moral rebels. Reconciliation is not the
only logically possible option God has for dealing with moral rebels.
Indeed, He seems to have only four logically possible and yet
mutually exclusive options.
1. SUMMARY CONDEMNATION—God could execute
summary condemnation for any and all deviations from the
normative moral standard.29

28
Consider, for example, “You shall be holy because I, the Lord your
God, am holy” [Leviticus 19:2] or Jesus’ comment in the Sermon on the
Mount, “Therefore be perfect as your Father in heaven is perfect.” [Matthew
5:48]
29
As far as I know there are no theologies that take this position for
pretty obvious reasons. People would have to believe that they had never
sinned or else accept being justifiably condemned whenever God chooses to
do so. There are very many people who would like for others with whom
they disagree to be summarily condemned, but this is an internally
29
 2. UNIVERSAL MERCY—God could forgive any and all
deviations from the normative moral standard.30
3. ARBITRARY ELECTION—God could, without using any
moral standard at all, condemn some and forgive others who
have violated the same normative moral code.31

inconsistent position. It reduces to what I will call Option #3—Arbitrary
Election.
30
This is the position taken in some religions of the world, perhaps most
notably Hinduism and perhaps Buddhism in virtue of their doctrines of
samsara and moksa. Some early church Fathers, in adopting a Platonic/Neo-
Platonic paradigm for Christian theology, concluded that all men would
ultimately be saved. See Frederick Copleston, SJ A History of Philosophy—
Volume II: Mediaeval Philosophy Augustine to Scotus (New York, NY:
Newman Press, 1966), pg. 33-34. Fr. Copleston argues that Origen [185-
254 AD] as well as St. Gregory of Nyssa taught a universalism. He says of
St. Gregory, “God created the world out of an abundance of goodness and
love, in order that there might be creatures who would participate in the
divine goodness; but though God is goodness and created the world out of
goodness, He did not create the world from necessity, but freely. A share in
this freedom God has given to man, and God respects this freedom,
permitting man to choose evil if he so wills. Evil is the result of man’s
choice. God is not responsible. It is true that God foresaw evil and that He
permits it, but in spite of this foreknowledge He created man, for He knew
also that He would in the end bring all men to Himself. Gregory thus
accepted the Origenist theory of the ‘restoration of all things’; every human
being, even Satan and the fallen angels, will at length turn to God, at least
through the purifying sufferings of the hereafter.” It is also a position taken
by Unitarian-universalists. The Universalist argument is basically to the
effect that since God loves everyone and will not condemn those He loves,
it follows that God never condemns anyone for anything, but forgives
everyone for everything.
31
This is the classical Calvinist-Reformed position, following
Augustinian theology and codified particularly in The Westminster
Confession. See also: Preserved Smith Erasmus: A Study of His Life and
Place in History (New York: Dover Publications, 1962 [Dover reprint of
1923 original]), Pg. 352-3. Smith says of Luther’s The Bondage of the Will,
“Considering that The Bondage of the Will was the chief fountain and source
of Calvin’s tremendous doctrine of predestination and election, it is not too
much to reckon it as one of the most important of sixteenth century works.”
[Pg. 354]. The argument is that since God is sovereign and Man is totally
depraved then Man is incapable of acting out of free-will, and so God elects
30
 4. VOLUNTARY REPENTANCE—God could stipulate some
compliance condition(s), namely the voluntary repentance of
those who deviate from the normative moral standard, to be
the necessary, if not a sufficient, condition of any
reconciliation.
Although God is metaphysically free, as I have argued above, He
cannot, or perhaps will not (about which I am not willing to quibble),
instantiate logically contradictory states of affairs.32 As a
consequence of the ontological doctrine it would be necessarily true
to hold that God creates a universe such that the Laws of non-
contradiction, excluded middle and identity of indiscernibles obtains,
and then chooses to conform Himself to them. Each of the above
logically possible options is logically incompatible with the others.
In other words, God is metaphysically precluded or precludes
Himself from exercising all or any combination of them. He may, in
fact, choose only one of them. We may characterize this as the basis
of God’s problem.
Now consider that only one of these logically possible options
complies with the ontological doctrine, namely Option #4. The first
three fail for different reasons. Summary condemnation fails because
it is bereft of any mercy, a trait that the ontological doctrine would
seem to require. To argue that God’s adopting summary
condemnation would meet the ontological condition is to adopt as
true the proposition that the trait of mercy is not a perfectible trait.
Anyone taking this position must present a sound, not merely a valid,
argument to that effect. Universal mercy fails because it is bereft of
any principle of justice since the failure to hold people responsible
for willful, voluntary moral deviance tacitly sanctions the violation

some equally depraved people for condemnation showing His justice and
the rest of the equally depraved for salvation showing His mercy. In
addition, Man is incapable of resisting God’s grace, presumably due to his
not having free-will, and, so, is incapable of losing his salvation through his
own actions.
32
Richard Swinburne makes this point in Is there a God? [New York,
NY: Oxford University Press, 1996 (Revised 2010)] and The Existence of
God [Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1979 (2nd Ed. 2004)]. He argues that
the dogma that God is omnipotent does not entail that God may instantiate
logically contradictory states of affairs. God cannot both create and not
create a universe. This seems to be entirely legitimate.
31
of normative moral principle. This neuters holiness altogether. This
would make God morally indifferent to actions that transgress the
normative moral standard, violating the ontological doctrine.
Arbitrary election fails because it holds that all sinners are equally
sinful, yet would have God treating the members of this class of
equally depraved people in soteriologically different ways. This
violates the normative moral principle of fairness that requires
treating persons of equal status in equal ways. This not only violates
the ontological doctrine, it also violates apostolic theology, or at least
Pauline theology. Paul consistently makes a point of advocating that
God is no respecter of persons. So, even if one were to object to the
philosophical-ethical point I have made, one would have to contend
with the fact that the Bible clearly states the same point. So, to deny
the philosophical point entails a denial of the Biblical point,
undercutting the reliability of Scripture itself. This is hardly a
tolerable consequence for those who subscribe to an inerrancy
doctrine.
Since the first three logically available options violate the
ontological doctrine in some way, any theology in general, and any
soteriology in particular, that entails or logically presupposes any one
of these three options is incompatible with the ontological doctrine
and must be theologically rejected, even if the theologies are
internally consistent, a possibility I would vociferously deny. This
leaves us with one and only one solution to God’s problem, namely,
voluntary repentance, the only remaining morally sufficient
soteriology.
Voluntary repentance differs from the others in that it alone
requires of the sinner a voluntary, i.e., non-coerced, return to the
normative moral standard that God has created within the fabric of
the universe and to which He voluntarily submits Himself. The moral
standard of holiness remains intact. God continues to comply with
holiness and continues to honor the requirements of man’s free-will
and moral responsibility. Yet, God leaves room for mercy in dealing
with repentant moral rebels, while justifiably condemning
unrepentant ones. Thus, no violation of the ontological doctrine
occurs.
Many theologies, particularly Reformed theologies, place the
responsibility for the requisite moral transformation of individual
people on God. God must take some action that alters the
fundamental character of a person from necessarily depraved sinner
32
to someone whom God has prepared for salvation. God, according
to these theologies, gives Faith to individuals such that they are
empowered to receive salvation.33 The rationale for beginning the
soteriological process at this point is that man is incapable, in virtue
of his depravity, of originating it.
But, must God initiate reconciliation by imposing alterations in
people themselves? Must God preserve His absolute sovereignty by
coercively making these changes in people? Does allowing people to
exercise free-will somehow compromise God’s dignity? Would a
voluntary repentance policy entail that man does something to merit
his salvation, thereby putting God under obligation and thus
cheapening His Grace? Reformed, as well as quasi-Armenian
evangelicals, tend to argue that it does.
To this position, I must take vociferous exception. It seems
abundantly clear that God may initiate a process to which people must
respond appropriately in order for God to legitimately offer salvation
and do so without violating the ontological doctrine. Voluntary
repentance places the repentance responsibility on individuals.
Before we consider the response of sinners, we must consider that
any response from Man is contingent on God’s initiating the
conditions of the response. About this Reformed theology is only
partly correct. God must initiate the soteriological plan, but He may
not, without violating the ontological doctrine, initiate a just
soteriology by coercion, i.e., by making changes in people to which
they have not agreed. God is under no legal obligation to offer
forgiveness to anyone (This is Grotius’ error). Stated another way,
people who violate the moral imperatives God has created have no
moral or legal standing to demand that God do anything
soteriologically. In the absence of God’s initiating a reconciliation
policy by choosing to forgive sins, no sinner has any hope for
reconciliation even should he desire it. It is in this sense that God’s

33
The passive voice is the necessary way to represent this idea. The
depraved sinner cannot be active in the process, and so must be acted upon.
The depraved sinner is passive to the reception of the requisite Faith
necessary for him to receive God’s irresistible grace. See Augustine: “…
the whole work belongs to God, who both makes the will of man righteous,
and thus prepares it for assistance, and assists it when it is prepared. … It
goes before the unwilling to make him willing; it follows the willing to make
his will effectual.” Augustine Enchiridion 32
33
sovereignty is preserved. God must initiate the entire process. Man
may only respond to the initiative. Further, Man’s response must
conform to the conditions God specifies in His reconciliation policy.
This means that the conditions for God’s communicating what His
reconciliation policy is must be in a form that all men can
comprehend. For the moment, I will not argue what this entails
except to say that this revelation will have to be rational, public,
linguistic and historical, conditions with which the Biblical record
seems to comply.
Since God is under no metaphysical obligation to initiate any
soteriological plan, it is completely appropriate to say that God’s
offering to forgive sins is a matter of His Grace. Nothing outside of
God’s self-determination is sufficient to compel God to do this or
anything else. Consequently, God, at His sole discretion, may or may
not offer Grace. Therefore, His choosing to do so would be “Good
News”, since apart from His doing so, no sinner initiated
soteriological plan suffices, although Man needs some soteriological
plan.
A bit of a proviso seems necessary here. If the ontological
doctrine is a necessary theological requirement, as I have argued that
it is, then God may be under an ontological obligation to offer sinners
some form of mercy. Otherwise, God would choose Option #1—
Summary Condemnation, as a solution to His “problem”. This, as
we have already seen, would violate the Anselmian-Cartesian
ontological requirement that God chooses to prehend all perfections.
The concept of a God that has mercy is “greater” than the concept of
God bereft of mercy. So, although God may not be metaphysically
obligated to offer a soteriological solution to man’s sin because He is
metaphysically free, He may choose to offer one as a consequence of
His self-determined ontological perfection. If the ontological
doctrine is viable, then any sinner could reasonably expect that God,
as a self-determinedly perfect being, would attempt some form of
mercy-based reconciliation. It seems that he could also infer that this
reconciliation would have to be, minimally, repentance based.
Revelation confirms this reasoning, even though one could not
deduce the particulars of such a plan. Indeed, Paul describes the plan
itself as a “mystery”.34

34
See: Colossians 1:24-29 especially 1:26. The sentence is long, and
1:26 is imbedded in its structure. I provide the Greek text here and highlight
34
 God’s problem now takes a turn. If voluntary repentance [Option
#4] remains the only option that conforms to the dictates of the
ontological doctrine, then God would have to devise a soteriological
plan that presents individuals with a component to which they may
non-coercively respond. First, God must specify the conditions
repentance requires. Next, God must address another question:
“What do I do to create an opportunity for sinners to respond to the
conditions that repentance requires?” He must do this without
compromising the sinner’s free-will.
Repentance: The Necessary Conditions
1. Non-compatibilistic Free-will
We must begin with the notion of moral responsibility. Moral
responsibility seems to logically presuppose free-will.35 Moral
responsibility seems to require that one can only be held morally
responsible for actions that meet the condition such that one could
have done otherwise had s/he chosen, and that s/he can have chosen
otherwise. It makes sense to praise someone for doing what one
ought to do if and only if there is a genuinely possible alternative
course of action that meets the condition such that one ought not to
do it. It also makes sense to praise anyone for not doing what s/he
ought not to do if and only if there is a genuinely possible alternative
course of action that meets the condition such that s/he can choose to
do what s/he ought to do. In the same way, anyone can be blamed for
undertaking actions that are the contrary of these conditions. If
anyone is to be held morally responsible, i.e., is to be subjected to

the clause in which Paul mentions the mystery: 24 Nu/n cai,rw evn toi/j
paqh,masin u`pe.r u`mw/n kai. avntanaplhrw/ ta. u`sterh,mata tw/n qli,yewn tou/
Cristou/ evn th/| sarki, mou u`pe.r tou/ sw,matoj auvtou/( o[ evstin h` evkklhsi,a( 25
h-j evgeno,mhn evgw. dia,konoj kata. th.n oivkonomi,an tou/ qeou/ th.n doqei/sa,n moi
eivj u`ma/j plhrw/sai to.n lo,gon tou/ qeou/( 26 to. musth,rion to. avpokekrumme,non
avpo. tw/n aivw,nwn kai. avpo. tw/n genew/n & nu/n de. evfanerw,qh toi/j a`gi,oij
auvtou/( 27 oi-j hvqe,lhsen o` qeo.j gnwri,sai ti, to. plou/toj th/j do,xhj tou/
musthri,ou tou,tou evn toi/j e;qnesin( o[ evstin Cristo.j evn u`mi/n( h` evlpi.j th/j
do,xhj\ 28 o]n h`mei/j katagge,llomen nouqetou/ntej pa,nta a;nqrwpon kai.
dida,skontej pa,nta a;nqrwpon evn pa,sh| sofi,a|( i[na parasth,swmen pa,nta
a;nqrwpon te,leion evn Cristw/|\ 29 eivj o] kai. kopiw/ avgwnizo,menoj kata. th.n
evne,rgeian auvtou/ th.n evnergoume,nhn evn evmoi. evn duna,meiÅ
35
See: Richard Swinburne Mind, Brain and Free-will [Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press, 2012]
35
either praise or blame, reward or punishment, then there must, of
necessity, be a minimum of two logically possible options available,
one of which is morally obligatory and the other of which morally
prohibited. Of course, there may be classes of actions such that any
member of that class is morally prohibited, and so anyone who
engages in an action that is a member of that class would be
blameworthy only to the extent that s/he could possibly have engaged
in an action that was a member of the morally obligatory class.
The same can be said for character traits as is said of actions. If
one is morally responsible for acquiring virtues such as love,
compassion, self-control, generosity, etc. then one is morally
blamable for having acquired vice traits like hatred, bigotry,
intemperance, greed, lust, etc. Choosing to acquire virtues and
working to acquire them is morally praiseworthy. Repudiating vices
and working to resist and/or replace them is morally praiseworthy. If
one is morally responsible for eschewing the acquisition of vices,
then one is blamable for having acquired them, and morally praised
for having repudiated them. In short, one can only be praised or
blamed for having voluntarily complied with possible moral
demands. One is morally blamed for choosing against possible moral
demands.
Notwithstanding these points, determinists of every ilk argue that
since all events in the universe are caused, then any choice is merely
apparent,36 i.e., choices that really reduce to some form of caused
event. Accordingly, it does not matter whether the nature of the cause
is theological or natural. If so-called choices are really caused events,
then they are events over which one has no volitional control, any

36
Karl R Popper, The Open Universe: An Argument for Indeterminism
(New York: Routledge, 1956, 1982 [1995]), Section 24, pg. 81-85, notes
that an argument from J. B. S. Haldane exposes this reasoning as an
absurdity. There can be no “apparent” freedom, for if all events are caused
and, so, as events, mental events are also caused, then it is impossible for
there to be any false mental event. But this result is abjectly false. False
beliefs, i.e. false mental events, are abundant as our Reformed opponents
will no doubt acknowledge. So, if there are false mental events then they
cannot be caused, unless, of course, God causes them. For God to cause
false beliefs violates our ontological doctrine. Interestingly, Popper also
notes that Haldane’s argument is a stronger version of one found in
Augustine (De libero arbitrio, Bk I, Chapters 11, 12 as well as Book II
chapters 2, 3 and 19). This consequence is quite odd.
36
belief to the contrary notwithstanding. This entails the consequence
that since such events are not volitional, no one whose actions are
involuntary can be held morally responsible for their effects on
character or consequence.
Critics of causal determinism have pointed out that the dogma of
metaphysical determinism, including scientific reductionism or
physicalism, is incompatible with the notion of moral responsibility,
and so the dogma is, as a result, inherently flawed. To respond to this
criticism, the philosophical debate over free-will vis-à-vis
metaphysical determinism has produced a cadre of philosophers who
argue the transparently inconsistent idea that one’s actions may be
both determined and such that “one could have done otherwise had
he chosen.” It is telling that the criticism of metaphysical
determinism, i.e., that it destroys any notion of moral responsibility,
has challenged some determinists to attempt a reconciliation of the
apparent truth37 of metaphysical determinism with the free-will-
incompatibilist criticism such that adhering to metaphysical
determinism does not entail a denial of a notion of moral
responsibility. Those who argue that the notion of moral
responsibility is, indeed, compatible with the notion of metaphysical
determinism have come to be described as soft determinists or
compatibilists. Einstein seems to have been a compatibilist for he is
vociferously determinist believing that conceding to quantum theory
entailed a philosophically unacceptable notion of uncertainty while at
the same time he was a vocal advocate for creating and organizing
institutions that would obviate the possibility of war. He vociferously
advocated for conscientious objection. Those who accept that
metaphysical determinism entails that no free-will exists and that
there is indeed no viable notion of moral responsibility are described
as deterministic-incompatibilists, or hard-determinists. Hard-
determinists, like B. F. Skinner, for example, respond to the free-will-

37
I emphasize this term due to the quite persuasive arguments in
Popper’s The Open Universe. Developments in Quantum Theory seem to
also mitigate against Classical determinism, scientism, physicalism and
reductionism. One cannot neglect the study of another of Popper’s insightful
arguments for the impossibility of a physicalistic reductionism, namely The
Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism written in collaboration
with John Eccles [New York: Routledge, 1977 (Reprinted 1998)].
37
incompatibilist criticism of determinism by accepting as true the view
that there is neither free-will nor moral responsibility.38
There are theological versions of philosophical compatibilism. In
fact, both Catholic and Reformed theologians commit what I will call
the Compatibilist Fallacy—The doctrine that all events in the
universe are caused and that some events are such that one could have
done otherwise had he chosen. Catholics,39 particularly Augustine,40

38
See B. F. Skinner’s Beyond Freedom and Dignity. One could also
make the case that Karl Marx’s view of the class warfare as caused by the
struggle between competing blind adherences of individuals who see their
interest as identical to the interest of the classes of which they are members
is a case of hard determinism. This is due to the fact, as Marx sees it, that
historical periods are nothing but the necessary effects of the development
of the economic factors of production, and these factors in turn are merely
material forces forming an irresistible historical dynamic. There can be,
under these conditions, no legitimate notion of individual moral
responsibility, although Marx and Marxists often discuss these matters in
moral tones. Marx’s early writing, as in The Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts of 1844 and Engel’s Condition of the Working Class in
England, reveals the moral outrage of the younger Marx at the exploitation
and alienation resulting from the laissez faire capitalism during the onset of
the Industrial Revolution in England. If this historical process is
dialectically inevitable, then Marx and Engels’ comment in the Communist
Manifesto exhorting workers of the world to unite against these injustices
seems philosophically quite dissonant. Neither is their adaptation of Marx’s
11th thesis on Feuerbach exhorting philosophers to no longer merely
interpret the world differently but to change it, anything but mere rhetoric.
Charles Dickens, an important contemporary of Marx and Engels, sees
matters quite differently. Scrooge, in A Christmas Carol repents of his
greed, and undertakes a programme of remedying the excesses of greed
through love and generosity.
39
See: Catechism of the Catholic Church III. Original Sin, pg 407: “By
our first parents’ sin, the devil has acquired a certain dominion over man,
even though man remains free.” [Emphasis added.] See also: pg 404/419:
“We therefore hold, with the Council of Trent, that original sin is
transmitted with human nature [emphasis added], ‘by propagation, not by
imitation’ and that it is … ‘proper to each’” (Paul VI, Credo of the People
of God sec 16).
40
Ibid., 406: “The Church’s teaching on the transmission of original sin
was articulated more precisely in the fifth century, especially under the
impulse of St. Augustine’s reflections against Pelagianism, and in the
sixteenth century, in opposition to the Protestant Reformation. Pelagius held
38
argue from the doctrine of original sin. Augustine has said that man
is not able not to sin — “non posse non peccare.”41 It is with this
view that Pelagius so strongly, and, in my opinion, rightly, objects.
In addition, Aquinas has argued that original sin was “in the seed.”
In a passage wherein he feels compelled to address the question of
how Jesus can be born free of original sin, Aquinas answers that
original sin is transmitted through the male semen and, so, since no
male was involved in Jesus’ birth, He escaped the contamination of
original sin.42
Some Reformers, like Luther, seem to avoid being classified as
compatibilists because they explicitly deny any notion of free-will.
Luther says, “‘Free-will’ is a downright lie; …” (Bondage of the Will
— Chapter 1). Calvin, as well as more recent theologians like
Gerstner and Murray, argue from a doctrine of total depravity.43 It is
their view that Man is so corrupted by God’s cursing Adam that
individual people as members of the class of Adam’s progeny cannot,
but for the intervention of God, not sin.44 Reformers see the denial

that man could, by the natural power of free-will and without the necessary
help of God’s grace, lead a morally good life; thus he reduced the influence
of Adam’s fault to bad example. The first Protestant reformers, on the
contrary, taught that original sin has radically perverted man and destroyed
his freedom: they identified the sin inherited by each man with the tendency
to evil (concupenscentia), which would be insurmountable. The Church
pronounced on the meaning of the data of Revelation on original sin
especially at the second Council of Orange (529) and at the Council of Trent
(1546).” See also Augustine: “For it was by the evil use of his free-will that
man destroyed both it and himself. … [S]o, when man by his own free-will
sinned, then sin being victorious over him, the freedom of his will was lost.”
[Emphasis added] Enchiridion 30.
41
See: Augustine A Treatise on Nature and Grace Chapter 56. Nicene
& Post-Nicene Fathers 1.5—Anti-Pelagian Writings.
42
Thomas Aquinas: “Original sin is transmitted to the children not by
the mother, but by the father.” Summa Thelogica [Part I of Second Part Q.
81 Article 5]
43
See John Calvin Institutes of the Christian Religion, especially Book
2, Chapter 2 “Man Now Deprived of Free-will, And Miserably Enslaved”.
44
The double negation here is intentional. See Calvin’s Institutes Book
2, Chapter 2, Section 6: “Free-will does not enable man to perform good
works, unless he is assisted by grace; indeed, the special grace which the
elect alone receive through regeneration.” [Emphasis added]
39
of free-will, either as hard deterministic incompatibilists or as soft
deterministic compatibilists, as necessary to a consistent theology,
notwithstanding their denials, as in Gerstner, that they deny free-will.
Calvin is singularly undaunted in advocating that the free-will
was lost in virtue of Adam’s fall. He asserts that the alteration is
“hereditary.”45 Since the nature of man was altered as a result of
God’s cursing Adam, and that all of Adam’s progeny are genetically
connected to Adam by this heredity, it follows that even infants are
depraved. Even elect infants are depraved in their nature, yet seem
to have been lucky enough to have won God’s salvation lottery.46
Although they have not yet sinned in practice, it is inevitable that they
will sin since the sin is in their nature. One sins because one is a
sinner, rather than becoming a sinner in virtue of sinning.
Presumably, Calvin believes that infants become sinners much as
they become blue- or brown-eyed.
If there is any freedom in man, it cannot be true that free choices
can be anything other than among evil options. It is not that no
morally good options are available in themselves. Man cannot but
sin because man cannot see what any of the moral options may be,
much as a blind man can see no color even though color does exist.
It would seem, however, that no blind man ought to be punished for
not being able to comprehend the universe visually. Calvin takes to
task theologians who accommodate their theological views on free-
will to the “doctrines of philosophers” by asserting that they “want
too much to seem in accord with them”. Calvin says that he sees no
one among theologians who is correct about this matter save for
Augustine.
Calvin further argues that Reason itself is corrupted by Adam’s
sin. This is peculiar inasmuch as Calvin formulates many arguments
he presumes are reliable notwithstanding that Reason is, according to

45
Calvin follows Augustine and his Neo-Platonic views here. See
Augustine Enchiridion Chapters 27-28. Augustine says, “[Angels] were not
all, like men, involved by one original sin in the bonds of an inherited guilt,
and so made subject to the penalty which one had incurred.” [28]
46
The Westminster Confesson makes room for a division between elect
infants and those who are not, along with others who are “other elect persons
who are incapable of being outwardly called by the ministry of the Word.”
Chapter 10, Art III. This is a very peculiar idea! It has a decidedly ad hoc
character.
40
him, untrustworthy. He presumes one of two things, and perhaps
both, to be true. He presumes either that his arguments although
tainted by the Fall’s curse are not sufficiently tainted by corrupt
Reason to fail to be compelling enough to correct the error of others,
and/or that, given that his arguments are both valid and sound, that
those to whom he makes his arguments have sufficiently untainted
reason that they can see that he is right. Either of these
presuppositions vitiates Calvin’s view that Reason itself is corrupted
in virtue of the Fall.
Finally, Calvin argues that the nature of all of Adam’s progeny is
corrupted by Adam’s free-will action, and that they are all morally
culpable in virtue of that nature even though, as in the case of infants,
some have never actually sinned. From this supposed fact Calvin
draws the conclusion that God is justified in condemning the sin of
each because each has a nature he could not possibly have chosen. It
is this presumption that is entirely gratuitous. If a crack mom makes
her baby a crack addict, is the baby morally responsible for its
addiction? The reasonable answer is that it is not, although it does
need treatment. It needs treatment not condemnation. The crack
mom, however, surely is vulnerable to justified condemnation.
Reformed theology reduces to three basic arguments designed to
show how any acknowledgement of free-will mitigates against any
viable theology.
 The Power Argument—If there is such a thing as free-will
among men, then there is a power in man such that it is
sufficient to conquer sin. But, the only power sufficient to
conquer sin is the power of God’s grace. Therefore, there is
no free-will, and, for anyone to claim that there is, nullifies
the grace of God, for then there would be two powers in
virtue of which man could conquer his sin, man’s free-will,
on the one hand, and God’s grace on the other. This, Luther
says, violates the clear teaching of Scripture.47
 The Impotence Argument—The more decadent man is, the
greater God is. If there were such a thing as free-will in man,
then man would not be as decadent or impotent as if there
were no free-will, and so, if man had free-will, God’s glory

47
See: Martin Luther The Bondage of the Will.
41
 would be diminished as well as the power of His grace.
Therefore, no free-will exists.
 The Merit Argument—If anyone is to be saved, it can only
be due to either man’s doing some work to merit this
salvation, putting God under obligation, or else he does not,
or as Luther48 says, cannot do any work to merit it. If man
cannot merit salvation, then it is God’s grace alone that is the
means of his salvation. Man can do nothing to merit
salvation. Therefore, God’s grace alone, apart from human
free-will, is the only means of man’s salvation.
If any of these arguments is sound, then Augustine is correct.
Human beings as members of the class of mankind cannot not sin—
non posse non peccare. If this is a part of the nature of fallen
humanity, then it makes no sense to say that individuals are sinners
in any morally meaningful sense. Furthermore, if God condemns
anyone who is a “sinner by nature” and therefore through no fault of
his own, then God is unjust. The Bible clearly has a doctrine of
condemnation for sinners, so if the Bible says that men are sinners in
virtue of the genetic alteration due to God’s cursing Adam for his sin
and that God does condemn such sinners, then God is unjust.
However, this conclusion violates the ontological doctrine, and so the
argument must be rejected as defective in validity if not in soundness.
The only way to “fix” this unacceptable circumstance is to hold either
1) that the Bible is fallible because its dogmas violate the ontological
doctrine or 2) that the depravity dogma is a misinterpretation of the
Biblical statements. The first alternative undercuts the Scriptural
infallibility doctrine, sola Scriptura, a consequence that Reformed
theologians would surely find anathema. The second undercuts the
depravity dogma, a consequence that Reformed theologians would
hardly eschew. Reformers seem to be trapped in a logical antinomy.
Perhaps this is the reason many of them reject Reason altogether.49

48
Also, Augustine Enchiridion 31.
49
I am thinking here primarily of Herman Dooyeweerd’s New Critique
of Theoretical Thought [1936, translated 1953]. Dooyeweerd was professor
of the Philosophy of Law at the Free University of Amsterdam and was
devoted to making Christianity central to any philosophical enterprise. He
argues that one cannot arrive at truth in the philosophical sense apart from
accepting an Archimedean Point, and that this point is based on God’s
Revelation, i.e., from a point external to the system, itself. This reminds me
42
 It seems that the least damaging “fix” is to preserve the integrity
of the Bible and to examine the passages that seem to substantiate the
depravity dogma in a way that preserves both the ontological doctrine
and the integrity of the Bible itself. A necessary condition for a viable
soteriology is that it must preserve a notion of free-will and moral
responsibility such that an individual can be held morally responsible
for his sins if and only if s/he could have done otherwise had s/he
chosen and that s/he could have chosen otherwise. Further, no just
God would condemn anyone in whom this condition is not met. No
one can be either praised or blamed for any action over which s/he
has no volitional control.
Reformers want to protect God’s sovereignty, dignity, or
integrity by eliminating free-will from the universe of discourse. The
title as well as the argument of Luther’s book, The Bondage of the

of a similar point Kierkegaard makes in his On Revelation and Authority:
The Book on Adler, or a Cycle of Ethico-Religious Essays [New York, NY:
Harper Torchbooks 1966 (Reprint of 1955)]. Further, Dooyeweerd’s
argument strikes me as similar to the argument of Kurt Gödel on the
undecidability of theorems in logical systems like Principia Mathematica,
although Gödel had no particularly religious application or motivation.
Incidentally, Gödel did construct a valid form for the ontological argument.
Immanence Reason is insufficient for Dooyeweerd. When I originally tried
reading him in the late sixties, this seemed quite insightful. I now wonder
whether God would have left Himself bereft of witness except for those who
have a Bible and the God-given Faith to read it, especially in the light of
Paul’s argument in Romans 1 and 2. The Apostle John also comments that
the purpose of his Gospel is that “These things are written that you might
believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing you may
have life in His name” [John 20:30]. According to John, the requisite faith
appears to result from rational reflection on Jesus’ ministry rather than as a
cause of conversion, as an “enabling grace.” According to Paul, one can see
the nature of God in virtue of rational reflection on the nature of the universe
itself as well as the moral order within the universe. In one sense, however,
Dooyeweerd is correct in that it makes sense to say that we could not deduce
the particulars of God’s soteriological plan based solely on an immanence
perspective, although rational reflection on the ontological doctrine would
seem to lead a priori to the conclusion that God would offer some
redemptive scheme predicated on the reality conditions that entail moral
responsibility.
43
Will, reflects this proclivity. Notwithstanding the views of Zwingli,50
Luther or Calvin as well as the secondary scholars who perpetuate
these fallacies, free-will is a necessary condition for a viable notion
of both praise and blame and, so, for moral responsibility. It seems
that few theologians and even fewer pastors understand that the
propagation of the traditional views denying that both God and Men
have free-will emasculates any meaningful soteriology. It is
meaningless to advocate that God has no free-will (He cannot but be
holy) and also to advocate that He is praiseworthy in virtue of such
holiness. It is equally meaningless to advocate that Man has no free-
will (s/he cannot but sin) and also to advocate that s/he is
blameworthy for his/her sin/depravity. The notions of praise and
blame require that some morally meaningful notion of free-will be
true.
2. Precipitate Moral Self-assessment
It will be necessary for each morally accountable agent to accept
responsibility for his/her own sins. Accepting responsibility means
each free and therefore morally accountable agent must acknowledge
that his/her actions do, in fact, violate the normative moral standard
and that s/he could have acted otherwise than the action s/he had
chosen and, further, that one can have chosen to do otherwise.
When one accepts the fact of morally accountable free-will and
that, in virtue of that free-will, one is morally responsible for the
consequences of such actions in both the deontic and the aretaic
dimensions, then one must go further by accepting responsibility
for both the consequences of the actions on the world at large, as
well as its effects on the development of one’s own character and
the effects on the character development of others. 51

50
Zwingli even argues that God, as the cause of all things, is therefore
the cause of all evil. “God is the only real cause in the universe”. Arthur
Cushman McGiffert A History of Christian Thought Volume II: The West
from Tertullian to Erasmus (New York, NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons,
1933[1961]), pg. 94.
51
Philosophers use Deontic to refer to theories that investigate the role
of ethics in identifying right and wrong actions or behaviors. Philosophers
use Aretaic to refer to theories about the development of the character of the
moral agent. It addresses the kind of person a moral agent is or should
become, i.e., whether he has become or is likely to become virtuous or
vicious.
44
A viable soteriology must include a means by which individual
sinners can become existentially convicted, i.e., motivated to
undertake moral self-assessment.
So, what are these moral imperatives? Jesus says that the
fulfillment of the Law and the prophets consists in loving God with
one’s entire heart, soul, mind and strength and the extension of that
principle such that it is a moral imperative to love one’s neighbor as
oneself whether or not one’s neighbor is one’s enemy. I conjecture
that this moral imperative is synonymous with God’s directive to
Israel to be holy because the Lord God is holy [Leviticus 19:2]. Jesus
states it in the Sermon on the Mount by saying “Be perfect even as
your Father in heaven is perfect” [Matthew 5:48].
I shall hasten to add that I am not proffering these imperatives as
true because the Bible says so. I do not want to relegate moral
principle to any particular religious Scripture for I do not want to
allow a claim of another religion’s Scripture which may advocate a
logically incompatible moral principle, like “kill your enemies”, to
put such a principle forward as viable moral alternative and equally
valid “religious” point of view. Such a competing principle — “kill
your enemies” — is immoral independently of the fact that some
religion or other advocates for its truth. So, my contention is not that
these principles are true because the Bible says so, but that the Bible
says so because they are true and if the Bible contains and advocates
moral truth, one should not be surprised that it maintains them as true.
I shall have to establish moral imperative predicated on some
fundamental properties of the created universe. These moral
properties will have to be epistemologically available to morally
accountable agents. Indeed, they will have to be necessarily available
a priori.
The Phenomenon of Pain and Suffering
I doubt that a morally relevant universe could exist apart from the
possibility of pain, suffering and misery. Of course, there are
conceivable universes that could function apart from pain, suffering
and misery. Such universes would not contain moral responsibility.
In the present universe, human beings and other sentient creatures are
constituted such that their physical and psychological configuration
allows for experiencing pain, suffering and misery.
In very many cases, the occurrence of pain constitutes a warning
of imminent potential harm. For example, the natural phenomenon

45
of a sentient creature’s sensitivity to excessive heat warns that it is
entering a zone that is potentially dangerous to its well-being. The
potential victim of the threatening circumstance becomes motivated
to undertake actions or develop strategies to mitigate the conditions
which threaten its well-being. There is a certain range of freedom
even here.
In general, for someone to cause another to experience gratuitous
pain or to neglect or refuse to intervene or interfere with conditions
that could cause pain, etc. is to sin. That is to say that when there is
no natural cause behind the experience of pain, but that the action of
some free being causes another to suffer in some or any respect sin
occurs. Some level of misery occurs in virtue of the actions of free
moral agents who have the capacity to choose any other action which
does not gratuitously cause pain, suffering and misery in others
capable of experiencing pain, etc. In short, sin causes dysfunction
which impacts the well-being of others.
Some pain and suffering occurs independently of immoral
causes. There are natural disasters. Those that occur do so in virtue
of natural law such that humans can suffer. I do not conjecture that
such occurrences as disease and injury due to disaster are necessarily
due to immoral actions of moral agents. I do maintain that such
natural occurrences call upon morally responsible agents to address
the suffering that occurs in virtue of them. Morally irresponsible
agents are indifferent to the plight of people who are experiencing
pain and suffering. As we shall soon see, to be indifferent to the
plight of people in misery would very likely qualify as a genuinely
immoral action, or perhaps, inaction. Recall Jesus’ parable of the
Good Samaritan. For example, conducting medical research and
providing medical attention such that pain can be alleviated, that
injuries and diseases can be healed would be a moral imperative. It
is, however, that there is also a moral imperative to preventatively
address natural disasters. If we can identify the natural basis for some
disease and can formulate therapies, medicines and protocols to
interfere with its occurrence or its progress or even to eradicate it,
then we are morally obliged to address the physical dimension of this
suffering. Warning systems should be developed for alerting people
of possible or imminent natural disasters. In taking such precautions
and following such imperatives, we once again encounter what
appears to be free-will.

46
 This is not all. There is a psychological dimension to pain and
suffering that calls upon others to empathize and/or sympathize with
those who suffer. This is an alleviation imperative. It is a moral
imperative to develop ways of addressing grief, depression, anxiety
etc. There is a moral imperative to create and organize institutions to
mitigate the effects of these natural disasters on the psychological
dimension to minimize or even eliminate the suffering this causes.
Free-will once again appears.
Some measures are preventative while others are restorative
imperatives. Since humans have the capacity for conceptual
transcendence, as does God, although not to the same degree, they
can anticipate what effects their actions are likely to have. If so,
moral responsibility exists both in individuals and in their
associations with, or against, each other. For example, planning
commissions ought to strive to institute policies that warn people of
natural threats and require building and settlement codes that could
potentially mitigate or withstand the damage natural disasters might
cause. Insurance companies and benevolence organizations come to
mind as institutions complying with the restorative moral
imperatives. Free-will again. Only humans have these capacities.
Only humans can formulate theories, test them, implement them and
modify them. Theory formation and falsification are uniquely human
attributes and presuppose the capacity for free-will responsibility.
This it seems, man cannot not do.
Agape Conditions for Genuine Moral Actions
It seems to me that agape/holiness consists in compliance with
three mutually sufficient conditions: 1) a Teleological or Effects
Condition, 2) a Deontological or a Duty Condition and 3) an Aretaic
or a Character Condition. Actions that comply with all three of these
conditions may be characterized as Genuinely Moral Actions—
GMA. Actions that comply with any two of these conditions while
failing to comply with whatever one remains may be regarded as
Nearly Moral Actions—NMA. Actions that comply with only one of
the conditions while failing to comply with any of the other two are
regarded as Barely-Moral Actions—BMA. Finally, actions that fail
to comply with all three conditions are regarded as Genuinely
Immoral Actions—GIA. The following are the moral maxims that
attend each of the three conditions. The protocol I will now describe
can be used to decide on which of a set of possible actions a person
might choose to undertake. In self-assessment, a person can review
47
the process s/he had used in deciding what s/he had done. In
deliberation, s/he can anticipate the actions that would most closely
comply with GMA expectations. S/he can assess the disposition of
his/her character and freely choose whether to continue with and
intensify his/her character dispositions or to eschew and alter them.
I cannot comprehend the status of the persistent debates in
Christian soteriology over free-will and moral responsibility. It is
abundantly clear that if there is, ontologically speaking, no possible
alteration of actions or of the constitution of one’s character, then it
necessarily follows that sin becomes morally meaningless. There is
no right or wrong. There is no Good or Evil. It further entails that
the notion of repentance is semantically vacuous. It further entails
that since, if sin is ontologically obviated, then the notion that
someone might undertake to die in order to save people from their
sins is abjectly inane. Jesus cannot die for anybody’s sin because
there is no sin.
The analysis for which I have just argued entails that the universe
is not closed and fixed and neither is the so-called nature of man
fixed. The universe is sufficiently open to allow for multiple actions
given some set of initial conditions and humans are uniquely capable
of choosing between the alternatives it provides such that they may
be held personally responsible for 1) the quality of their deliberations,
2) the effects of those decisions on the universe at large and 3) on the
character dispositions of themselves and others. Moral change is not
only possible but is morally required if the Holy God is to retain His
holiness integrity while initiating the conditions such that He may
extend mercy under conditions that He alone specifies.
The Teleological Condition and its Maxims

The teleological condition specifies that moral responsibility
exists in virtue of the fact that that actions have consequences. Some
normativist thinkers have proffered that the only condition that is both
necessary and sufficient for any action to be good is that it must
increase the greater balance of pleasure over pain in the universe.
This is, of course, entirely too simplistic a standard. First of all, it is
impossible to make an epistemologically reliable judgment on the
morality of any particular action since the required knowledge of the
range of its effects on the total well-being in the universe is decidedly
unattainable. One would have to know what the beneficial balance
of pleasure vis-à-vis pain for any particular action as well as the what
48
the balance for every other possible action in the universe such that
every possible pair of actions could be ranked. If there is free-will,
then one would have to know how every possible free-will agent
would react to the consequences that come to exist in virtue of the
action itself. This seems to be too much to expect. A weaker standard
is called for. Secondly, since one could only know whether some
action was good or not in virtue of some result that occurred in virtue
of the pleasure/pain standard, no one could use the standard as a
means of deliberating on what to do. It leaves only with an evaluative
standard. One could determine only whether or not one ought to have
done what he did. Finally, the ontological effects of such actions are
inherently irreversible in virtue of the fact that time is unidirectional.
If someone decides that some action, if taken, would meet this
utilitarian standard, and it turns out that the judgment is deficient in
any respect at all, an “oops” response cannot remedy the deleterious
effects that will have occurred in virtue of the erroneous judgment.
These facts are sufficient to conclude that a results standard is
impossible and is, therefore, irrelevant by itself.
Of course, these deficiencies can be modified somewhat by
restricting the range of consequences the judgment must cover and to
accept that the judgment is not a deductive inference but an inductive
one. A sufficient amount of human experience has been accumulated
to correlate certain actions or action types as well as character traits
for that matter with sufficiently similar consequences. The mistakes
people have made become the data for deciding that similar actions
will have sufficiently similar effects and so would be similarly
mistaken. Therefore, restricting or refraining from taking such
actions would reduce dysfunction. So, one could determine with a
relatively high degree of reliability that some action will, more likely
than not, have similar effects. This is the basis for deferring to the
wisdom of the past. It is even more so since our current state of data
accumulation and statistical analysis seem to have the capacity for
giving a relatively high degree of positive correlation between
decision-actions and their effects such that critical masses can be
anticipated. Laws are decided on this basis, so it seems moral
judgments as the basis of legal judgments is entirely legitimate. If
past effects have been predominately deleterious, then future effects
are more likely than not to also have deleterious effects. If there are
sufficient negative correlations, i.e., that there is a high positive
correlation of certain actions with an increase in human misery, then

49
such actions or action types ought to be proscribed both morally and
legally. The contrary is also true. Actions and traits that tend to
produce peace and harmony can be identified and promoted. Human
misery would diminish and humans would tend to flourish.
The consequences of actions will either tend to promote human
flourishing or else they will tend to promote various degrees of
dysfunction and misery. Therefore, there are two maxims in terms of
which actions would either comply or fail to comply with the
teleological condition. The first teleological maxim prescribes that it
is a moral good for humans to flourish. Therefore, one is morally
compelled to engage in actions such that the consequence of such
actions would tend to promote or contribute to human flourishing.
The Human Flourishing Maxim—Maximizing the “flourish
factor” is a moral good. So, act in a way such that the maxim of
your action is that more human beings may flourish than will
experience misery. [This includes the moral obligation to
discover by learning and/or research what factors tend to
promote human well-being and to deliberately choose to
proactively engage in them.]
The second teleological maxim proscribes any action which
precipitates, promotes or tends to promote human misery. Therefore,
one is morally compelled to engage in actions such that there is or is
likely to be little or no misery consequence and/or an abatement of
human misery—the misery abatement maxim.
The Misery Abatement Maxim— Minimizing the “misery
factor” is a moral good. So, act in a way such that the maxim
of your action is that the fewest possible number of human
beings will experience misery. [DO NO HARM: This includes
the moral obligation to discover by learning and/or research
what factors tend to diminish human well-being and then to
deliberately choose to eschew such actions.]
The Deontological Condition and its Maxims

The second condition is the deontological or duty condition. It
requires of moral agents to regard other human beings according to
duty, independently of any motivation or effect. It is predicated on
the fact that humans occupy a special place in what Arthur Lovejoy

50
called The Great Chain of Being.52 The special place humans occupy
is further elucidated by Mortimer Adler in his The Difference of Man
and the Difference It Makes.53 Immanuel Kant, who is the foremost
advocate for this view of ethics, called humans “rational beings.” The
Bible depicts humans as created in God’s image. Whether or not any
particular human may have become good or evil, his/her status
deserves special consideration.
Mankind is not an animal differing from others in degree.
Mankind is different in kind notwithstanding any other similarities it
has with other species. Indeed, Jesus associates with both sinners and
those whose self-righteousness sees no need for a physician. He
hopes for repentance in both. He defends the “sinners” against the
demeaning of the “hypocritically self-righteous.” They not only
demean the class of “sinners” but they demean Him for thinking that
such “sinners” deserved to be redeemed. Kierkegaard’s observation
is germane. Some sinners know that they are, and some are unaware
of it. Those that know they are, are infinitesimally closer to
forgiveness than those who fail to realize that they are. How does
avga,ph treat human beings as rational beings, as in God’s image,
notwithstanding that they very often sin and often quite egregiously?
It is one’s duty in virtue of the fact that someone is human that
certain actions are obligatory. There are three maxims in virtue of
which one would comply with this condition:
The Dignity Maxim: To treat human beings with dignity and
respect is a moral good. So, every human being has a moral
duty to treat other human beings with dignity and respect, i.e.,
no human being may use any other human being as a thing or
means to some exploitative end such that such actions threaten
or impinge upon that human being’s total well-being.
There are two features of humanity that together configure what
it means to treat and be treated with dignity and respect. The first is
that humans qua human are free moral agents. This dimension we

52
Arthur O. Lovejoy The Great Chain of Being: A Study in the History
of an Idea [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973 (Reprint of
1934)]. Theses were The William James Lectures delivered at Harvard in
1933.
53
Mortimer J. Adler The Difference of Man and the Difference It Makes
[New York, NY: World Publishing, 1967]
51
have already explored. As an extension of this dimension, humans
have the capacity to repent of sin. Treating people with dignity and
respect means that one must be devoted to efforts to maximize the
holiness and minimize the evil in oneself and others. Since sin seems
to be the choice that many make much of the time, to treat someone
as a sinner means to endeavor to persuade him to become
dispositional averse to sinful choices and character traits while being
dispositionally prone to holiness choices and traits. Conversely, to
treat someone with dignity and respect entails that sinners are capable
of holiness and worth the effort to help them to choose holiness and
eschew sinfulness.
Immanuel Kant reduced ethics to what he called the Good Will.
He said in the opening statement of his Fundamental Principles of
the Metaphysics of Morals. “Nothing can possibly be conceived in
the world, or even out of it, which can be called good, without
qualification, except a good will.” The principles of morality,
holiness if you will, are a function of rational deliberation. For Kant,
the necessary condition was for the agent to be aretaically good such
that one’s actions are of moral worth. Such principles, he averred,
are known a priori. They are known independently of any experience
or motivational intent. Rational deliberation on what he calls the
categorical imperative will always and only yield the right thing to do
and expose the wrong things. No appeal to any motivation or
intention is relevant to this determination nor is any appeal to the
outcome of any action as a justification for undertaking it.
Kant’s categorical imperative is: “Act only on that maxim
whereby thou canst at the same time that it should become a universal
law.” He says there is only one categorical imperative, the one I just
mentioned. He does claim, however, another form of the categorical
imperative, namely: “Act so as to treat humanity, whether in thine
own person or in that of any other, in every case, as an end withal and
never as a means only.” Notwithstanding that he consistently avers
that there is but one, the two forms do seem to have sufficiently
different properties that one is hard-pressed to claim that they are
alternative versions of the same imperative.
The Advocacy Maxim: Advocating for what is true, right and
good is a moral good. So, every human being has a moral duty
for being an advocate for all moral as well as ontological truths.
Everyone is morally responsible for accepting responsibility for
moral goodness in him/herself and in others.
52
 This maxim is a maxim of the relevance of the notion of truth in
ethics. Truth is a property of statements about the ontological
configuration of the world. If untrue statements are made and people
take them as true, then since reality is stubborn, adverse consequences
will occur, the intensity of which will be a function of the degree of
divergence of the statement from the objective constitution of the
world. Beliefs to the contrary of true statements are likely to cause
pain and suffering of intensities that are a function of the stated errors.
Such statements may either be intentional or unintentional, which is
entirely irrelevant to the extent of the error. Mistakes of judgment
are not as morally culpable as are intentional prevarications. The
latter contributes to the disposition one’s character, while the former
does not necessarily do so. One must strive for the truthfulness of
statements both ontologically and morally, for they are inherently
related.
While the notion of the “true” is a function of the correlation of
statements to states of affairs, the notion of “right” is a function of
actions considered and undertaken. It is a function of ought vis-à-vis
ought-not. It is decidedly oriented to what a future world will become
in virtue of one’s decisions and actions. To this extent it is
anticipatory. It is a function of intention. One is morally obligated
to act such that human dignity is maximized. Whereas right is
anticipatory, good is evaluative. Good is a function of the results.
There is no guarantee that the intentions behind an action will in fact
produce the hoped-for effect. If one is in tune with the universe, then
truth in statements and beliefs will guarantee that the good in
intentions will produce the right in actions.
Advocacy for the true, right and good entails a persistent striving
for understanding the universe in all of its dimensions. Therefore,
when people put theories forward about the universe, they must be
scrutinized and falsified if possible. If theories are strong, then
adherence to them becomes a moral obligation. One must create
conditions such that humans can flourish and misery is abated as
much as is ontologically and epistemologically possible. One is
morally obligated to advocate for statements that are true, for
intentions that are pure and results that are good.
The Reconciliation Maxim: Achieving reconciliation in the
interest of moral goodness, i.e., holiness, between human beings
alienated from each other is a moral good. So, every human
being has a moral duty for being proactive in the reconciliation
53
 of all human beings to each other and to God. This must occur in
ways such that such actions are compatible with holiness. In so
doing, one complies with both the first commandment’s
admonition to love God with all of one’s heart, soul, mind and
strength and the second to love one’s neighbor as oneself even if,
or perhaps, especially if the neighbor is one’s enemy.
Deviating from the advocacy maxim entails conflict. The failure
to pursue the truth about the created universe means that either
intentions become corrupted, or results do and perhaps both occur.
When the deviations from the truth produce dysfunctional effects,
pain and suffering will occur when the actions of others impact the
well-being of another/others. Of course, in virtue of the pain and
suffering, it is tempting to become hostile to the perpetrators. Very
often the hostility does not consider whether or not the intentions of
the agents of such actions are deliberate or merely inadvertent. In
either case, alienation is likely to occur. The victims are likely to see
retaliation as justified. Hence, conflict feeds on itself, ratchetting up
misery and vice. Gandhi, in the spirit of Jesus perceptively noted that
“An eye for an eye makes the whole world blind.” So, rather than
following this policy of retaliation, the moral imperative is to persist
in being proactive in the reconciliation of all people to God and each
other. But, it cannot be mere reconciliation. It must be reconciliation
predicated on the true, right and good, upon holiness/avga,ph.
The Aretaic Condition and its Maxims

The third condition required for holiness/avga,ph is the aretaic
condition. Unlike the previous two conditions which govern the
actions of a morally accountable agent, this condition governs the
constitution of the character of the morally accountable agent. The
supposition underlying the aretaic condition is that a morally
accountable person is responsible for the configuration of his/her own
character.
In the universe God created, it is necessary that it be sufficiently
open that given any particular state of affairs morally responsible
agents may choose to undertake any of multiple morally relevant
actions. The open texture of the created universe also requires that
both virtues and vices are available for selection by every morally
accountable agent. Since there are several mutually exclusive pairs
of virtues and vices, it will follow that there is an incredibly rich

54
potential for how characters become constituted. Suppose there are
twenty-two pairs of virtues and vices. The total possible
22
combinations would come to 2 or 4,194,304 possible character
configurations. If we further factor in that for each virtue/vice pair,
there is an intensity factor then there will be a very much larger
number of character configurations. Repentance requires of sinners
that they repudiate the character traits that dispose them to
committing acts that are contrary to the true, right and good.
Repentance requires that they be displaced with dispositions that are
compatible with the true, right and good.
Virtue Acquisition Maxim: It is a moral good for human beings
to acquire traits of virtue. It is a virtue acquisition imperative for
every human being to acquire any and all moral traits of
character such that s/he is disposed to act in the beneficial
interest of any and all human beings including him/herself.
Vice Repudiation and Eradication Maxim: It is a moral good
for human beings to repudiate and eradicate traits of vice. It is
a vice repudiation imperative for every human being to
repudiate any and all moral traits of character such that s/he is
disposed to act contrary to the beneficial interest of any and all
human beings including him/herself.
The error committed in the past consists in supposing that
morality is a function or either the results of an action or of whether
or not an action complies with duty or is a function of the intention
of the actor. In other words, one must choose from the three general
types of theory because they are logically incompatible, they are
mutually excusive. This mistake can be remedied by construing them
as mutually sufficient conditions. If an action is to be genuinely
moral, then it must satisfy all three conditions. Failure to comply in
any respect is sufficient to qualify as sin.
3. Experience Remorse for Sins
Having accepted responsibility for one’s sins in both deontic and
aretaic dimensions (i.e., both as actions undertaken and as character
traits acquired) it will be necessary for free agents to experience
remorse for having chosen to become persons who are capable of
violating normative moral universals. This remorse will have to be
genuine existential remorse. Remorse cannot be merely verbal or
behavioral expressions, for that would be hypocrisy. It may not be
reduced to merely liturgical expressions. In theological terms,

55
existential remorse cannot be confused with mere verbal confession.
Confession is perhaps necessary as an expression of remorse, but
unless it is existential it is not a sufficient response. Confession may
be and ought to be a verbalization of sorrow. But, mere liturgical
confession is not sufficient to meet the remorse condition since one
may cry or wail and say words, particularly liturgically correct verbal
formulations,54 without having the requisite existential remorse.
God, as understood in terms of the ontological doctrine, is not likely
to confuse mere hypocritical verbalizations with confessions that are
genuine expressions of one’s existentially accepting responsibility
and expressing existential remorse for the range of dysfunction s/he
has caused. Reconciliation must be predicated on a genuine
existential response of the self to its own sinfulness, a sinfulness that
exists in virtue of the cumulative effect of free choices and not as a
matter of some supposed “sinful nature”. So, our meta-soteriology
necessarily requires an existential experience of remorse. 55 Psalm 6
is an excellent expression of this point.
4. Repudiate and Eradicate Sin-oriented Character Traits
One may meet the condition of accepting responsibility and
experiencing remorse without satisfying the repentance that our
soteriology requires. In addition, it will be necessary for the free
agent to repudiate both the actions and the character traits that form
the raison d’etre of sin activities. This is the negative dimension of
repentance. One must exercise one’s free-will in the cessation and
eradication of the traits that lie at the base of moral rebellion. Again,
this process cannot be confused with the mere cessation of sin-
behaviors. One cannot attain to the moral standard of holiness unless
one stops violating the morality of the normative standard. It is
necessary to cease sin actions, but merely stopping them is not

54
Recall the Catholic confessional formula, “Forgive me Father for I
have sinned.”
55
I have always found that Soren Kierkegaard’s Sickness Unto Death
to be a philosophically insightful existential exegesis of this notion. Even
Calvin acknowledges this dimension for he says, “It will be of no avail to
commence the study of righteousness unless impiety shall first have been
eradicated from their [Israel’s] inmost heart.” [Emphasis added] Institutes
Book 3, Chapter 3, Section 6. We must not, however, allow the passive
voice to seduce us. Calvin will come to say that we can repent if and only
if God provides the faith necessary for the repentance itself to occur.
56
sufficient. Someone convicted of a heinous crime and incarcerated
in a segregation lockup in a maximum-security prison does not
become holy in virtue of his not being capable of committing crimes.
He has been forced to cease the behaviors that are sins without
necessarily giving up the traits that make him a sinner. The cessation
of sin-behaviors requires that one must repudiate the character traits
that lie at the foundation of the behaviors. One must repudiate the
greed, lust, etc. This is Jesus’ argument in the Sermon on the Mount.56
Paul provides a short list of some of these sin-traits:
The acts of the sinful nature are obvious: sexual immorality,
impurity and debauchery, idolatry and witchcraft, hatred,
discord, jealousy, fits of rage, selfish ambition, dissensions,
factions and envy; drunkenness, orgies, and the like.57
5. Resolve to Comply with Holiness Expectations
The positive dimension involves accepting responsibility for both
displacing the vices one has acquired and replacing them with the
virtues incumbent on a person of holiness. Paul provides a short list
of the positive traits:
The fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, patience, kindness,
goodness, faithfulness, gentleness and self-control. Against
such things, there is no law. Those who belong to Jesus have
crucified the sinful nature with its passions and desires. Since
we live by the Spirit, let us keep in step with the Spirit. Let us
not become conceited, provoking and envying each other. 58

56
I have argued this thesis in my The Surpassing Righteousness: The
Sermon on the Mount for Would-be Disciples, [Bloomington, IN: Xlibris
Corporation, 2013].
57
Galatians 5:19-21a.
58
Galatians 5:22-26 This passage provides an insight into the volitional
dimension of repentance. Paul says, “Those who belong to Jesus Christ have
crucified the sinful nature with its passions and desires.” [vs 24 oi` de. tou/
Cristou/ vIhsou/ th.n sa,rka evstau,rwsan su.n toi/j paqh,masin kai. tai/j
evpiqumi,aijÅ] This statement reflects the will of the Christian to repudiate the
“sinful nature”, to adopt the words of the NIV for the term sa,rx. It seems
odd that the implication of a “sinful nature” under the aegis of total depravity
would be impossible to support, yet Paul asserts consistently with the
notions of moral responsibility, that those who choose Jesus express that
choice by crucifying the passions that give power to the actions.
57
 This process of addressing the traits in order to displace vices and
acquire virtues is surer in the transformation of a person than working
the other way around. One may strive to alter the sinful behaviors,
but always with a struggle. Altering trait orientations will inevitably
alter actions. The converse is hardly ever true.

58
 Chapter Three — Expiation in Apostolic Argument

The General Character of the Apostolic Argument
How do we interpret the statements of the Bible when it discusses
soteriology? Methodologically, I will begin with how the Bible lays
out its soteriology in the evangelistic preaching of the Apostles. It is
remarkable to me that apostolic arguments are so similar. In general,
the apostolic argument proceeds in this way.
P1: The man Jesus of Nazareth was indisputably a genuinely
good man: 1) in the moral standards of His teaching, 2) in His
personal integrity, and 3) in the quality of His social ministry.
P2: Notwithstanding His personal goodness, the goodness of
His ministry and teaching, Jesus was rejected, betrayed and
ultimately crucified.
P3: Jesus was vindicated as Messiah by His resurrection from
the dead.
C1: Since Jesus was so vindicated, God is justified in holding
the men who rejected and murdered the Christ, including any
and all men who have the same values, accountable for the
assassination of the Messiah.
P4: However, if anyone realizes that s/he 1) is someone who has
rejected or is capable of rejecting this genuinely Good Man, and
2) is someone who accepts responsibility for having become the
kind of person who is capable of doing this to such a man, and
3) finds being such a person to be morally repugnant, then God
is willing to forgive him/her, regarding him/her as though
righteous, accepting his/her repentance in lieu of actual holiness
compliance, as long as the good faith transformation of his/her
character proceeds. The old person must die and the new person
be born again, hence, the symbolism of baptism.
C2: Therefore, one ought to accept God’s offer of forgiveness
by complying with His requirement that one repent.

59
 The importance of the crucifixion is its moral impact on the
sinner. This means that the crucifixion is expiatory and in no sense
propitiatory. The theories of Abelard of Brittany and Pelagius tend
to acknowledge this dimension of the crucifixion. Does the sinner
see it as an act conducted by evil people in the interest of preserving
evil? Does s/he see it as an act s/he could have condoned at one time
but can no longer? On the one hand, a sinner may voluntarily choose
to remain a sinner. On the other hand, the sinner may see this
soteriological event as the locus terminus for rejecting his/her
allegiance to and/or complicity with evil. This is for the sinner to say,
“I have condoned the same values that had resulted in the murder
of God’s Messiah. I find that to be despicable. I regret and
repudiate the evil values that found/would find such an action to
be necessary and freely choose now to adopt the holiness values
of the Messiah. I gratefully accept the grace that covers for my
failures while I, in good faith, work on ‘attaining to the full
measure of the stature of Christ’.”
God designed these features to provoke a response from the
sinner such that the sinner is forced to decide between remaining a
sinner and choosing to return to the moral requirements of holiness.
But, let us be clear about something. This is not Pelagianism. Neither
is it a Christian Stoicism. The response of sinners to the sacrifice of
God depends on God’s willingness to specify and initiate the
conditions of their reconciliation. It is by no means necessary that
God should offer to forgive any sin whatsoever. Grace means that
God adopts a reconciliation policy that He is under no obligation to
adopt. The sinner has no prerogative in this matter. Inasmuch as the
actions and traits of the sinner have created the alienation, the sinner
cannot initiate any forgiveness policy, although s/he may appeal for
it. Rather, God may, at His option, initiate a reconciliation policy by
requiring the repentance of the self-alienated sinner. So, the sinner
may respond to a reconciliation policy, but may not initiate it. This
concept is neither complex nor exotic. It is straightforward. It needs
no special theological insight or argument. The sinner is most
certainly not in a position to obligate God in any sense. After having
created the moral alienation through his sin, the sinner has lost the
moral right to demand or expect anything.
How does the crucifixatory sacrifice of Jesus Christ achieve this
result? First, it consists in God’s becoming the man Jesus, displaying
that God’s moral expectations are attainable. The Hebrew writer
60
makes this point by saying of the mediatory High Priest, the God-
Man, that, He has been tempted in every way, just as we are—yet was
without sin [Heb 4:14-16, esp. 15]. The point the writer argues is that
as High Priest, Jesus had no extraordinary means of avoiding
whatever temptations man must face. In short, this must mean that
Jesus was capable of sinning or else His temptations were, as my
inmate students would say, “bogus.”
Paul states the complement of this doctrine.
No temptation has seized you except what is common to man.
And God is faithful; He will not let you be tempted beyond what
you can bear. But when you are tempted, he will also provide a
way out so that you can stand up under it.59
This text plainly indicates that men are not sinners by nature, but by
choice. No one sins by necessity. To deny this is to deny the veracity
of an apostolic position. The preservation of the sinner-by-nature
necessarily comes at the expense of denying that Paul’s
characterization is true. The conjunction of these two texts implies
that Jesus could have sinned but did not, while although it is possible
for man not to sin, he does. This is the exact contrary of received
evangelical dogma. This means that a genuinely good man, who
taught goodness, lived out such goodness both deontically and
aretaically would be rejected by people who choose to, as Paul says,
“suppress the truth in unrighteousness” [Romans 1:18]. This places
moral innocence and evil in the boldest relief.
Gandhi, for example, has advocated this principle in recent times.
He seems to have understood that when evil people brutalize the
morally innocent, their brutality is maximally exposed. Gandhi
applied the principle as a politically pragmatic strategy, using it to
expose the brutality of British Colonial Imperialism in both South
Africa and India when its policies were victimizing, even brutalizing
people. In considering Gandhi, the exploited people for whom he
advocated were very likely not morally perfect. So, their innocence
is somewhat compromised. But, consider the case where the victim
of brutality is genuinely morally innocent, is genuinely holy. Any
action or policy that brutalizes innocents is grotesquely evil. This is
particularly clear in the case of child sexual abuse especially when
the child is both terrorized and tortured. When an adult exploits or

59
I Corinthians 10:13
61
brutalizes a child, the adult is exposed as particularly evil.60 In the
same way, the moral innocence of Jesus serves to expose the
sinfulness of anyone who would strive to eliminate the light of moral
goodness because he would be embarrassed or exposed for the kind
of person that he has chosen to become.
This is not merely a historical consideration. It is an existential
one. No one may object to being morally identified with the people
who did in fact assassinate Jesus on the ground that he was not alive
and present at the events that culminated in His crucifixion. On this
ground, relatively few people would be culpable. Rather, anyone who
would have participated in the events that culminated in His
crucifixion is morally culpable. That someone would have qualified
as culpable in this way is indicated by the extent to which a person is
willing to strive to exploit or even ignore the plight of innocents so
that s/he can persist in his/her own immorality. The crucifixion
serves to mark out the extreme brutalization of the innocent. The
crucifixion types people according to their particular mode of
reacting to the brutalization of innocence. It compels existential self-
assessment because it provides the opportunity for everyone to
discover which type of person in these historical events s/he is most
like. “Am I the Pharisee who seeks to preserve an institution, a
Roman politician who seeks to preserve political power, a Roman
soldier who is just doing his job, a betraying Judas, a cowardly Peter
or a voice in the mindless mob or someone follows the herd of the
self-interested?” Existentially, all will have contributed to the

60
For example, in 2006 in Vermont, a criminal court judge sentenced a
man to 60 days upon his confession of raping a little girl from her age 6 to
her age 11. Some are genuinely outraged by this indecent sentence,
demanding that Judge Cashman be removed from the bench. Others defend
such moral indecency by saying that Judge Cashman is a “compassionate”
judge. While is difficult to conceive that anyone would find that such an act
of judicial discretion does anything but sanction the brutalization of a truly
innocent little girl, there are some who defend the judge rather than
condemning the rapist. In June of 2007, a ring of pedophiles was broken up
in Britain. These people published on the Internet the photographs and
videos of the sexual abuse of 31 children ranging in age from infancy to
toddlers.
62
conditions that left Jesus standing alone as the sole standard of
goodness in the flesh.61
I will focus on twelve occurrences of the Apostolic arguments:
1) Peter’s Pentecost Argument,
2) The Beggar’s Healing,
3) The 1st Sanhedrin Interrogation,
4) The 2nd Sanhedrin Interrogation,
5) Stephen’s Argument,
6) Peter at Cornelius’ House,
7) Paul at Pisidian Antioch,
8) Thessalonica Comment,
9) Paul’s Areopagus Speech,
10) Corinth,
11) The Persuasiveness of Apollos, and
12) Events in Ephesus.
I will not attempt a full exegesis of these arguments. I will rather
try to put the argument into the form that exposes its logic. It seems
to me that these cases are important due to the fact that Luke’s
research into the spread of the Gospel seems to indicate that the
message to both Jew and Gentile was generally the same. The
crucifixion of Jesus was the focal point of the message because it
focuses on His goodness and innocence as well as His resurrection as
the vindication of His Messiahship. It is as if God says, “Okay, you
tried to kill Him (Me), but He (I) will not die. You have to deal with
Him (Me) because He (I) is (am) not going away.”
Peter’s Pentecost Argument—Acts 2:22-41
Peter’s discourse on the Day of Pentecost is often called the first
Gospel sermon. I will not quibble about this way of referring to it
except to make two remarks. First, its being first is less important
than that its being the first recorded model presentation of the reasons

61
This is the real genius of Mel Gibson’s screenplay The Passion of the
Christ. People who see the movie are generally either motivated to subject
themselves to moral and spiritual self-assessment, or strive to segregate
themselves from the movie by hypocritical moralizing. It is also the reason
that so many felt compelled to vilify both Gibson and the movie.
63
for someone to pay attention to the points that the argument makes.
Second, given that today’s sermons are less about making sound
arguments than about using emotional discourses to arouse emotional
responses, Peter’s discourse is very little like what we would call a
sermon today. It does seem to me that reducing sermons into devices
for emotional manipulation cheapens the validity of the apostolic
point. Presenting the Gospel, it seems to me, ought not to be non-
cognitive, for that allows our secular critics to dismiss its content
without any serious reflection on its soteriology. 62

62
I must make a point about the position of non-cognitivists. My thesis
that early Christian preaching is based on an argument requires that David
Hume and his non-cognitivist disciples are wrong. Non-cognitivism argues,
following Hume, that one cannot have a deductively valid argument when
one or more of the premises of an argument, or perhaps, from their point of
view, an argument-like structure, contains a statement of value. Hume says
that one cannot deduce an “ought” from an “is”. He believes that one cannot
validly deduce values from facts, or facts from values for that matter.
Hume’s point requires that it is impossible for a value to be truth functional.
This seems to me to be clearly wrong. One need only reflect on whether a
legislator presents, or should present, reasons for passing a particular piece
of legislation. For example, could one really argue that “No one ought to
rape children” is not a value-fact? Of course, if it were not a fact, but only
a non-truth functional value (and values are not permitted in arguments),
then one could not use this ought statement as a premise in an argument the
conclusion of which is that some person ought to be held legally culpable
because he raped a child. This seems clearly silly. Someone’s holding that
raping children is morally wrong seems to be making a claim that is both a
value and a fact, not merely a personal emotive point of view. Similarly, if
a legislature had passed an unjust law, say, for example, that men above the
age of 40 but not yet 60 years of age may rape children between the ages of
9 and 12, it seems that civil protestors in objecting to this injustice must
resort to a value as a premise, namely, “No one ought to be permitted to rape
a child at all.” To take another example, notwithstanding the Dred Scott
ruling, “There ought not to be slavery in society” seems a legitimate premise
in an argument the conclusion of which is “The Supreme Court ought to
strike down slavery in America.” To argue according to the non-cognitivist
paradigm is to argue that these activities are merely personal emotive
positions, or collections of the emotive opinions of constituencies with the
same or similar emotive opinions, without any moral standing beyond the
points of view of those who have the emotions. This is moral silliness. We
must debate the truth of the values premises, just as we must establish the
truth of so-called fact-based premises.
64
 The discourse is an argument. It presents premises. It presents
conclusions that follow from the premises. Given that the premises
are true and that the form of the argument is valid, then one cannot
deny the truth of the conclusion without being irrational.
Here is the argument from Acts 2:22-36
P1: God attests to the veracity of Jesus of Nazareth’s ministry
in virtue of the miracles, signs and wonders that attended it.
P2: Jesus of Nazareth was turned over to wicked people in order
to have them kill Him.
P3: God raised Jesus to life, and we apostles are all witnesses
to this fact.
P4: The Scriptures, penned by King David, acting as a prophet,
refer to the death of someone whose body will not decay
(Citing the 16th Psalm, one of David’s, Peter says, “Because
you will not abandon me to the grave, nor will you let your
Holy One see decay.”).
P5: This prophetic reference cannot be about David since he
died and he remains dead in his tomb.
P6: The prophecy refers to the Messiah as someone who will
not remain dead.
C1: The resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth identifies Him as
God’s Messiah.
P7: Anyone who participates in or condones the murder of
God’s Messiah is guilty of the blood of the Messiah.
C2: You are guilty of the blood of the Messiah.
The audience followed the argument sufficiently well to ask the
question, “What must we do?” Exegetically, this question indicates
a considerable degree of doubt that a positive response could possibly
be forthcoming. The verb is in the subjunctive mood, indicating
doubt or skepticism. Existentially, this is understandable, since if it
is true that one has complied with the murder of God’s Messiah and
God has vetoed man’s rejection by means of the resurrection, it
becomes a moment of existential crisis [as Luke says in Acts 2:37,
they were “cut to the heart” — katenu,ghsan th.n kardi,an]. The
Apostolic answer to this question is, therefore, both surprising and
compelling. If this event becomes the moral turning point in one’s
65
life, then God is willing to forgive his/her sin and offer grace-based
forgiveness in exchange for his/her repentance. In exchange for
repentance, God is willing to regard the sinner as though s/he was
righteous. Otherwise, s/he will have to contend with the justified
wrath of the holy God, the wrath one can neither ignore nor eliminate.
The Beggar’s Healing—Acts 3:12-26
On this occasion, Peter and John had entered the Temple
compound. A beggar was there and asked them for some money.
Peter said that instead of money he would heal the man of the
infirmity that kept him in his state. The obvious reaction to the
miracle was one of heartfelt joy from the beggar and of amazement
from the crowd. Peter seized the opportunity the healing afforded to
present the Gospel argument. He argues thusly:
P1: You [pl] disowned Jesus of Nazareth when he was
presented to Pilate for His condemnation and execution.
P2: You [pl] prevailed upon Pilate to execute Him even though
he was prepared to release Him.
P3: You [pl] disowned a righteous man and asked for the
release of a murderer.
C1: Therefore, you [pl] had the “author of life” killed.
P4: God raised this Jesus from the dead.
P5: The Prophets had foretold of the suffering of the Messiah.
C2: So, you [pl] have not merely killed a man, you have killed
God’s Messiah.
P6: God is prepared to wipe out your sins provided you repent
and turn to God before He returns to restore all things.
C3: Therefore, repent and turn to God.
st
The 1 Sanhedrin Interrogation—Acts 4:8-12
The beggar’s healing had caused a commotion and that aroused
the attention of the Sadducees. Luke calls attention to the fact that
the resurrection played a central role in the apostle’s arguments. As
is commonly known, the Sadducees denied any doctrine of the
resurrection. So, it would be natural for them to take note of an
argument in which it played such a prominent role. The members of
this sect were the first to react to the influence that the Gospel

66
argument had on the common Jew. If someone had indeed been
resurrected from the dead, then the claim that no resurrection from
the dead was possible would be obviously false. After all it takes
only one counter-example to falsify a universal proposition.
Luke states Peter’s argument in briefer form. The enthymematic
form is quite pithy. In answering the demand that he cite some
authority for this miracle, Peter comments that God had raised Jesus
of Nazareth from the dead, the very man whose crucifixion they had
demanded. The beggar stands healed because the Messiah they had
rejected had authorized it. Further, this Jesus is the only one who is
empowered to authorize the salvation of anyone who is to be saved.
The basis of this authorization vitiates the claims of the
Sadducees in particular and the whole of rabbinic teaching in general.
Jesus was primarily rejected due to the implications of the claims He
made and the actions He undertook. Both Sadducees and Pharisees
held to the view that God would perform no miracle through a
blasphemer. So, they regarded it as impossible that God would work
miracles through Jesus because they regarded the claims Jesus made
as clearly blasphemous.63
If Jesus was a blasphemer, then this beggar could not have been
healed. Since he is obviously healed, then it follows that it was false
to conclude that Jesus was a blasphemer. If that was true, then their
having crucified Him meant that they were wrong about Jesus’ claims
and Jesus was indeed God’s Messiah. One of two things had to be
true. Either God works miracles through blasphemers or Jesus was
no blasphemer. Either of the two conclusions dooms their theology.
They could not relinquish their doctrine that God will not use
blasphemers for miracles, nor could they deny that a miracle had
occurred. They could perhaps argue that Jesus had nothing to do with
it. But, that begs the question of whether the Apostles were
blasphemers. They had claimed that the beggar’s healing was the

63
See: Matthewhew 9:1-8. Recall that Jesus had already used this
argument. Jesus first forgave the paralytic’s sins and then, when rebuked
for doing so on the ground that “only God could forgive sins”, Jesus
responded by asking which was easier to do 1) to forgive sins or 2) to
command the paralytic to walk. Then Jesus punctuates His authority to
forgive sins by commanding the paralytic to “pick up his bed and walk.”
The moment that the paralytic complies is the moment that Jesus’ authority
is confirmed and their theology is vitiated.
67
work of Jesus, attributing to Him prerogatives that were reserved for
God alone. If they were blasphemers, no miracle should have
occurred. But, that avenue is closed since they recognized that the
man had indeed been healed [Acts 4:14]. So, the only conclusion
available to them was that the Apostles were not blasphemers. The
Apostle’s testimony that Jesus is the Messiah is vindicated. Their
own logic had trapped them. Their arguments, having failed, left
them with intimidation as their next best strategy.
The 2nd Sanhedrin Interrogation—Acts 5:27-34
It is a curious thing that Luke mentions that the Pharisees and
Sadducees found the continued healing of crowds of people so
disconcerting [Acts 5:12-16]. How could the healing ministry of
anyone be a source of such consternation? Luke says that they were
“filled with jealousy” [Acts 5:17— evplh,sqhsan zh,lou]. They
arrested the Apostles who were later miraculously freed with
instructions to continue, “to tell the people the full message of this
new life” [Acts 5:20]. Peter and John complied with these
instructions. When the Sanhedrin called for their prisoners, the
guards discovered that they were gone. Word then arrived that they
were in the Temple courts teaching again. The authorities re-arrested
them, “without using force for fear that the people would stone them”
[Acts 5:26].
The High Priest’s opening remarks are telling. He says, “You
have filled Jerusalem with your teaching and are determined to make
us guilty of this man’s blood.” [Acts 5:28— bou,lesqe evpagagei/n evfV
h`ma/j to. ai-ma tou/ avnqrw,pou tou,touÅ] The argument was having its
cumulative effect. Jesus was a good man, yet they were responsible
for the grossest injustice of crucifying not only an innocent man but
also one who did nothing but good. Even Pilate had recognized this.
Peter reiterates the argument:
The God of our fathers raised Jesus from the dead—whom you
[pl] had killed by hanging Him on a tree. God exalted Him to
His own right hand as Prince and Savior that He might give
repentance and forgiveness to Israel [Acts 5:30-1].
All of the elements are present. The facts of their involvement
and of the resurrection itself are not in dispute. The resurrection of
Jesus verified His place as God’s Messiah. Their strategy to destroy
Him is also clearly evident. The conclusion was clear. It angered
them such that they were ready to kill them and would have done so

68
except for the intervention of Gamaliel. The members of the
Sanhedrin had to choose either repentance or wrath. Rather than
complying with the dictates of repentance, they chose instead to cover
up the affair and to intimidate the preachers of this exposé.
Stephen’s Argument—Acts 7:51-53
We are quite unaccustomed to thinking of someone’s being held
responsible for being a certain kind of person. This is, no doubt,
because legal systems use behavior as the basis for establishing
culpability. It is rather easier to determine whether someone did or
did not do something than it is to establish that someone has a certain
kind of character. It is for this reason that my thesis may be regarded
by some as dubious, namely that the preaching of the cross must make
people realize that they would have participated in the crucifixion in
someway merely because the sinful character reacts the same way to
the presence of holiness then as now. Of course, if I am wrong about
this, then there is only a very small class of people that could be held
morally responsible for the events leading up to and culminating in
the crucifixion. This narrow focus would emasculate the
soteriological power of the cross.
My thesis has a friend. Stephen’s argument makes my point
exactly. Stephen was accused of and arrested for “speaking against
the Holy Place and the Law.” The members of the Synagogue of
Freedmen had produced false witnesses who had testified of Stephen
that he incessantly claimed that, “this Jesus of Nazareth will destroy
this place and the customs Moses has handed down to us.”64
Stephen’s defense did not consist of an argument denying the truth of
their claim, although he apparently could have done so. Instead, he
recounted the history of Israel paying particular attention to God’s
defending Israel against moral abuses of pagan nations like Egypt. In
addition, he made a point of explaining that God used the prophets to
criticize Israel’s deviation from and defiance of the moral code
embodied in the Law of Moses. Israel’s history is replete with
examples of Israel’s repudiation of morality. Both Kings and Priests

64
Acts 6:13 They characterized Stephen’s doctrines as “blasphemy
against Moses and against God.” [6:11—to,te u`pe,balon a;ndraj le,gontaj o[ti
VAkhko,amen auvtou/ lalou/ntoj r`h,mata bla,sfhma eivj Mwu?sh/n kai. to.n qeo,n \]
69
repudiated God’s holiness and “went a whoring after other Gods.”65
This leads up to Stephen’s conclusion.
You stiff-necked people, with uncircumcised hearts and ears.
You are just like your fathers: You always resist the Holy Spirit!
Was there ever a prophet your fathers did not persecute? They
even killed those who predicted the coming of the Righteous
One. And now you have betrayed and murdered him—you who
have received the law that was put into effect through the angels
but have not obeyed it [Acts 7:51-53].
One can confidently infer from this statement that Stephen’s
arguments centered on:
P1: The law by itself is insufficient to produce the moral
compliance that God’s holiness requires.
P2: The priesthood supposed that compliance with the Torah,
and the Talmud, Midrash and Mishnah was merely
behavioral, perhaps merely liturgical compliance
P3: The Prophets delivered the demand for repentance as a
change of heart throughout Israel’s history. They pointed to
the coming of the Messiah, or, as Stephen calls Him, the
Righteous One.
P4: The priesthood, overall, systemically resisted the clear
warnings of the prophets, persecuted many, and killed some,
including the prophetically promised Messiah Himself.
P5: The central proposition in Jesus’ message was that
behavioral compliance with the Law was insufficient for
meeting the moral demands of the Kingdom of God [See:
Matthew 5:20].
C1: Therefore, you are just like your fathers. There is no
qualitative difference between you and your fathers. Both
are hostile to the moral demands of God and God’s law

65
Recall the prophet Hosea’s use of this metaphor. The objection is not
as much religious as it is moral. The moral deviancy of pagan cultures found
an accomplice in Israel. The whore characterizes the moral deviancy of a
particularly prevalent and noxious mode of sinning.
70
 because you are unwilling to comply from the heart. You
are stiff-necked and uncircumcised in your heart.
The fathers, who had persecuted the prophets and rejected their
calls for repentance, had the same character as their sons. Moreover,
even though they could not be held directly responsible for the
execution of the Messiah inasmuch as they pre-dated the incarnation,
they are nevertheless morally culpable since they and their sons had
the same character traits. Both the fathers and the sons chose moral
rebellion even to the point of killing those who stood for moral
holiness.
Stephen’s last words punctuated the condemnation. He reports
seeing the resurrected Lord seated at God’s right hand [Acts 7:59].
God’s Messiah is not dead and cannot be killed and these priests are
guilty. That they had become furious is understandable, and there
was no Gamaliel to save Stephen. The points of argument are,
however, the same.
Peter at Cornelius’ House—Acts 10:37-43
After Luke’s discussing some of the growing pains in the early
church, Peter’s invitation to Cornelius’ house appears as the next
important presentation of the Gospel argument. Up to this time, there
had been a definite confrontational element in the argument’s
presentation. The Jewish leadership was not only exposed as
culpable agents in the crucifixion, but also in its attempts to discredit
the emerging Christian movement. The question now comes to the
fore as to whether non-Jewish peoples may be admitted to the Church
without first becoming Jewish proselytes. Further, there was a
question of how they are to be treated in the Church. Were the Jewish
cultural and religious prejudices going to become a part of the new
expanded Christian Church? After some convincing, Peter was led
to the conclusion that Jesus meant for the Gospel to be universal, i.e.,
that all human beings are to be offered the same opportunity to repent
and receive God’s forgiveness.
In presenting the Gospel argument to Cornelius’ household, Peter
makes no accusatory comments. It seems that he had concluded that
there was no need to emphasize the culpability dimension of the
gospel message since Cornelius had already disclosed his openness
to the ethical demands of faith. Luke describes him and his household
as “devout, God-fearing and generous” [Acts 10:2 euvsebh.j kai.
fobou,menoj to.n qeo.n su.n panti. tw/| oi;kw| auvtou/( poiw/n evlehmosu,naj

71
polla.j tw/| law/| kai. deo,menoj tou/ qeou/ dia. panto,j(]. The Gospel
argument is restated for the benefit of those present. There is neither
rancor nor any anticipation of resistance. Peter seems almost
apologetic for his having resisted the vision he had seen. “I now
understand that God shows no favoritism, and accepts men from
every nation who fear him and do what is right.”66 The elements are
all present, except for the conclusion that God has a right to judge
those who participated in the execution of the Messiah. It seems that
Peter perceives that it is unnecessary to make the point that these
people are guilty because Cornelius had already complied with the
repentance expectations. There was no need to inform Cornelius that
he was a sinner. Of that he was abundantly aware and was well
underway in addressing his moral deficiencies.
Here is the argument stated for Cornelius, and perhaps for any
who have or will have complied with repentance.
P1: You are aware of the reputation of Jesus of Nazareth, who
went about doing good, healing all who were under the
power of the Devil because God was with Him.
P2: They killed Him by hanging Him on a tree [Note the third
person plural pronoun].
P3: God raised Him from the dead and we can testify; we ate
and drank with Him after He rose from the dead.
P4: God has appointed Him as judge of the living and the dead.
P5: All the prophets testify that everyone who believes in Him
receives forgiveness of sins.
There is no stated conclusion to the argument, perhaps because
those gathered were already willing to comply with whatever
directive God may have chosen to give.
Paul at Pisidian Antioch—Acts 13:16-41
I often wonder whether anyone else was as surprised as I was to
discover that the argument Paul uses in his missionary activity is

66
Acts 10:34, 35—VAnoi,xaj de. Pe,troj to. sto,ma ei=pen( VEpV avlhqei,aj
katalamba,nomai o[ti ouvk e;stin proswpolh,mpthj o` qeo,j( avllV evn panti. e;qnei
o` fobou,menoj auvto.n kai. evrgazo,menoj dikaiosu,nhn dekto.j auvtw/| evstinÅ
[Emphasis added]

72
virtually identical to the arguments Peter and the other apostles and
evangelists had used. If there is a model or a paradigm for what
people need to hear in evangelistic preaching, surely this fact
confirms that the early apostolic model used this argument.
Paul has a strategy. He goes to cities in which there is a
synagogue, preferably a synagogue with a “God-fearing”67
constituency. Paul presents the following argument in the synagogue
of Pisidian Antioch.
P1: God promised Abraham that the Messiah would come from
his seed, and the history of Israel shows that God kept this
promise.
P2: God replaced Saul with David, on moral grounds.
P3: Jesus of Nazareth, who was to come to be identified as the
promised Savior, is a descendant of David. Furthermore,
John the Baptist foretold him as the one for whose coming
people could prepare by repenting of their sin and being
baptized.
P4: The people of Jerusalem and their68 rulers did not recognize
him and condemned him, fulfilling the words of the prophets.
P5: The people of Jerusalem and their leaders prevailed upon
Pilate to have Jesus crucified, notwithstanding the fact that
Pilate found no charge sufficient for such an action.
P6: God raised Jesus from the dead, a fact to which many can
testify, having traveled with Him around Galilee after his
death.

67
The God-fearers were Gentiles who were willing to acknowledge the
authoritativeness of the Hebrew Scriptures, but were reluctant to become
proselytes to Judaism. These form a bridge group that Paul was willing to
target to gain access to both cultural groups. See: Donald McGavern The
Bridges of God
68
Notice that, as with Peter’s message to Cornelius, there is no
accusation of direct complicity in the events of the trial and crucifixion. The
references are in third person, not in second person.
73
 C1: God has kept His promise as made in both the 2nd Psalm
and the 16th Psalm where it says, “You will not allow your
Holy One to see decay.” [Psalm 16:10]
C2: David cannot be the fulfillment of this prophetic statement,
since he died and remains in his tomb.
C3: It is through this Jesus that forgiveness of sins is proclaimed
to you. Everyone who believes is justified from everything
the Law of Moses was insufficient to justify.
C4: Take care that you do not perish according to the warning of
the prophets.
The similarity of this argument to Peter’s original argument can
hardly be more striking.
The Thessalonica Comment—Acts 17:2
The brevity of Luke’s representation here is telling. He
characterizes the general parameters of Paul’s argument form. First,
Luke says that Paul went to the synagogue, as was his custom, and
reasoned with them over the course of three weeks.69 He is said to
have explained and proved 70 that:
P1: It was necessary for the Christ/Messiah to suffer and rise
from the dead.
P2: The life and ministry of Jesus of Nazareth meets the Old
Testament specifications that the Messiah would meet.
C: So, it follows that this Jesus of Nazareth is God’s Messiah.
My thesis that these presentations of the Gospel were indeed
arguments is justified in the light of Luke’s comment that Paul was
“reasoning” [diele,xato], explaining [dianoi,gwn] and “proving”
[paratiqe,menoj] and that “some of the Jews were “persuaded.”
[evpei,sqhsan] Other non-Jewish demographic groups also accepted

69
Acts 17:2 kata. de. to. eivwqo.j tw/| Pau,lw| eivsh/lqen pro.j auvtou.j kai.
evpi. sa,bbata tri,a diele,xato auvtoi/j avpo. tw/n grafw/n(
70
Acts 17:3 dianoi,gwn kai. paratiqe,menoj o[ti to.n Cristo.n e;dei paqei/n
kai. avnasth/nai evk nekrw/n kai. o[ti ou-to,j evstin o` Cristo.j Îo`Ð VIhsou/j o]n
evgw. katagge,llw u`mi/nÅ
74
the validity of Paul’s arguments. It seems safe to conclude that
believing is both a cognitive and a moral process.
Luke obviously abbreviates the arguments Paul used. It would
have been helpful to have an extended version of these arguments.
What Old Testament messianic prophecies does he use to convince
those who accept the veracity of the Old Testament in identifying the
Messiah? What arguments does he proffer in defense of the
interpretations he attaches to those passages? How does he handle
the potential objections of secular skeptics to the claims that there was
a Jewish man from Nazareth who actually, not metaphorically, rose
from the dead?
I am prepared to argue that Paul has left us with a primer on his
arguments and how he responds to the objections he has received over
many presentations of the Gospel argument. This primer is his
Epistle to the Romans. I shall return to an extended exegetical
analysis of this Epistle in chapters Five through Eleven. Inasmuch as
I take Paul to be the author of Hebrews,71 I regard its argument as the
way Paul addressed dominantly Jewish audiences in “proving” that
Jesus was the Messiah. Suffice it to say for the moment that a
comparison of Luke’s representations of the character of the Gospel
arguments across all evangelists with Paul’s own representation of
“his” Gospel leads me to the conclusion that, given the internal
consistency of the Bible as a whole and the New Testament in
particular, if anything in the Epistle to the Romans seems, according
to the exegesis of the advocates for Option #3—Arbitrary Election,
to contradict an Option #4—Voluntary Repentance interpretation of
the soteriological imperative, then the Option #3—Arbitrary Election
interpretations of the Epistle will have to be abandoned in favor of
the unambiguous rendition of the Apostolic argument in the Acts of
the Apostles. In short, if Acts is consistent with Option #4
soteriology, and the soteriology of Romans allows for some exegesis
which necessarily Option #3, then it is impossible for the Bible to be
inerrant. So long, sola Scriptura.
Paul’s Areopagus Speech—Acts 17:22-31
Presenting the Gospel argument within the confines of Judaism
is somewhat easier since there is an accepted corpus of inspired
documents. Donald McGavern, for example, argues that Paul’s

71
This opinion is largely irrelevant to the argument of Hebrews itself.
75
evangelistic strategy was to identify the “God-fearers” bridge group
and use their connection to the synagogue as a way of gaining access
to Greek society at large.72 Luke records Paul’s using this strategy
while in Athens. However, in this case, Paul went beyond his
strategy, by engaging people in the marketplace. His conversations
were apparently as interesting as they were controversial. Luke
characterizes Paul’s activities in the same way as in Thessalonica.
Luke says, “he kept on reasoning [diele,xato — “Drawing or
formulating an argument”] in the synagogue with the Jews and God-
fearing Greeks, as well as in the marketplace day by day with those
who happened to be there.”73 Stoic and Epicurean thinkers74 disputed
his arguments which had focused on “the good news about Jesus and
the resurrection.” Athenian intellectual curiosity prompted them to
invite him to address the Areopagus. The core of the Gospel appears
in Paul’s remarks after he sets up his audience by commenting on its
prevailing cultural and intellectual paradigms. Paul’s argument is as
follows:
P1: You have an idol to “the unknown god”.
P2: I know some things about this unknown god, namely that
He:
1. Has no need of temples.
2. Cannot be represented as a figurine.
3. Needs nothing.
4. Gives life to all things.
5. Has made all men and nations from one man.

72
See: Donald McGavern Bridges of God.
73
Acts 17:17 diele,geto me.n ou=n evn th/| sunagwgh/| toi/j VIoudai,oij kai.
toi/j sebome,noij kai. evn th/| avgora/| kata. pa/san h`me,ran pro.j tou.j
paratugca,nontajÅ See also: Acts 17:2 diele,xato auvtoi/j avpo. tw/n grafw/n(
“Drawing an argument from the Scriptures.”
74
Apparently none of these Stoic and Epicurean philosophers saw
Paul’s gospel as any species of their own thought. I am left to conclude that
the aspersions Reformation advocates cast on Armenian type theologies as
“Stoic” in virtue of their emphasis on free-will and the use of natural reason
is faulty. Nor did the Epicureans see Paul’s gospel as any type of
antinomianistic or hedonistic philosophy akin to their own.
76
 6. Determines where men shall live and how long their
civilizations will survive.
P3: Up until now, this God has overlooked the ignorance you
have acknowledged in this idol, but now He demands of all men
everywhere that they repent.
P4: This God has appointed someone to judge the world with
justice.
P5: This man is identified by His having been raised from the
dead.
P6: This man is Jesus of Nazareth.
Although Luke does not provide the details of Paul’s argument,
what he does provide leaves room for Paul’s making the point that
their provincial and contingent gods do not come intellectually close
to a concept of God that meets the standard of what we have called
the ontological doctrine. Since a notion of God as meeting this
doctrine is clearly superior to the notion of gods that have only
mythological status and are, at best, morally capricious, it would
follow that Greeks ought to give attention to the details of what a
Holy God, i.e., a God that is both holy and a spirit—a Holy Spirit,75
would morally require.

75
The use of the description “Holy Spirit” has produced much
dissention throughout the history of the Church. Although I have little time
or inclination for going into a discussion of this dimension of the so-called
“Trinity,” I want to suggest that a major blunder may have occurred in
reading a Trinitarian theology into the exegesis of pneu/ma passages,
particularly in Paul. There are many places where the term “holy” is an
adjective in predicate position to the noun “spirit”. Other times the adjective
is in attributive position. The semantic difference between attributive and
predicate position syntax seems to have been either ignored or neglected in
the exegesis leading up to the development of a pneumatology. Further,
where the term “holy” does not co-occur with the term “spirit”, there appears
to be a very nearly universal supposition that the term should be capitalized,
allowing the reader of the translation to infer that the referent is “the Holy
Spirit”. In many cases, this practice seems to be exegetically careless. I
cannot conceive of an exegetical approach to the solution of this dogma.
Indeed, I would argue that those who wish to make a point of this
pneumatological ambiguity are straining out gnats only to swallow camels.
Paul warned Timothy [1 Timothy 1:1 ff.] to command those leading people
77
 It is perhaps telling that the members of the Areopagus, according
to their theological/metaphysical framework, did not think that a
resurrection of the dead was even possible, a position that was
consistent with the Sadducean position. This would mean that, to the
extent that one could establish that a resurrection of a crucified
innocent man had historically occurred, one ought to pay attention to
the implications of such a fact. Minimally, it would mean that such
a fact would entail the consequence that their theologies were
cognitively and morally inferior, thereby failing the ontological
doctrine. A God that controls life and death is clearly superior to any
that cannot. Coupling such power with self-determined moral
perfection and the demand for repentance means that even Greeks
could conclude that a Holy God/Spirit would have to require
repentant holiness from men. How I do wish I had the full text of
Paul’s remarks.
Corinth—Acts 18:4-6
The brevity of Luke’s comments about Paul’s activities in
Corinth establishes, at least to his satisfaction, that he has documented
the Gospel argument content as well as the missionary strategy well
enough. He merely reiterates it in order to maintain the pattern. Luke
again uses the terms “reasoned” and “persuaded”. The conclusion of
the argument is that Jesus is the Christ.
Paul encounters the same responses. Some Jewish adherents
found his argument persuasive enough to consider, while others
believed it. However, some Jews in the Corinthian synagogue
opposed Paul and subjected him to abuse. Notwithstanding this
opposition, those Jews who came to accept the arguments, including
the Chief of the Synagogue, set up a church in the house next door.
The opposition in Corinth seems to have severely distressed Paul. A
vision came to encourage him. It told him, “Stop [mh. with the present
imperative] being afraid, keep on speaking and do not begin to be
silent, for I am with you, and no one is going to attack you or harm

to engage in meaningless talk to cease and desist. If there is genuinely only
one God, then it matters not by how many names He goes. Otherwise, we
would be driven to list all of His names and then make some contentious
demand that true believers use the names appropriately or else be justly
accused of heresy. If it were not for the factions the Trinitarian controversy
has engendered in the Church, it could be dismissed as silliness.
Unfortunately, the divisions it causes are too pernicious.
78
you, because I have many people in this city.”76 I have taken the
liberty of rendering a translation that is more in keeping with the
established grammatical conventions for these Koine constructions.
The presuppositions contained in the grammar reveal both that Paul
was fearful at the intensity of the opposition to his arguments.
Further, it reveals that he was considering a cessation of his
preaching. Jesus had to intervene to give Paul a clear sense of
direction and encouragement. Luke records that Paul continued his
efforts for another eighteen months.
Persuasiveness of Apollos—Acts18:28
Luke’s characterization of Apollos’ efforts is terse. He was an
articulate and fervent man skilled in both the Scriptures and in
rhetoric, a discipline which at this time was more cognitive than it is
in ours. Luke reports that Apollos’ activities in Achaia “refuted
[diakathle,gceto] the Jews in public debate, proving [evpideiknu.j] from
the Scriptures that Jesus was the Christ.”77
Events in Ephesus—Acts 19:4-10
Paul argues persuasively in Ephesus about the Kingdom of God.
Many oppose him, but he teaches disciples in a lecture hall of the
school of Tyrannus. He carries this on for two years according to
Luke. His efforts saw the expansion of the Gospel to both Jews and
Greeks all over Asia.
Summary
It seems clear that the gospel, as Luke represents it, was always
presented as an argument. In the missionary activity of the early
church, every major player argued its content. It created opposition,
but no one ever authorized modifications to it in order to make
believing it easier on those who disagreed with its premises or its
conclusions. There was some accommodation for those who had
already shown that they had accepted the responsibility for their sins.
They needed only the details of how God had established who Jesus

76
Acts 18:9 ei=pen de. o` ku,rioj evn nukti. diV o`ra,matoj tw/| Pau,lw|( Mh.
fobou/( avlla. la,lei kai. mh. siwph,sh|j( 10 dio,ti evgw, eivmi meta. sou/ kai. ouvdei.j
evpiqh,setai, soi tou/ kakw/sai, se( dio,ti lao,j evsti, moi polu.j evn th/| po,lei
tau,th|Å 11 VEka,qisen de. evniauto.n kai. mh/naj e]x dida,skwn evn auvtoi/j to.n
lo,gon tou/ qeou/Å
77
Euvto,nwj ga.r toi/j VIoudai,oij diakathle,gceto dhmosi,a| evpideiknu.j dia.
tw/n grafw/n ei=nai to.n Cristo.n VIhsou/nÅ
79
was and what role He played in the divine soteriological plan.
Accordingly, only the resurrected Jesus of Nazareth is authorized to
forgive the sins of anyone.
The fact of the sinful rebellion of individuals is the basis of
Gospel’s message of condemnation. There is no reference to the fall
of Adam or its effect on mankind, making them sinners by nature.
For any admittance to God’s Kingdom, the Gospel requires
repentance as a personal, volitional return to the Holy God’s standard
of holiness. No argument occurs in the Acts of Apostles by any player
in the Church’s early expansion explaining sin in any way other than
as personal moral rebellion and that personal volitional repentance is
the necessary moral remedy.
God gives Faith to no one, although He does recognize Faith in
people. It is sufficient for God to exercise His disposition to forgive
those who repent, for those people to have chosen Faith. So, Grace
is not a power God uses to change some people and not others, but a
disposition to forgive people who choose to be governed by holiness.
It is not God’s will that any should perish, but that all should come to
repentance [2 Peter 3:9b]. This should be enough to refute the
Reformed Election Dogma. It is apparently not. It is not God’s will
that is in question, but man’s response to it. If there is to be any
condemnation it will be due to the decisions individuals make about
whether or not they will comply in good faith with God’s legitimate
demands of holiness, recalling John 3:16-21, especially that which
follows the portion we all memorize.

80
 Chapter Four—Mistakes of Option #3 Theories

My third contention is that soteriological mistakes may often be
based on hermeneutical mistakes that are, in turn, based on a failure
to consider other viable exegetical options. They are often based on
faulty theological paradigms, most notably, Option #3 paradigms. In
addressing the first mistake, I will analyze passages in the Epistle to
the Romans. I choose this genesis since this epistle is perhaps the
single most sustained soteriological argument written by an apostle.
In addition, commentators and theologians of a determinist ilk tend
to cite this epistle in defense of their views. However, there are
abundant examples of exegetically sound cases to the contrary of
Option #3 views. Perhaps the most poignant example of this
phenomenon is the 18th chapter of Ezekiel and the warnings in The
Hebrew Epistle. The author of The Hebrew Epistle punctuates his
theological arguments with a series of warnings to anyone who
ignores or neglects the import of his arguments. This I will also
examine. In addressing the second mistake, I shall outline the general
theological arguments for the Option #3 theologies and then layout
an alternative exegetical basis for an Option #4 theology. First, I will
address the faulty paradigm that comes to control the exegetical basis
for Option # 3 theologies.
Preserved Smith in his book on Erasmus noted that Martin
Luther’s Bondage of the Will was critical in Calvin’s formulation of
his doctrines of predestination, foreknowledge and election. These
doctrines have come to control the theology of most evangelicals, and
this control is uncritical and unreflective. Even so-called Armenian
traditions are ensnared in its mesh. I want to consider both the stated
theology and the underlying philosophy of these concepts. 78 In

78
Of course, I am at a disadvantage since the basis of my critique is
philosophical. By this I mean that I will bring to bear on these issues the
philosophical disciplines of epistemology, logic and ethics. Reformers tend
to base their rejection of such arguments on the belief that Reason was
corrupted in the curse of the Fall and is, therefore, unreliable. This is in spite
of the fact that the Genesis account of the curse mentions nothing about
81
addition, we shall have to expose the inconsistencies of the dogma of
total depravity. My contention is that if it is philosophically
untenable to hold these views, then we should expect that the Bible
does not, in fact, commit any Christian to them.
Predestination and Election/Reprobation
The Presbyterian theologian John H Gerstner is quite clear in
arguing a position that advocates that individuals are free moral
agents as well as incapable of choosing to do otherwise than to sin
unless God directly intervenes in the individual’s heart. This position
conforms to compatibilist paradigm to which I referred above.
Gerstner defines “foreordination” as “God’s ordaining, or decreeing,
or determining, or appointing, from eternity whatsoever is to come to
pass.” Again, he says, “‘Foreordination’ is the comprehensive, all-
inclusive term. This informs us that there is nothing at all in the
whole universe which is exempt from this pre-ordinating of God
[Emphasis added].” “[I]t is the outworking of the eternal decree of
God.” Gerstner describes a closed universe outside of God’s will
nothing was, is or ever can be.
Now, Gerstner defines “predestination” as “that division of
foreordination wherein free moral agents are said to act.” 79 He says:

Reason or the corruption thereof. Of course, in attempting to defend this
position, Reformers have to use arguments. It should be clear that such a
theological principle is doomed and so also is their strategy. On the one
hand, if one can use Reason to establish that a particular theological
argument is valid then one has to accept the proposition that Reason is a
reliable discipline for discovering the truth about things. On the other hand,
if one cannot use Reason in virtue of its defective character, then one has
lost the capacity to use argument at all. This latter consequence vitiates any
viable apologetics, something that undercuts the basis for writing the books
that Cornelius Van Til, Gordon Clark and Bernard Ramm have written.
79
John H Gerstner A Predestination Primer [Grand Rapids, MI: Baker
Book House, 1960]. This comes from The Westminster Confession Chapter
3—“Of God’s Eternal Decree”. This sounds very much like the view of
Democritus who also claimed that all things are “foreordained by necessity”.
Leucippus, a disciple of Zeno, claims that “all things happen according to
reason and by necessity.” It would seem that Leucippus and Democritus as
well as Cicero would be strange bedfellows for Reformed theologians since
they are Stoics, believing, as they do, that the natural law is the basis for all
reason. Although it would seem to be inconsistent with their determinism,
82
 [T]hat part of foreordination which deals with the actions of free
moral agents, be they angels, men or devils…. So, I repeat, the
meaning [of predestination] is that God foreordains, fore-
appoints, foredecrees, foredetermines the actions of free moral
agents.80
Gerstner proceeds in setting up this theology by differentiating
between election and reprobation. For him, following the
Westminster Confession, the difference consists in the following
distinction:
Election is that part of predestination which pertains to the
saving acts of free moral agents.81
He says that election is a positive doctrine inasmuch as:
God from all eternity foreordains that some actions should be
unto eternal life by actually initiating, or instigating, or
energizing, or empowering these actions,82 … to wit, the saving
actions already mentioned.
God’s role is unambiguous in Gerstner’s account. He says,
God must actually empower this person [who has fallen into sin
and is unable to save himself or even to reach out to be saved]
to accept the salvation God proffers to him…. Election is
positive because God actually does do something. He actually
effects the act in the person.83
On the other hand, reprobation is God’s being passive to the condition
of some individuals. Gerstner’s words are:
• God predestines the acts of sinful men by ordaining all the
circumstances which lead to the sinner’s choice of evil
without inclining, or disposing, or energizing the sinner to do
the evil deed.84

Stoic ethics argues that each person ought to control only those things that
are controllable, namely the way each adapts to the external necessity of the
natural law governed universe.
80
Ibid. pg. 6.
81
Ibid. pg. 7.
82
Ibid.
83
Ibid.
84
Ibid.
83
 • He [God] does not change the heart of the individual, or
enable or incline the individual to do the virtuous and saving
act, but on the contrary leaves the individual to himself. This
individual then inclines toward the evil and does the wicked
deed which brings about his damnation.85
• If God decides [for whatever inscrutable reason] not to
change a particular individual but rather to leave that person
to himself, we call that reprobation.86
• … For a person to come to Jesus Christ there must be a prior
divine action in that person’s heart.87
It seems difficult to argue that the foreordination/predestination
doctrine is accurate given clear Biblical facts. Once again, we have
the alternative of accepting the Reformed account of things or the
Biblical one. In the absence of any way to reconcile these logically
incompatible representations, the acceptance of the Reformed
doctrines entails the denial of the Biblical one. Biblical theology is
logically incompatible with the Westminster Confession.88 They are
mutually exclusive.
Foreknowledge
In what sense may one say that God has foreknowledge? In
general, Christians are generally agreed in holding that
foreknowledge is a necessary property of God. If God has
foreknowledge then God has knowledge of future events because
“God foreordains, fore-appoints, foredecrees, foredetermines the

85
Ibid.
86
Ibid. Gerstner should have said “had decided” instead of “decides”
given the doctrine of foreordination.
87
Ibid., pg. 8.
88
As part of my World Religions class, I always provide the students
with a copy of the Council of Trent Confession and the Westminster
Confession. The reaction from these students is nearly universal. No one,
they say, could actually believe this. It is prima facie unjust. Our
discussions are passionate. The atheists have their belief that Christianity is
either pernicious or just silly reinforced while the Reformed or Reformed-
oriented students struggle with the inherent cognitive dissonances. There
are few who advocate of what I am calling Option #4 theologies. However,
when I explain the paradigmatic parameters of Option #4, they tend to give
Christianity a more favorable hearing.
84
actions”. As Luther says, “God knows nothing by contingency.”89
Gerstner adds that God does this foreordination with regard to “free
moral agents”, and does this so blithely that the obvious analytic
contradiction appears not to have even occur to him. How can the
actions of “free” moral agents be “free” and also “foreordained,
foredecreed, or foredetermined”? One might just as well refer to a
“square circle” or a “non-three-sided-triangle”. The Dogma of
Foreordination asserts this of God. God is, accordingly, omniscient
since whatever events occur are events that God has already
“foreordained, foredecreed, or foredetermined” will occur even so far
as the individual actions of individual agents.90
Traditional theology has always advocated the view that God is
omniscient. To be sure, God knows many things, indeed many things
to which we humans are not privy. The Bible apparently represents
God as knowing about people before they were even born.91 God
provides information about future events, or perhaps “possible” or

89
See: Martin Luther The Bondage of the Will Chapter 5 “The
Sovereignty of God” section 9.
90
This is also a feature of Islamic fatalism—“As Allah wills.”
91
Psalm 51:5 is often cited as evidence of this doctrine. Calvin says of
it that “there is no ambiguity in David’s confession…. he properly reiterates
the confession of impurity from his very birth.” [Institutes of the Christian
Religion Book 2, Ch 1, Sec 5]. It is worthy of note that the semantics of the
notion of confession contains the notion of personal responsibility. One
does not confess to things one does compulsively or involuntarily. However,
Calvin’s interpretation of the verse takes it out of the context of the Psalm
itself. David accepts full responsibility for his sin (Orchestrating the death
of Urriah in order to cover up his adultery with Bathsheba and the resultant
pregnancy). There is no indication at all of any appeal to any depraved
condition. In fact, the translators of the NIV leave room for interpreting
e
David’s remark `yMiai ynIt.m;x/y< aj.xeb.W yTil.l'Ax !Aw['B.-!h as “Surely I was
sinful at birth, sinful from the time my mother conceived me.” [I.e., “I have
sinned ever since I was born.”] Literally, the words say, “I was wallowing
in iniquity [yTil.l'Ax !Aw['B] from the time I was born.” David’s sin is his
own and God is justified in holding him responsible for it, hence his appeal
to God for forgiveness. There is room for existential hyperbole due to
existential remorse. The prominence of the 1st person singular both in the
form of the verbs and in the pronominal suffixes lead to this conclusion.
Other exegetical conclusions are unjustified.
85
even “probable” future events, to prophets who in turn convey these
prophecies to others.92
Consider for example, that God knows that Judas will betray
Jesus. Does this entail that Judas had no choice in the matter? It is,
according to the Foreordination Dogma, a particular event already
determined, inasmuch as every particular event is determined before
the foundation of the world. If God needed a traitor for the viability
of His plan to save the world through Christ’s death on the cross,
would it be true to say that God’s soteriological plan victimized
Judas? God’s choosing Judas as Christ’s traitor, as a matter of
foreordination, appears to mean that Judas could not have avoided
betraying Him. Further, the Reprobation Dogma requires that no
matter what Judas would do, no divine activity would, or perhaps
could, interfere. This creates the question, “If Judas had free-will and
had chosen to remain loyal to Jesus, or would have repented of his
treachery (as he apparently tried to do in attempting to return the
bribe), would God’s plan have failed for the lack of a traitor?” If one
answers this question in the affirmative then something will have
happened that God did not foreordain and, consequently, could not
have known. His not having foreordained it entails the conclusion
that God could not have foreknown it. In order for the Foreordination
Dogma to be true, God must have caused, i.e., foreordained, Judas to
betray Jesus. If this is true, then the Dogma of Reprobation is false,
for God will not have merely left Judas to sin, but had caused all
events, including Judas’ treachery, to unfold according to His
inscrutable and inviolate will. Answering the question in the negative

92
The early Church saw Jesus’ crucifixion in many of the Psalms,
particularly the 16th and the 22nd. However, the theological insight was only
recognized as a fulfillment of prophecy after the events had occurred. Sir
Karl Popper discusses this kind of sloppy thinking as not actually predictive
but as retrodictive. See his The Open Universe: An Argument for
Indeterminism Section 19 “The Verdict of Special Relativity”, pages 57-62.
Although Popper was not discussing prophecy, but rather the predictability
of scientific hypotheses in terms of Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity,
the point seems relevant here in that using the Special Theory of Relativity
presupposes that God would be immanent in Space-Time inasmuch as all
events, including Divine events, must occur in Space-Time. It is a major
theological problem to address whether or not the universe God created is
open or closed and the extent to which God is affected by the universe He
created.
86
means that either God caused Judas to act in treachery guaranteeing
the viability of His plan, or God had a plan “B”, a Judas backup plan,
if you will [See: Matthew 26:20-25].
Plan “A” would violate our ontological doctrine for He will have
caused Judas to do something such that his act was immoral
(provided, of course, that the notion of “a caused action is immoral”
is not an oxymoron) and that Judas could neither have done nor willed
to do otherwise. God becomes unjust the moment He condemns
Judas for this act. Some plan “B” option, is logically possible and
consistent with maintaining both God’s free-will and man’s, but has
adverse consequences for the omniscience doctrine. Can God know
what Judas will do apart from God’s causing him to do it? The
Foreordination Dogma will not permit this interpretation. But, if He
can, then no problem exists.
It does seem that there were many people who could have acted
such that Jesus would have been betrayed. It does not seem to be
necessary for Jesus’ betrayal that Judas is the necessary betrayer. I
suspect that there were very many people who hated Jesus and were
working on ways to eradicate Him. As the High Priest is reported to
have said, “It is expedient that one man should die to save the people.”
[John 11:50] Certainly many others were capable of dealing
treacherously with Jesus. So, it is altogether reasonable to hold that
God knew that there would be a betrayal without causing any
particular individual to become the betrayer. Neither does it mean
that God, at some “critical mass” point, could not have known enough
about Judas’ values and choices to have been ignorant of his
intentions. By the time of the Last Supper, when Jesus identifies
Judas as the betrayer, Judas may very likely have decided on and very
likely had already implemented his plan of betrayal (It was to have
been carried out a mere few hours hence.). In such a case, Jesus will
have merely stated a fact. Matthew declares Jesus’ words, “But woe
to that man who betrays the Son of Man! It would be better for him
if he had not been born.” This seems to be statement assigning
personal responsibilty based on a general moral principle.
Upon considering the election and reprobation dogmas of
Reformed theology, we are faced with a problem that vitiates the
moral justification for God’s acting or refusing to act, “for whatever
inscrutable reason.” Foreordination asserts that God created the
universe in every particular to conform to His will. In virtue of this
foreordination, God has chosen beforehand which individuals He
87
elects, again “for whatever inscrutable reason”, and those whom He
has chosen for reprobation, again “for whatever inscrutable reason.”
If, as the Dogma of Election asserts, God “effects” the necessary
changes in a sinner’s heart such that the sinner can use the God-
originated gift of faith to be saved, and He neglects doing the same
for others who are equally depraved, then Judas is indeed condemned
in virtue of God’s inscrutable will. Unless there is some moral
justification for this policy, God’s exercising His will “for whatever
inscrutable reason” is very probably immoral. But, if “for whatever
inscrutable reason” is taken to be prima facie moral, this practice is
itself entirely inscrutable. Let us suppose that I am walking in a park,
alongside a frozen pond one winter day. At once I observe a person
in the pond who has obviously fallen through the ice. I have the
power to render assistance. If I do so, and save the person, I am a
hero. If I do not, I am, according to Gerstner and others, neither
heroic nor insensitive. I merely have “inscrutable reasons” for
ignoring the plight of the victim. I may or may not have reasons for
my response, or lack thereof, which I refuse to divulge. Few people
will think me morally justified in neglecting to act for the victim’s
good. Indeed, most will think ill of me for my inaction, and, it seems,
with considerable justification. So, why should we blithely accept
that God’s inaction with regard to sinners of reprobation is morally
justifiable? “Inscrutability” seems to be no justification for my
refusal to disclose my reasons and certainly does not entail that they
are moral. It may indicate that they are not.
So, a complication arises in virtue of the logical interface between
the concepts of God’s omniscience in virtue of the Dogma of
Foreordination and man’s free-will, something Gerstner blithely
accepts as natural. It would seem, as the classical argument has it,
that there is a connection between God’s knowing the properties of
an event and His causing the event to conform exactly to what He
knows. Luther argues thusly in the chapter on God’s sovereignty in
his The Bondage of the Will. If God knows something about any
future event, then it would seem that it cannot be true that the future
event that He knows can be otherwise than what He knows about it—
otherwise God would not know it, but only believe it to be true. Since
beliefs can be false while knowledge can never be false, then no so-
called free moral agent can ever exercise its free moral agency
incompatibly with God’s knowledge of events, for that would mean
that God did not really know the events, and, so, God would not have

88
omniscience, for then there would be something God did not know,
but only believed. In such a case, God will have had a false belief,
and no false belief is knowledge. If it is true that there would be
something God did not know, then that entails that the proposition
“God is omniscient” is false.
There is the logical possibility that God could know all knowable
things thus technically being omniscient and still have some beliefs
such that they are false. Any objection to accepting this possibility
would entail the proposition that the concept of omniscience requires
that God not only know all knowable things but that it must also be
true that God’s beliefs are always true. Of course, one could object
to this scenario by claiming that it is true that God only has knowledge
of knowable things and that He has no beliefs at all. Not having any
beliefs at all entails that it is impossible for God to have false beliefs
since He has no beliefs at all. However, the notion of “knowing
knowable things” is fraught with excruciatingly difficult
epistemological ambiguities. What is a knowable thing, event,
process or relation vis-à-vis an unknowable thing, event, process or
relation? Are we to allow looks backward in order to know some
thing, event, process or relation? Does God know things, events,
processes and relations by necessity or by contingency? I have a
headache!
One way of dealing with this problem is to argue what has been
called the “middle knowledge” doctrine.93 Richard Swinburne
discusses the “middle knowledge” concept in evaluating Alvin
Platinga’s argument to show that God’s foreknowledge is not
incompatible with man’s free-will. Swinburne says:
[Platinga] holds that, Although God could not make people
choose freely as they do, he foreknows how they will choose
freely; not just ‘foreknows’ in the sense of ‘is aware of their

93
See: Richard Swinburne Providence and the Problem of Evil [New
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1998], pages 127-137. Swinburne cites
the origination of this argument with Luis de Molina Of Divine
Foreknowledge originally published in 1588 and available through the
translation of A. J. Freddoso (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988).
See also: Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach and David
Basinger Reason & Religious Belief: An Introduction to the Philosophy of
Religion Third Edition [New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003], pg.
163.
89
 present desires and beliefs, and so knows now how likely it is
that they will do the good as they see it or alternatively capitulate
to desire and do wrong’, but knows necessarily (namely, without
the possibility of mistake) exactly what they will do. Platinga
holds this because he holds to a strong traditional view of God’s
essential omniscience, as God knowing all true propositions;
and combines this with the view that God is not timeless but
everlasting, and so knows now how people will choose
tomorrow, that is has foreknowledge of their free choice. Such
omniscience on this view is essential to God: he cannot but
know all this, or he would not be God. 94
Platinga also holds that God’s omniscience includes
(essentially) ‘middle knowledge’, that is, knowledge not merely
of how actual beings will choose (freely); but also knowledge in
advance, of how all possible beings would choose (freely) in all
possible circumstances if he were to create them.95
God’s omniscience coupled with His omnipotence would mean
that God has the power to create any logically possible universe and
to know every logically possible circumstance in every logically
possible universe, of which there may very well be an infinite number
of possible agents, circumstances and universes.96 Therefore, He
would know what every possible free agent c/would choose in each

94
Ibid. pg. 128: It must be noted that the terms “necessary: and
“essential” have very stringent modal logic characterizations in virtue of his
argument earlier in Alvin Platinga The Nature of Necessity [New York, NY:
Oxford University Press, 1974]. One ought also to examine his God and
Other Minds [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967]. But if God is
omniscient by necessity, it would seem to be incompatible with the middle
knowledge doctrine to hold that God knows all things with regard to free
beings by experience.
95
Swinburne Providence and the Problem of Evil, pg. 128. Also see:
Alvin Platinga God, Freedom and Evil [London: George Allen & Unwin,
1974].
96
Origen of Alexandria [185-254 CE] argued for an infinity of worlds
[De principii, 1,2,10; 3,4,3]. Karl Popper makes a similar remark in his
Logic of Scientific Discovery [New York, NY: Routledge, 1968 (1959)], pg.
39. “This situation is sometimes described by saying that there is a great
number—presumably an infinite number—of ‘logically possible worlds’.
Yet the system called ‘empirical science’ is intended to represent only one
world: the ‘real world’ or the world of experience.”
90
possible universe for every possible circumstance. It would seem,
then, that it would be a simple matter for such a God to choose one
of the particular logically possible universes in which all of the free
agents of that particular universe would be both free and would
always and only use their freedom to choose what is morally right.
This possible condition would seem to comply with the Reformed
Dogma of Foreordination. So, why didn’t God “foreordain” such a
world? If we say that it is not possible for God to have done this, then
God is not omnipotent. If we say that it is possible for Him to do this,
then in view of the fact that our world does not conform to this
condition, would mean that God chooses of His own free-will not to
create such a universe in favor of creating a universe in which He acts
unjustly. This result violates the ontological doctrine. Perhaps the
best solution is to abandon Foreordination, Election and Reprobation
and start over with different paradigmatic parameters.
Empirically speaking, notwithstanding this logical possibility,
the universe of which we are aware is not such a universe. When
Popper attempted to persuade Einstein that his idealism was
untenable, he says,
“Appealing to his own way of expressing things in theological
terms, I said: if God had wanted to put everything in the world
from the beginning, He would have created a universe without
change, without organisms and evolution, and without man and
man’s experience of change. But He seems to have thought that
a live universe with events unexpected even by Himself would be
more interesting than a dead one.” [My emphasis]97
Even if it is logically possible for such idealistic universes to
exist,98 we are still left with the present de facto universe in which
beings seem to have the capacity to choose both good and evil and
very often choose the latter, although sometimes the former. I
presume that this type of universe is God’s goal in determining who
the candidates for Eternal Life might be. This would entail that God

97
Karl R Popper Unended Quest: An Intellectual Autobiography (New
York, NY: Routledge, 1992 [Reprinted 2006]), pg. 150. Recall that
Leibniz’s theodicy argued that of all of the logically possible universes, this
one is “the best of all possible worlds” in virtue of the principle of sufficient
reason.
98
See: Swinburne Providence and the Problem of Evil, Chapter 5
“Action”, especially pg. 84-85.
91
does not know who these might be until they serve a trial period on
earth. This consequence serves to reinforce the view that God is not
omniscient, at least not in the classical sense, and that people have
morally relevant free-will. If we acknowledge this conclusion, then
either God will have erred in some way in creating this existing de
facto universe such that sin and evil, and so, pain and suffering are
possible, or else God does not have omniscience in this sense.
Platinga’s fix does not work. Either there is a causal correlation
between what God knows and what occurs in the future, entailing that
no free-will exists, or else the proposition that God is omniscient, i.e.,
has unfalsifiable knowledge of future events, is false, preserving
man’s free-will. By the way, quantum theory seems to have falsified
the dogma of ubiquitous uniform causality.
It occurs to me that Romans 8:28 [oi;damen de. o[ti toi/j avgapw/sin
to.n qeo.n pa,nta sunergei/ eivj avgaqo,n( toi/j kata. pro,qesin klhtoi/j
ou=sinÅ] may render a valuable insight. According to the Chester
Beatty papyrus p46 (circa 200 AD) as well as Alexandrinus [A] (5th
century) and Vaticanus [B] (4th century) Paul asserts that “God works
all things for good for those who love Him, who have been called
according to His purpose.” [NIV] The term “God” is in the
nominative case [o` qeo.j] in p46, A and B, while in the UBS text the
term “God” appears in the accusative case [to.n qeo.n], a reading that
is assigned a {C} rating, indicating “a considerable degree of doubt”.
In either event, the semantics is the same. The accusative form of
“God” makes the term the object of the participle “those who love”
[toi/j avgapw/sin]. The nominative would be the subject of the main
verb “works together” [pa,nta sunergei/ eivj avgaqo,n]. So, whether God
is explicitly the object of the present active dative participle “to those
who keep on loving” or is explicitly the subject of the verb “works all
things together”, both textual readings suggest that God’s activity is
both interactive and reactive. If it is reactive, then there seem to be
some events God did not cause; events to which He reacts and
interacts with for the good of His people. This is the corner into
which Reformed theology has painted the Faith. It answers the
question of whether it is more important to preserve the doctrine of
God’s omniscience or to allow that human beings are free moral
agents in terms of affirming the former and denying the latter.
Another way of trying to solve this problem is to object on the
ground that the argument as presented presupposes that God is
immanent and temporal, i.e., He, like other temporal beings, cannot
92
have epistemological access to future events. But, some have argued
that God is not temporal in this sense.99 God exists independently of
time—or Space-Time, to accommodate to prevailing cosmological
views. On this view, all events in the universe are in the existential
present for God. For God, there is, in this way of thinking, no future
per se. If there is no future, then God has a posteriori knowledge of
all actual events vitiating Luther’s view, specifically in The Bondage
of the Will, that for God no events are contingent. If all events are
known by God a posteriori, then Luther’s claim that God knows
nothing by contingency is false. So, God cannot be epistemologically
mistaken as a matter of fact rather than as a matter of foreordination,
i.e., necessity. He is, therefore, omniscient as a matter of fact. The
problem with taking this view is that there are certain Biblical
examples such that God does not know some things. So, even if we
adopt this atemporal remedy, we lose Biblical inerrancy. If God is
omniscient, He cannot be surprised, yet He is.
This raises another perspective on God’s immanence vis-à-vis
transcendence. If God is transcendent only, then we seem to justify
a Deist worldview. This mitigates against the capacity of God to
interact with immanent events and so violates the exegesis of Romans
8:28. This consequence is clearly incompatible with the Biblical
records wherein God uses miracles in the interest of His will. If God
is immanent only, then this mitigates against God’s knowing future
events, including how people will use their free-wills. But, if we take
God’s transcendence to be such that it includes an immanent
involvement in history, then we seem to have a case, metaphorically
speaking, of God’s having a Delorean (recall the movie trilogy Back
to the Future). That is to say, God can be aware of how all events
would play out and take steps to interfere with or modify their effects,
say by using miracles or natural events for that matter. It occurs to
me that if the dogma of foreordination were true, then that dogma
entails that no miracle can occur unless of course God wills the
miracle which interferes with some other circumstances which was
also willed by foreordination. This seems a bit much. Indeed, the
consequence of this view is compatible with classical deism, a
theology that I suspect Reformed theologians would find quite

99
See: Richard Swinburne The Coherence of Theism [Oxford, UK:
Clarendon Press, 1977 (Reprinted 1993)], “Chapter 10: Omniscience”, pp.
183.
93
repugnant. This would mean that one must conclude that God’s
omniscience would be dynamic rather than static. Instead of event E
entails consequence C and E is true, therefore C is true, one would
have the freedom to choose any of several event actions, E1, E2, E3,
… En, and God’s omniscience would know for all of the possible
variations on every logically possible selected event what
consequences c/would occur such that He could interact as necessary
to keep event consequences C1, C2, C3, … Cn, within the parameters
of His will. The static view sees events as an unbroken, and perhaps
unbreakable causal chain. The dynamic view sees God as interactive,
dealing with causal chains that come to occur as they occur in virtue
of human, and perhaps demonic, decision-making. It seems to me
that this interpretation would expose the fact that God’s omniscience
is more profound than the classical static omniscience doctrine. Such
is my sorry attempt to make sense of this dogmatic malaise.
In addition, one result of the epistemological dilemmas created
by Neils Bohr’s Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum physics is
what Hugh Everett III has called the “many-worlds” or “branching
universe” interpretation. If, as some have interpreted the
Copenhagen Interpretation to entail, Schrödinger’s cat is both dead
and alive until such time as an observer opens the box, then this
becomes something of a problem for a realist view of the Law of Non-
contradiction. To avoid this result, Everett proffers that with each
possible alternative result, all options occur [my emphasis]. But the
Copenhagen proviso is that no observer in one world can know of
any observers or their observation reports in any of the potentially
infinite other worlds. “[T]he so-called ‘many-worlds interpretation
of quantum mechanics, or the somewhat sensational thesis that the
world splits at any quantum-mechanical interpretation into many
worlds.”100. Alastair Rae says of this interpretation, “This leads us
to an absolutely critical point about the many-worlds interpretation:
once a split has occurred, the two branches have no way of being

100
Karl R. Popper, Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics, [New
York, NY: Routledge, 1982 (Reprinted 2005)], Section 5: “Everett’s ‘Many-
Worlds’ Interpretation”, pp. 89-95. Of course, Platinga’s discussion in The
Nature of Necessity is compulsory.
94
aware of each other.” [Rae’s emphasis]101 Of course, this is
epistemological nonsense, for one cannot claim to know about
unknowable events or observation reports in unknowable universes.
As Popper would observe, this claim is literally meaningless since it
is inherently untestable. Positivists would have to reject this claim as
nonsense as well.
God and an Open Universe?
What then can the Bible mean when it says that God foreknew
what He foreknows? One thing is certain. There are Biblical
passages that either expressly affirm that things happen as a surprise
to God or presuppose that God does not know something in or about
the future.102 Of course, if such passages exist and the inerrancy
doctrine is to be preserved, then it would follow that the Bible does
not have a doctrine of God’s omniscience, at least in the classical
sense. It is incompatible with the omniscience doctrine for the Bible
to describe God in terms that entail that He does not have incorrigible
knowledge of the future. This would not, however, entail that God
could not or would not interact with decisions and the events caused
in virtue of such decisions such that the universe stays on track with
His ultimate aims.

101
Alastair Rae Quantum Physics: Illusion or Reality [Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 1986 (2002)], pg. 76.
102
I owe the following example to Stephen Schneider. For example,
Jeremiah 32:35 “They built high places for Baal in the Valley of Ben
Hinnom to sacrifice their sons and daughters to Molech, though I never
commanded, nor did it enter my mind, that they should do such a detestable
thing and so make Judah sin.” [NIV—emphasis added] Kai. wv|kodo,mhsan
tou.j bwmou.j th/| Baal tou.j evn fa,raggi ui`ou/ Ennom tou/ avnafe,rein tou.j
ui`ou.j auvtw/n kai. ta.j qugate,raj auvtw/n tw/| Moloc basilei/ a] ouv sune,taxa
auvtoi/j kai. ouvk avne,bh evpi. kardi,an mou tou/ poih/sai to. bde,lugma tou/to pro.j
to. evfamartei/n to.n Ioudan. [LXX]
~h,ynEB.-ta, rybi[h] ;l. ~NOhi-!b, aygEB. rv,a] l[;B;h; tAmB'-ta, Wnb.YIw:
taZOh; hb'[Ae Th; tAf[]l; yBili-l[; ht'l.[' al{w> ~ytiyWIci-al{ rv,a] %l,Mol; ~h,yteAnB.-ta,w
s `hd'Why>-ta, Îayjix]h;Ð ¿yjix]h;À ![;m;l
See also: J. Behm, noe,w The Theological Dictionary of the New Testament
[Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdman’s Publishing Company, 1967], Vol.
IV, Pg. 949. “In the LXX the organ of noei/n is often the kardi,a in
acc[ordance] with OT thinking.”
95
 Consider that it would seem that the omniscience doctrine
requires that God knows incorrigibly what His own future actions will
be. So, the offering of prayer requests is nonsense since if someone’s
prayer asks God to change some future event, then God would have
to change His mind making what He had previously willed false with
regard to what He would do in answering a prayer. This would entail
that God will have to climb into His DeLorean and go back to before
the foreordination decisions were made and change the things He had
willed before the foundation of the world. Of course, if this is what
He does in virtue of prayers, we could never know anything about
such a policy, including how many times He may have made such
changes.
Prayer itself becomes a puzzlement, as my friend Stephen
Schneider once pointed out to me. If the universe is created exactly
as God wills in every particular, then any request to have the universe
operate differently in some or any particular is impudent if not
blasphemous. If the universe is closed and fixed, no request for God
to change it would be justified, nor would God be disposed to make
any such alterations, for such changes in a causally closed universe
would alter other events as well as those the prayer originally
besought. So, petitionary prayer would be banished from devotional
life (a consequence some extreme Reformers actually aver). If, on
the other hand, prayer is a conversation in which people and God
interact, then God can arrange the universe differently as long as
requests for Him to do so do not entail any violations of His holiness
standards or create logical impossibilities [“ask any thing in my
name”].103 The metaphysical consequence of this alteration in
theology is that God will have created a relatively open universe and
has not taken a position on certain logically possible matters that may
arise in the future. So, when the Bible says that God appeals to people

103
Consider that God’s extending King Hezekiah’s life falls into this
category [2 Kings 20, see also Jeremiah 26:19]. There are also illustrative
instances particularly Isaiah 1:15 and Jeremiah 7:16, in which God divulges
to His prophets that He no longer listens to prayers on behalf of a rebellious
and unrepentant Israel. It seems God does not make up His mind about
people, until He knows when a person’s or a popuation’s character reaches
a critical mass of immorality that precludes any meaningfully possible
repentance. See also: Jeremiah 4:28, 15:6, 20:16; Ezekiel 24:14. Perhaps
Hebrews 6 expresses this notion as well.
96
to “ask anything in my name and it will be done,” that would mean
that God acknowledges that His own decisions are relatively unfixed
with regard to a sufficiently open future. God merely requires that no
one can expect that his/her prayers would be answered when their
petitions are incompatible with His holiness values and/or would
create contradictory states of affairs or would compromise other more
comprehensive objectives God may have. God apparently does not
know, or, perhaps better, does not commit Himself as to what He
might do pending the myriad of prayer requests of free beings.
It seems to be pretty clear that the attempts to develop theologies
along Option #3 lines must presuppose that the universe God has
created is closed and fixed. This means that Reformed theologies,
and others, are compatible with scientism, reductionism and
metaphysical determinism, all of which entail the consequence that
there are no uncaused events and, so, there can be no notion of
morality outside of those entertained and promulgated by non-
cognitivists. Of course, if non-cognitivism is true, then there is no
need for a soteriology at all. Sin cannot exist in a metaphysically
closed universe in any normative sense of the term. If there is no
normative morality, then there is no sin from which to be saved.
Consequently, there is no need for a Savior. Metaphysical
determinism, if true, banishes Jesus from this particular universe.
Further, God’s patience in dealing with sinners presupposes that
He does not have fixed knowledge of the future actions of free
beings.104 God allows time to pass so that sinners might have time
and room to repent.105 Of course, an omniscient God, in the
traditional sense, will already know whether anyone would repent;
indeed, He would know when everyone who would repent will have
repented.106 This is a direct consequence of the Foreordination

104
See: Richard Swinburne The Cohenrence of Theism where he argues
that God’s free-will restricts the interpretation one may coherently assign
the the concept of God’s omniscience. See also The Christian God [Oxford:
The Clarendon Press, 1994], “Chapter 6: Divine Properties”, pp. 128-134.
105
As, for example, Peter’s argument in 2 Peter 3
106
Be it noted that this use of the term “repent/repentance” here is
entirely gratuitous, for if the universe God created is causally closed and
ontologically fixed then no one change change his/her mind, especially
morally, inasmuch as since all events are the effects of antecedent causes
97
Dogma. In fact, according to the middle knowledge doctrine, God
could have created a universe populated solely of people whom He
foreknew that they would repent. Recall that, according to the middle
knowledge doctrine, God would be able to save everyone in some
particular universe since He could have selected among an infinite
number of possible universes a possible universe in which He
foreknew that all free agents would, in fact, repent. Note, in addition,
that a universe in which all “sinners” would repent as a matter of free-
will would be qualitatively inferior to a universe populated by free
beings who would only use their freedom such that they would
always and only act according to holiness. So, if God had chosen
such a “repentant” universe he would not have chosen the best of all
possible universes, for the latter universe would seem to have been
“better”. This would seem to have violated the ontological doctrine.
Our present universe does not appear to be such a one.
Many New Testament critics object to an Athanasian Christology
because Jesus asserts that he does not know something, entailing that
Jesus and God are separate beings since no single being can both
know all things and also not know something. This objection
presupposes the Reformed closed universe model. If God is
omniscient and has foreordained every particular event in the
universe, then God knows the answer to the question of which Jesus
says He is ignorant. In logic, the application of the Law of the
Identity of Indiscernibles requires that since no individual can both
know and not know some particular thing, one is logically committed
to maintaining that two separate individuals are involved.
Accordingly, Arian Christology would have a major point in its favor.
However, conceptually shifting to an open-universe-paradigm we can
easily see that God has no need to make judgments about what He
will do until He decides to make the judgment. Jesus-as-God-
incarnate may not know because He-as-God has not yet decided. So,
when critics discuss the so-called problem of the Church’s expecting
the end-times to occur by the end of the generation that walked with
Jesus, they ignore the genuine scenario that the influence of the
Church in redeeming the world was proceeding satisfactorily, making
the “end of the world” unnecessary, at least for the moment.

and mental events are necessarily included in such a universe, them all
mental events are caused effects of antecedent events.
98
 So, the precision of the end of time may not be a fixed unalterable
date in history, a date some sagely premillenialist may claim to
discern. Rather, since God interacts with history in responding to and
influencing its events, as alluded to earlier, such a date may be
provisionally set and can be changed according to God’s will
depending on how sinners respond to the call for repentance. There
would be room for revivals. Similarly, God may have decided that a
particular evil person’s influence left unchallenged would result in
His ending history. But, once people or prophets rise up against and
restrain evil people, very likely through the redemptive efforts of the
Church, bringing agents of evil down, God is free to suspend His
wrath until He has to decide about a future evil person or people. This
seems to me to be Paul’s doctrine of the last times in 2 Thessalonians.
He argues that “the Day of the Lord” will not occur unless there is
first an apostasy of the restraining influences providing the conditions
for the revelation of the “man of lawlessness.” Paul argues that God
will not call an end to history unless the church first goes apostate and
that, as a result of the loss of her restraining influence, the man of
lawlessness, whose purpose is to displace God, appears.107
Biblically, there appears to be a very clear characterization of
God as someone who acts within an openly textured universe and
tailors His activities according to the activities of free agents within
that universe. When Jesus says that He cannot answer the question
of when the end times will occur [Mark 13:32], and one takes an
Athanasian position in Christology, we seem to have to conclude that
God leaves at least some futures provisionally open. Accordingly,
God would have established policies in virtue of which His actions
react to the circumstances created by the actions of free agents or
critical masses of them. So, God may make a determination about
what He will do as the movement of history proceeds. Recall that
"
God, in Noah’s time, regrets [~x',N] at having created man.108 When,

107
I think it is a mistake to think of this “man of lawlessness” as merely
some particular historical figure, usually construed in political terms.
Rather, I think it is a characterization of a kind of people who are members
of the class of those in moral rebellion. Particular leaders as members of
this class embody the properties of this class of people, making these
individuals easier to focus on in particular historical epochs.
108
Genesis 6:6 `ABli-la, bCe[t ; .YIw: #r,a'B' ~d'a'h'-ta, hf'['-yKi hw"hy> ~x,N"YIw
99
exactly, does God’s regret [~x',N"] occur given that everything in the
universe is foreordained in every particular? Further, in the case of a
revival, c/would God change His mind about dispensing wrath,
suspending it to allow an extended period for the repentance to
continue, not wanting anyone to perish? Did He not anticipate these
and similar events when He planned for creating the universe as
interfacing with His soteriological plans?
One of the roles prophecy plays is to warn people of impending
judgment if people do not “turn from their wicked ways.” Tradition
interprets Genesis 6 as allowing that Noah was not only to construct
the ark, but also to preach to his generation about the imminent
judgment notwithstanding its derision and contempt. Recall that
Peter refers to Noah as a “preacher of righteousness”—2 Peter 2:5.109
It seems odd to say that God wills the destruction of all men except
for Noah and his immediate family and also to say that Noah should
warn his generation so that they might repent in time to forestall the
impending doom.
In many cases, God offers to repent of the evil He has planned
when people repent of their wickedness [See: II Samuel 24:16 = I
Chronicles 21:15, Jeremiah 18:8, 10; 26:3, 13; 42:10]. This would
mean that God makes preparations in potentially multiple ways,
willing different things according to which of the potential courses
develops. These considerations seem to affect what we may say
about the classical omniscience doctrine.
God’s not knowing which course of events will occur would
mean that He does not know something until certain other events
occur. If it does, then it seems God’s omniscience is provisional. For
example, Jeremiah reports God as having divulged that offering child
sacrifice to Molech was an abomination He had not even considered
possible. Similarly, consider the problem Jonah faces when God
instructs him to go to Nineveh and preach repentance to them.
Apparently, the evil there was so profound that Jonah tries to resist
complying with God’s directive. He ends up going only to find that

109
Noah is depicted as the stalwart preacher forewarning doom, but the
people “sneered at him, each one, calling him demented, a man gone mad”
(Sib. Or. 1.171–73). See: Mathews, K. A. (1996). Vol. 1A: Genesis 1-11:26.
The New American Commentary. Nashville: Broadman & Holman
Publishers.
100
the Ninevites respond to God’s call to repent, a consequence Jonah
resents. This seems a rather roundabout way to approach the
conversion of a morally rebellious people especially if God has a
power to elect (cause someone to be able to respond) the Ninevites,
or chooses to exercise such a power of election over them. Could
God’s election of the Ninevites have been cancelled by Jonah’s
refusal to preach to them? Would Jonah’s refusal to comply interfere
with God’s purposes vis-à-vis the Ninevites? Or does God cause
Jonah to relent and preach as well as causing his resentment at the
response of the Ninevites?
Revivals of faith surely entail that any plans God may have to
dispense His wrath would proceed unless there is a repentance-based
revival. In the case of a revival, God will implement His repentance-
option-response instead of His wrath-option-response. This would
preserve God’s free-will along with His omnipotence. The Reformed
view does not allow for this within God or His universe. Reformed
theology seems unable to address the question of whether it was the
sin or the repentance that God foreordained or predestined. Would
He or could He have foreordained both? Why should God have to
use prophets at all if, as Reformers argue, all things are predestined
in particular detail from before the foundation of the world?
The Scripture often portrays God as repenting (changing His
mind) of things He has decided. One merely needs to examine the
places where some form of the term “repent” occurs in conjunction
with the term “God”, and then exegete those passages for the
cognitive impact of the doctrine of God’s repentance on this
doctrine.110 Do not forget Genesis 6:5-7 where God says that He

110
See: Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament [1344.0 ~x;n "
(nacham) be sorry, repent, regret, be comforted, comfort. Not used in the
Qal, nacham occurs chiefly in the Niphal and Piel.] “The KJV translates the
Niphal of nacham ‘repent’ thirty-eight times. The majority of these instances
refer to God's repentance, not man's. The word most frequently employed to
indicate man's repentance is shûb (q, v.), meaning ‘to turn’ (from sin to God).
Unlike man, who under the conviction of sin feels genuine remorse and
sorrow, God is free from sin. Yet the Scriptures inform us that God repents
(Gen 6:6-7; Exo 32:14; Jud 2:18; 1Sam 15:11 et al.), i.e. he relents or
changes his dealings with men according to his sovereign purposes. On the
surface, such language seems inconsistent, if not contradictory, with certain
passages which affirm God's immutability: ‘God is not a man... that he
101
repented of creating mankind due to the level of evil man had
attained. Their thoughts and intentions were “only evil all of the
time.”111 Only Noah and his family had shown a sufficient level of
righteousness that God was willing to grant him and his family an
exemption from the imminent wrath. It seems that this comment
entails that men had behaved with a level of malice that God had not
anticipated. This is not the only case of God’s expressing such
surprise. Consider another example. God says to Moses that he has
decided to annihilate the children of Israel because of their
wantonness and idolatry at Sinai. Moses appeals to God to change
his mind and uses some very peculiar arguments, to which God
ultimately responds [See: Exodus 32:12-14].
Total Depravity
Let us now consider the claims that the advocates of another
mistaken dogma make, i.e., the dogma of man’s total depravity. John
Murray frames total depravity in terms of the Westminster
Confession.
By this sin they fell from their original righteousness, and
communion with God, and so became dead in sin, and wholly
defiled in all the faculties and parts of soul and body. They being
the root of all mankind, the guilt of this sin was imputed, and the
same death in sin and corrupted nature conveyed, to all their
posterity, descending from them by ordinary generation. From
this original corruption, whereby we are utterly indisposed,

should repent’ (1Sam 15:29 contra v. 11); ‘The Lord has sworn and will not
change his mind’ (Psa 110:4). When nacham is used of God, however, the
expression is anthropopathic and there is not ultimate tension. From man's
limited, earthly, finite perspective it only appears that God's purposes have
changed. Thus the OT states that God ‘repented’ of the judgments or ‘evil’
which he had planned to carry out (1Chr 21:15; Jer 18:8; Jer 26:3, 19; Amos
7:3, 6; Jon 3:10). Certainly Jer 18:7-10 is a striking reminder that from God's
perspective, most prophecy (excluding messianic predictions) is conditional
upon the response of men. In this regard, A. J. Heschel (The Prophets, p.
194) has said, ‘No word is God's final word. Judgment, far from being
absolute, is conditional. A change in man's conduct brings about a change in
God’s judgment.’”
111
Genesis 6:5
`~AYh;-lK' [r qr; ABli tbov.x.m; rc,yE-lk'w> #r,a'B' ~d'a'h' t[;r' hB'r; yKi hw"hy> ar>Y:w:;
102
 disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to
all evil, do proceed all actual transgressions.112
Man, by his fall into a state of sin, hath wholly lost all ability of
will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation; so as a
natural man, being altogether averse from that good, and dead
in sin, is not able, by his own strength, to convert himself, or to
prepare himself thereunto.113
Murray takes it for granted that the Westminster Confession and the
Bible are perfectly compatible. Unfortunately, this presumption is
entirely gratuitous.
First, there is a peculiar distinction Murray makes between what
he calls “natural virtue or civil righteousness” on the one hand and
the terms used in the Confession “any spiritual good”, on the other.114
The [Westminster] Confession does not, of course, deny to
men what we may call natural virtue or civil righteousness. It
affirms that works done by unregenerate men may, as regards
the matter of them, be things which God commands, and of
good use both to themselves and others. Neither does it say
that all men are equally depraved, or to put it more accurately
it does not say that this corruption "whereby we are utterly
indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and
wholly inclined to all evil" receives the same degree of
development and expression in all. What the Confession does
is to set forth the teaching of Scripture with respect to the
moral and spiritual condition of men as they stand in the pure
light of the divine standard and judgment. Judged by that
norm they are dead in sin and wholly defiled.115
Apparently we are to accept as true the proposition that although
people can do “civil righteousness” from a “natural virtue”, this
capacity is irrelevant to one’s total depravity in virtue of which all
humans are “utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all
good, and wholly inclined to all evil” and again “altogether averse

112
Westminster Confession VI.2-4
113
Westminster Confession IX.3.
114
Also see Calvin’s Institutes Book 2, Chapter 3, Section 4.
115
John Murray “The Reformed Faith and Arminianism” The
Presbyterian Guardian 1935-1936
103
from that good”. This is apparently a concession to the fact that there
have been a significant number of human beings that are “civilly
righteous” out of “natural virtue” — Mohandas K. Gandhi comes to
mind. Murray needs to be able to account for someone of Gandhi’s
stature as a moral leader while maintaining that, notwithstanding this
“civil righteousness”, this “natural virtue”, he is, nevertheless,
spiritually depraved, no doubt because he is primarily Hindu (I am
guessing that Reformers are prepared to accept the proposition that
God had not elected him since he was not a Christian, otherwise God
may elect various and sundry non-Christians for salvation).
So, if this is what is meant, we are left to conclude that there are
two types of goodness only one of which is “spiritually” relevant.
People with what we may now call “spiritually relevant goodness”
are only those who have been given the faith necessary to qualify as
“saved.” We are left with the further conclusion that some people to
whom God may have given the faith in virtue of which they would be
saved may do less “civil righteousness” than those who do more
“civil righteousness” but have less “spiritually relevant goodness”.
This seems not only odd but prima facie unjust. Bifurcating goodness
into two types of goodness creates cases of prima facie injustice. It
raises the question: “In virtue of what do acts of ‘spiritual’, as
opposed to ‘civil’, righteousness consist?” It cannot be acts such as
Gandhi did inasmuch as he is, according to the doctrine, still totally
depraved. He is not, after all, a Christian. If Gandhi was one, in order
to account for his having done good things, then it would seem to be
possible for Gandhi to be a Christian without knowing that he was,
indeed without making a commitment to being one in virtue of the
faith God would have to have given him. One can be depraved,
indeed totally so, and still do good things, which, soteriologically,
matters not a whit to God. This is in spite of the statement of the
Westminster Confession that “total depravity” means, that “whereby
we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good,
and wholly inclined to all evil, do proceed all actual transgressions.”
[Emphasis added]
The Confession leaves no room for the equivocation Murray
thinks he needs. I am left to conclude that the Confession states the
strong position, namely that no acts of goodness or righteousness are
possible, much less soteriologically significant. But, this leads me to
also conclude that as long as God has given anyone the requisite faith
such that it nullifies total depravity, that one cannot infer from any of

104
his/her actions, whether good or bad, that s/he is either saved or not
saved. Presumably this consequence extends even to the person
him/herself. If someone has been saved, he cannot know this with
any degree of certainty. Gandhi could not infer that he was saved
despite his apparent endeavors to be right and to do rightly. Indeed,
Gandhi studied and admired Jesus but remained Hindu
notwithstanding his adopting many of Jesus’ doctrines, especially
non-violence in responding to evil. This is the conclusion Murray
wants to have.
It permits other conclusions to which I hope he would be
opposed. An adulterous preacher cannot infer from his sin that he
was not saved or that his salvation is in jeopardy. On this ground
alone, the doctrine is not only silly, but pernicious, for it permits
unbelievers to conclude that God is either stupid or malicious and it
allows believers, or so-called believers, to live lives imbued with sin
all the while claiming irresistible grace and eternal security.116 It
turns out that this distinction distinguishes between indiscernibles.
Any distinction that ends up making no distinction was never a
distinction in the first place. Artificial distinctions tend to be ad hoc,
appearing in arguments merely to buttress them when they are about
to collapse.
Finally, it ought to be possible to genetically test the Total
Depravity dogma. If man is genetically sinful as the dogma claims,
then one ought to be able to take a DNA sample from any human
being and identify the gene in virtue of which original sin exists. We
could go further. We could compare the DNA of someone who is
what Gerstner would call reprobate, any infant will do because all are
depraved in utero, and compare that sample with someone whom
Gerstner would call elect, perhaps Jonathan Edwards, Charles
Spurgeon, D. L. Moody, Bob Jones or Billy Graham will do. There
should be an empirical DNA difference between the reprobate human
DNA and the elect human DNA. As a consequence, the DNA test
could in principle establish those to whom God had given Faith and
those to whom He had not. We could even take two DNA samples
from the same person, one before God had given him “enabling” faith

116
Gandhiji makes this observation about the Plymouth Brethren man
cited above. See: Mohandas K. Gandhi Gandhi an Autobiography: The
Story of My Experiments with Truth [Bostom, MA: Beacon Press, 1957
(1993)], pg. 124-125.
105
and one after he was supposedly saved and determine what gene had
changed. Further, if we knew where the depravity gene was, we
should be able to fix it and turn everybody into an elect person. We
could extract or copy the Faith gene from the elect and surgically
replace the depravity genes of all reprobates (perhaps felony
prisoners will do) with copies of the Faith gene. If God chose to
continue His reprobate policy, He would then be forced to change the
gene back or else accept our genetic fix. We would be able to
circumvent the foreordained will of God. Since Faith is a genetic
alteration, on this account, we could settle the matter. I doubt,
however, that anyone would be awarded a Nobel Prize for
discovering this gene. I doubt that there is such a gene. It even seems
silly to argue that there is one. Yet, this has been the position of
Catholics and Reformers for over two millennia.
Summary
The analyses of the dogmas in virtue of which Option #3
theologies construct their theological paradigm are inherently flawed.
The universe cannot be closed, as the foreordination dogma requires.
It is entirely possible, indeed, necessary for God to have created a
universe with a sufficiently open texture such that God is free as is
man who is created in His image. It also seems quite clear, as we
have concluded, that consistently with this analysis, one can take a
consistent Athanasian position in Christology. This also entails that
sinners can be legitimately held morally responsible for having
chosen to become sinners and that they have a moral duty to repent
for the forgiveness of sins. It entails that God’s soteriological plan
can provide both the opportunity and the incentive for voluntarily
repenting of sin.

106
Chapter Five—Thesis 1) “The Righteous Man shall live by
Faith”—Romans 1:17

The Roman Epistle becomes an exegetical enigma. On the one
hand, in the first three chapters, sin is regarded as an act of defiance
against God’s holiness imperative. In the fourth chapter it contains
the soteriological principle of justification by faith. This sort of faith
is modeled on the patriarch Abraham, and so we might expect the
passages arguing this principle would be compatible with the
Reformed doctrine of sola Fide. However, there is no indication that
God gave faith to Abraham because He had elected him.
On the other hand, the epistle seems to have a central doctrine of
the “sinful nature”, or at least the NIV leads us to this conclusion.
Paul, according to the NIV, uses this notion in the fifth chapter and
again in the seventh. The eighth chapter seems to continue the “sinful
nature” theme. Notwithstanding the translation’s use of this
terminology, the question arises whether the so-called notion of a
“sinful nature” vitiates the viability of the notion of free-will and
moral accountability that the early chapters clearly presuppose and
espouse. If it does, then we have a clear case of a serious
inconsistency in Paul’s theology in general, and his soteriology in
particular. Either Paul will have made a huge theological blunder
violating the ontological doctrine (which doctrine would seem to
require that any “real” God would behave with logical consistency;
that is to say that the Holy God’s inspired authors would provide,
under His direction, a sustained argument that is internally consistent)
or the compatibilist views of Augustine culminating in the Reformers,
especially Lutherans and Calvinists, are mistaken and they have
committed the theological blunder.117 In any event, a resolution of

117
It would also be necessary to explain any discrepancy between
Luke’s characterization of Paul’s evangelistic argument (a point I have
already argued in Chapter Three) and the theology that occurs in an exegesis
of his Roman epistle. It seems that there ought to be a consistency between
the two. If inconsistencies occur, then we have a serious infallibility
problem. The presumption ought to be in favor of a compatibility of
107
this problem requires a defense of the proposition that there is no
exegetical reason to prefer an Augustinian-Calvinist-Reformed-
Compatibilist theological position to any theology that assigns the
responsibility for sin to the sinner and graciousness to the Divine
initiative to save those sinners who repent. So, I will present my
argument according to the thesis that an internally consistent reading
of the Roman Epistle is logically, and, therefore, theologically,
incompatible with the positions taken by advocates for Option #3
paradigms and is compatible with Option #4 paradigms.
Eight Theses on Romans
I will argue that Paul’s argument structure for the Epistle is built
on defending these eight theses:
1. The righteous person lives his/her life according to faith as a
cognitive moral principle, i.e., the righteous person knows
what is holy and resolves to live according to holiness,
whether his/her life goes well or ill.
2. Since people have the capacity for living according to faith as
a cognitive moral principle, God’s wrath against their moral
rebellion is morally justified. Morally rebellious men who
willfully suppress the truth for the express purpose of
engaging in unrighteousness are without excuse
[avnapologh,touj].
3. Jesus Christ is the embodiment of what Faith is and His
expression of this Faith occurs independently of the Law and
the Prophets, and is not incompatible with either of them.
4. Abraham is the example of how God deals with people who
resolve to comply with God’s just holiness expectations. God

theology between the two divinely authorized authors. I realize, however,
that an ardent advocate of the Option #3 position will not have to require
that the Infallibility of Scripture Doctrine entails that there always needs to
be logical compatibility between various Scriptural texts. Since Option #3
advocates maintain that Reason is unreliable on the ground that it is
corrupted by the Fall, it is unnecessary for it to be a logical requirement that
Scripture should be logically consistent. Therefore, the infallibility doctrine
could not possibly be falsified. Any so-called contradiction between
passages appeals to Reason, which is, by dogma, already tainted. Oops!
There I go using Reason again!
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 extends His grace to those who, like Abraham, choose faith,
i.e., moral integrity, as the basis for their lifestyle.
5. Grace is God’s disposition to accept, in lieu of a person’s de
facto failure to comply with the moral requirements of Faith,
his/her resolve to become as holy as He justifiably expects.
6. Jesus, as the embodiment of God’s expression of moral
expectation and grace, is unlike the original Adam in fact but
not in nature. Adam is the type of rebellious man, while Jesus
is the type of the righteous man who lives by faith.
7. The Jewish people are the people through whom God chose to
present Himself as the Messiah and messianic moral
expectations in history; yet this role confers on this people no
special soteriological status. A faithless Jew is no Jew at all.
A Gentile with faith is as much a Jew independently of having
the appropriate liturgical scar or lineage. “Jewish” as a species
of humanity must comply with God’s holiness expectations
just as all others must, on the ground that God is no respecter
of persons [ouv ga,r evstin diastolh. VIoudai,ou te kai.
{Ellhnoj(].
8. Consequently, Christians, people of faith, voluntarily and
conscientiously alter their lifestyle to conform to God’s just
holiness expectations. Christians accept responsibility for
becoming disciplined disciples.
Thesis One: “The Righteous Man Shall Live by Faith”
Thesis 1: The righteous person lives his/her life according to
faith as a cognitive moral principle, i.e., the righteous person
knows what is holy and resolves to live according to holiness,
whether his/her life goes well or ill.
If faith is that in virtue of which one can be saved, is it not vitally
important to know in what faith consists? No one can deny that the
notion of faith is central to Christianity. Every theological tradition
places it at the core of its soteriology. Unfortunately, the notion is
variously articulated. Further, there is disagreement over which of
the various notions is the correct one. If one is “correct” vis-à-vis the
others, then there will have to be some criterion in virtue of which all
of them can be measured. This elevates the discussion to another
level in terms of how one arrives at the criterion that everyone ought
to adopt so as to resolve cognitive dissonances between the various

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notions. Is faith defined by “authoritative” interpreters? What counts
as an “authoritative” interpreter? What agency gets to certify the
credentials of the authoritative? Is this not nepotistic? Does the
definition have to rely on councils and synods or the creeds they
devise? Does this not reduce the discussion to politics? Is the
definition, therefore, in evolution such that what it once meant it does
so no longer? Is there a magisterium? Is its definition merely what
individual people take it to mean? In other words, is faith not
cognitive at all but non-cognitive, even mystical?
I will proceed by giving authoritative status to the Christ and the
doctrines of His apostles. Where the Bible speaks, I will also, at least
to the best of my ability. Where doctrines have evolved, I will
examine them in virtue of Biblical criteria. I understand that many of
the historical authorities have come to quite diverse opinions on the
Scripture and each has drawn on the Bible in defense of its views.
We cannot conclude however that all such interpretations have equal
cognitive standing since they articulate doctrines that are internally
inconsistent in themselves as well as being externally inconsistent
with each other. Surely the Word of God is not so variable as to mean
different things to different people. Surely it has its own meaning.
What exactly is this thing called “Faith”? If it is faith in virtue of
which the righteous man shall live, then the answer to this question is
paramount. Christians use the term “Faith” as though they
understand what it means. It is only when we begin to study the
notion of faith that we discover how very slippery it is. As we had
previously asked, “Is faith a species of spiritual ignorance?” Is faith
opposed to reason, as many would argue? Once one comes to know
something does one no longer have faith? To reiterate our earlier
point, if faith is ignorance of whatever kind, then it is difficult to
distinguish between one kind of ignorance and another. So, one could
not know that one faith or belief is true vis-a-vis any other faith or
belief.
The trouble that religion faces in our post-Humean,
postmodernist time is that there is a nearly universal confusion
between 1) faith/belief as a subjective state and 2) faith/belief as
objective content, 3) faith/belief as a property of moral character and
4) faith as that power in virtue of which God enables some sinner to
believe such the sinner can be saved.

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The Problem of Non-cognitive “Faiths”
One could believe as a subjective state that his/her faith is true as
objective content. But no belief , no matter how passionately held as
a subjective state, is ever guaranteed to be objectively true, as
objective content. So, how does one discover that a subjective belief
is false as objective content? Doesn’t one have the moral and
intellectual responsibility to believe as a subjective state what is
objectively true? A true belief as objective content needs something
more than merely believing it as a subjective state in order to have its
truth certified. Nothing is true because someone believes it, because
it is possible for beliefs as a subjective state to be false as an objective
state of affairs. Further, it does not follow that reality relents in virtue
of anyone’s affirming something false or refusing to believe
something true.
Currently, according to the critics of religious belief, from David
Hume through the Logical Positivists to the Postmodernists, belief
has no ground for any appeal to its truth other than a psychological
appeal to a subjective-state-passionately-held. So, religious belief is
only true for the person who happens to believe it, and that truth is
merely true for that particular believer. Another “truth”, even a
“truth” that is logically incompatible with the first one, remains true
for another believer, or even for the same believer at some other time.
Hopefully, we shall be able to discover something more substantial
in Paul’s notion of faith than this relativistic, subjectivist twaddle.
If faith/belief is merely a “subjective-state-passionately-held”
then faith itself presents problems for evangelism. Obviously when
religious belief is merely subjective, merely personal, evangelism
can, indeed, it must take on the form of manipulating subjective
states. Evangelism must bypass the mind because the mind is
irrelevant, even untrustworthy.118 That Christianity has
accommodated to this epistemological relativism is seen by the fact
that preaching has less and less to do with theology and exegesis and
more to do with emotainment, i.e., the Faith has become
psychologized. This should not be surprising since fewer seminarians

118
Interestingly, this is not only the position Gnostics held but also one
Hindus and Buddhists hold. Any so-called knowledge is of a phenomenal
world and is in virtue of that fact maya, illusion and unreal. Meditation is
the practice the goal of which is to empty the mind of any and all
phenomenal content.
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seek degrees in philosophical theology or even exegetical studies and
devote their academic energies toward pastoral counseling and
administration. It is fine, even necessary to focus on the mechanisms
for remedying the dysfunctional effects of sin on people or to have an
efficient administration of programming, provided it contains
discipling as well as coping. However, the discipline itself is tainted
with the focus on the subjective condition of the client. Little effort
focuses on the falsity of the beliefs that keep them in psychological
turmoil, or on the inconsistency of these beliefs with other facts that
are clearly true.
Worship increasingly relies on vehicles for making people feel
good about their belief, i.e., subjective-state-passionately-held. Any
change from one belief, i.e., subjective-state-passionately-held, to
another subjective-state-passionately-held belief has to occur in
virtue of some change of feeling. William James would be proud of
Christians for having adjusted their views to his.119 That is to say that
a subjective-state-passionately-held consists in trumping one
emotional experience with one that is more erotic, more orgasmic.
Since, these emotional “highs” are shorter-lived, like an addiction,
the next “fix” has to create greater and greater “highs” closer and
closer together. Hence, since having daily and hourly worship service
“hits” are impractical, we must get our musical “highs” through
“Christian” radio, audio and video recordings, CDs and DVDs. The
“binges” come in expensive praise weekends or praise retreats or
praise cruises. Christianity can not only not compete with the
erotically driven entertainment and drug culture, it must not do so, for
Christianity is not about feeling good, but about becoming good.
When one withdraws from reality for whatever reason or by whatever
means, it becomes more and more difficult to deal with reality.
Reason has come to be regarded as unreliable in matters requiring
faith since the fall of Adam is said to have corrupted Reason itself.120

119
I refer, of course to William James’ Varieties of Religious
Experience [New York, NY: Collier Books, 1961], the 1901-1902 Gifford
Lectures, wherein he analyzes religious belief in psychological terms.
120
Recall, as earlier cited, Pascal’s Pensees, 445: “You must not, then,
reproach me for the want of reason in this doctrine [man’s having original
sin], since I admit it to be without reason. But this foolishness is wiser than
all the wisdom of men, sapientius est hominibus [I Cor 1:25]. For without
this, what can we say that man is? His whole state depends on this
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Reason is regarded as the tool of Satan. Reason cannot comprehend
the inscrutable God, “whose ways are higher than our ways.” So,
anyone who believes, even though the belief is contrary to reason or
is positively irrational, is spiritually superior to those who rely on or
give some place to Reason in Faith. If one is to believe in Christ, one
must have been given the gift of Faith in virtue of which he can
believe (i.e., have a subjective-state-passionately-held) the things
necessary for salvation but which one could not previously believe
due to original sin or total depravity.
Of course, it escapes notice that if faith as a subjective-state-
passionately-held is a gift given to men at God’s sole discretion, it is
difficult to understand why everyone does not have the same
subjective-state-passionately-held. This may be called the
Augustinian, or perhaps, the Westminsterian Fallacy. The
Heidelberg Confession makes the same claims. Augustine argued121
in his Treatise on Man’s Perfection in Righteousness that both faith
and perseverance are gifts God gives to whom He chooses and that
for anyone to argue otherwise demeans God’s sovereignty. This
removes the notion of Faith from being a choice man makes to a gift
he may receive from God.122 Indeed, Pelagius pointed out that even
the person who may123 have been given this gift does not really know
whether s/he has it since no one can infer from any set of actions what
his/her soteriological status might be. Indeed, the putative assurance
is predicated on a feeling and feelings change frequently, even
whimsically, hence the terror of doubt.

imperceptible point. And how should it be perceived by his reason, since it
is a thing against reason, and since reason, far from finding it out by her own
ways, is averse to it when it is presented to her?” Pascal, the brilliant
scientist/mathematician, was quite comfortable keeping his dogmatically
certified faith as a subjective-state-passionately-held in one pocket and his
science-based reason in the other. Similarly, Aquinas distinguishes what
men can know by means of Reason, i.e., by philosophy, from the things He
must learn by means of revelation, i.e., theology, the dogmatics provided by
the Church.
121
Note how peculiar it is for someone to argue about something that is
against Reason.
122
Note: the subjunctive mood is intentional.
123
Subjunctive mood again
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 Of course, my objections can be summarily dismissed by “the
subjective-state-passionately-held” view of faith since they are based
on arguments, and they, therefore, represent a tainted faith if it has
any faith status at all. Accordingly, faith cannot be rational. I reject
this conclusion inasmuch as it depends on an argument which if their
view is the case is already tainted and so is not necessarily true.
The Problem of Faith as Objective Theo-Historical Dogma
The history of Christian dogma is replete with specifications on
what the Church took the faith to be. It is defined doctrinally. It,
however, missed the doctrinal point. Consider that the faith is nearly
universally presented in terms of what one must believe as theo-
historical factoids. The Heidelberg Catechism follows the tradition
of its Catholic ancestry. Consider the answer to Question 23:
1. I believe in God the Father, Almighty, Maker of heaven and
earth: 2. And in Jesus Christ, his only begotten Son, our Lord: 3.
Who was conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary:
4. Suffered under Pontius Pilate; was crucified, dead, and buried:
He descended into hell: 5. The third day he rose again from the
dead: 6. He ascended into heaven, and sitteth at the right hand of
God the Father Almighty: 7. From thence he shall come to judge
the quick and the dead: 8. I believe in the Holy Ghost: 9. I believe
a holy catholic church: the communion of saints: 10. The
forgiveness of sins: 11. The resurrection of the body: 12. And the
life everlasting.
Throughout history, Catholics as well as others have convened
numerous conclaves the purpose of which was to specify what these
factoids were, solidifying them in creedal statements and inculcating
such “beliefs” through catechisms. There is little emphasis on the
aspect of belief/faith that is arguably primary in the teaching of Jesus
and the Apostles. In these confessions, there is nary a word on
repentance as necessary for the remission of sins. Nothing states the
positive expectation Jesus establishes that people of the Kingdom will
have chosen a righteousness that surpasses that of the scribes and
Pharisees, namely, to love both God and their neighbors, especially
their enemies with the whole of their heart, soul, mind and strength.
Jesus makes this the core of His soteriological expectations and Paul
follows His lead. When Jesus argues with the Pharisees, He never
requires of them, for example, that they believe Jesus to be born of a
virgin or that the virgin perpetually retained her virginity. He does
warn them that their refusal to accept that they must attain to a
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righteousness that surpasses even the Law and the prophets will entail
having to deal with the eschatological judgment of the Son of Man.
The historical factoids are indeed factual elements describing God the
Father’s incarnation as the Son Jesus of Nazareth. They are not,
however, the conditio sine qua non of the Gospel of Jesus.
Repentance from sin and devotion to holiness is. This is faith.
When Paul argues for “his” gospel, there is little focus the things
that the creeds mention as primary and much emphasis on the moral
quality of the life of the believer. The faith consists primarily in
repenting of sins and devoting oneself to coming to the full measure
of the stature of Christ. The faith is primarily the specification of the
holiness expectations Jesus had established and reaffirmed.
Notwithstanding that both Catholics and Reformers condemn sin, it
is quite odd that when they feel compelled to specify what the faith
is, their creeds and catechisms place little emphasis on repentance.
Indeed, the debates on the purity of the faith consist in metaphysical
speculations, primarily on how it is metaphysically possible for a God
of a divine nature can also exist as a human individual of a
diametrically opposite nature. Chalcedon was supposed to have
solved this problem in 451 CE since Nicaea had not sufficiently done
so in 325 CE. The answers remain flawed. I dare say that should
some adequate explanation have occurred, the remaining central
question of anthropology would remain notwithstanding a “correct”
Christology. The question of whether man a sinner by nature or by
choice would remain. Many of the creeds disclose their
anthropologies primarily because they had already decided that man
is sinner by nature not by choice. So, if God is holy by nature and
man is a sinner by nature, never the twain shall be reconciled.
The Problem of Faith as an Enabling Gift
Another tradition has averred that faith is a gift in virtue of which
God enables sinners to believe what is necessary for them to believe
in order for God to save the elect. Such a view prohibits the
origination of faith in the sinner. Since the sinner is one in virtue of
his/her nature, then whatever faith s/he may come to have has to come
from outside. Perhaps this is also due to the putative fact that for faith
to originate with the sinner would entail that faith would be a merit
or a work and so God would be obliged to save him/her because of
something the sinner had done. So, whether the argument derives
from depravity (man is incapable of originating faith) or it is in virtue

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of denying the sinner any merit, if the sinner is to receive the faith
that is necessary for his salvation, God must provide it for him.
The Westminster Confession
Consider the Westminster Confession:
Chapter 14—Of Saving Faith
I. The grace of faith, whereby the elect are enabled to believe
to the saving of their souls, is the work of the Spirit of Christ
in their hearts, and is ordinarily wrought by the ministry of
the Word, by which also, and by the administration of the
sacraments, and prayer, it is increased and strengthened.
II. By this faith, a Christian believes to be true whatsoever is
revealed in the Word, for the authority of God Himself
speaking therein; and acts differently upon that which each
particular passage thereof contains; yielding obedience to the
commands, trembling at the threatenings, and embracing the
promises of God for this life, and that which is to come. But
the principal acts of saving faith are accepting, receiving, and
resting upon Christ alone for justification, sanctification, and
eternal life, by virtue of the covenant of grace.
III. This faith is different in degrees, weak or strong; may be
often and many ways assailed, and weakened, but gets the
victory: growing up in many to the attainment of a full
assurance, through Christ, who is both the author and finisher
of our faith.
Article I plainly states, “[T]he elect are enabled to believe to the
saving of their souls.” In answer to the question of how the elect
acquire this saving faith, the Article says: it “is the work of the Spirit
of Christ in their hearts.” Note that the term “enabled” is prominent.
Note that the enabling agent is “the Spirit of Christ.” Further, apart
from “the administration of the sacraments and prayer,” it cannot be
either “increased or decreased.” The conclusion is that faith happens
to sinners and is in no way something the sinner has apart from such
intervention. The sinner is entirely passive to the process in virtue of
which s/he acquires the faith that is necessary to his/her salvation.
God is the active agent.
Article II enumerates the things a person of faith is now enabled
to do. The Christian now is enabled to:
1) “believe to be true whatsoever is revealed in the Word,”

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 2) “act differently upon that which each particular passage
thereof contains,”
3) “yield obedience to the commands, trembling at the
threatenings, and embracing the promises of God for this life,
and that which is to come,” and finally,
4) “accept, receive, and rest upon Christ alone for justification,
sanctification, and eternal life, by virtue of the covenant of
grace.”
What is left to the “believer” given the enabling influence of God
over the sinner? Interestingly the Confession mentions nothing here
of the responsibility of the sinner to repent in good faith. Apparently,
since God wants to save an “elect” sinner only, the “elect” sinner can
neither want to be saved nor do anything to acquire salvation nor to
resist it inasmuch as God has elected him and so imposes salvation
upon him, he will be justified by faith alone as enabled by God alone
to have the faith in virtue of which he is regarded as though justified.
Article III avers that the extent to which there are various degrees
of faith is due solely to the inscrutable will of God. Christ is both the
author of this faith and the finisher of it. So, not only is the fact that
a sinner has faith a function of God’s sovereign will, but that the
amount of faith a sinner has is also a function of His sovereign and
inscrutable will. Nothing whatsoever is left to man.
Heidelberg Catechism
Consider now the Heidelberg Catechism:
Question 21. What is true faith?
Answer: True faith is not only a certain knowledge, whereby I
hold for truth all that God has revealed to us in his word, (a) but
also an assured confidence, (b) which the Holy Ghost (c) works
by the gospel in my heart; (d) that not only to others, but to me
also, remission of sin, everlasting righteousness and salvation, (e)
are freely given by God, merely of grace, only for the sake of
Christ's merits. (f)
Notice that faith is that which is “a certain knowledge…which
the Holy Ghost works by the gospel in my heart.” The sinner receives
“remission of sin, everlasting righteousness and salvation.” The
agency of this gift is “freely given by God, merely of grace” in virtue
solely of the merits of Christ. This is “true” faith. The catechism
now addresses the content of the belief.

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 Question 22. What is then necessary for a Christian to believe?
Answer: All things promised us in the gospel, (a) which the
articles of our catholic undoubted Christian faith briefly teach us.
Question 23. What are these articles?
Answer: 1. I believe in God the Father, Almighty, Maker of
heaven and earth: 2. And in Jesus Christ, his only begotten Son,
our Lord: 3. Who was conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the
Virgin Mary: 4. Suffered under Pontius Pilate; was crucified,
dead, and buried: He descended into hell: 5. The third day he rose
again from the dead: 6. He ascended into heaven, and sitteth at
the right hand of God the Father Almighty: 7. From thence he
shall come to judge the quick and the dead: 8. I believe in the
Holy Ghost: 9. I believe a holy catholic church: the communion
of saints: 10. The forgiveness of sins: 11. The resurrection of the
body: 12. And the life everlasting.
How may I have something by faith, of which God is the sole
agent, and yet must be taught of its particulars? As noted above, these
items have been reiterated throughout the history of dogma and are
the products of conciliar deliberations. They are, in general, the
features of the Gospels themselves, features to which the councils had
access for their deliberations. Presumably, at least according to John,
learning of such things as he has recorded is sufficient for someone
to come to believe that Jesus is the Messiah. The belief/faith (do not
forget that the same Greek term pi,stij is used for these two English
terms) of which he speaks bears no resemblance to these catechetical
statements. John mentions nothing of faith or grace enabling anyone
to accept the evidence he cites. If these are necessary components of
faith, then why are they not transmitted by the same power in virtue
of which a sinner is said to receive faith in the first place? What need
is there for any Gospels if God transmits this information directly by
faith? If the Gospels contain supplementary information, why does
the faith originally bestowed need any supplementation at all? This
is why, it seems to me, that this theology reduces to a pernicious form
of Gnosticism.
Question 56. What believest thou concerning "the forgiveness of
sins"?
Answer: That God, for the sake of Christ's satisfaction, will no
more remember my sins, neither my corrupt nature, against which
I have to struggle all my life long; (a) but will graciously impute

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 to me the righteousness of Christ, (b) that I may never be
condemned before the tribunal of God. (c)
Question 60. How are thou righteous before God?
Answer: Only by a true faith in Jesus Christ; (a) so that, though
my conscience accuse me, that I have grossly transgressed all the
commandments of God, and kept none of them, (b) and am still
inclined to all evil; (c) notwithstanding, God, without any merit
of mine, (d) but only of mere grace, (e) grants and imputes to me,
(f) the perfect satisfaction, (g) righteousness and holiness of
Christ; (h) even so, as if I never had had, nor committed any sin:
yea, as if I had fully accomplished all that obedience which Christ
has accomplished for me; (i) inasmuch as I embrace such benefit
with a believing heart. (j)
Question 61. Why sayest thou, that thou art righteous by faith
only?
Answer: Not that I am acceptable to God, on account of the
worthiness of my faith; but because only the satisfaction,
righteousness, and holiness of Christ, is my righteousness before
God; (a) and that I cannot receive and apply the same to myself
any other way than by faith only. (b)
This argument is and always has been curious to me. In virtue of
what are sins forgiven? The Catechism avers that it occurs in virtue
of the putative fact that God will merely no longer hold the sinner
responsible for his/her sin. I must hasten to add that this is true only
for elect sinners. Reprobate sinners have no such enablement,
forgiveness or assurance. Since the elect and the reprobates are ex
hypothesi equally depraved and one may only be only saved by
having God bestow an enabling grace/faith, why does God “impute
the righteousness of Christ” on only a few, how many we are never
told? We are assured that Christ has “satisfied” God with regard to
the elect sinner’s sins. In virtue of this “satisfaction” God “will no
more remember [his/her] sins” provided s/he is elect. He “will
graciously impute to [him/her] the righteousness of Christ.” The
crucial term is “impute” the meaning of which is according to the
American College Dictionary: “4. Theol. to attribute (righteousness,
guilt, etc.) vicariously; ascribe as derived from another.” The sinner
retains his/her “corrupt nature.” So, the sinner’s imputed
righteousness has nothing to do with the “corrupt nature” one retains
and with which s/he “continues to struggle,” inclined as s/he remains

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to all evil,” “as if I never had had, nor committed any sin” according
to the answer to Question 60.
The teleological dimension of sin itself remains unmitigated. The
effects of people’s sins still negatively impact their peers and the
world at large notwithstanding that God has regarded them as though
they are sinless, i.e., righteous. One must merely believe the things
about Christ’s sacrificial efforts and, further, s/he can do so only
under the enablement of God Himself. The sinner is not called upon
to repent of actions because s/he “retains his/her corrupt nature”. If
some notion of repentance is to survive this notion of faith, it survives
merely as acts of penance for having acted sinfully, not for deciding
to kill the deeds of the flesh. If the deeds of the flesh are to die, God
must kill them.
Paul avers no such thing. The answer to the question of whether
one is permitted to sin that grace may abound is for Paul a resounding
no [Romans 6:1 ff.]. The Baptist also demands that people show the
fruits of repentance, for it is blasphemy to claim repentance while not
expressing it in actions (works?). Faith is not imposed on elect people
who would not otherwise solicit salvation, for they are incapable of
soliciting it. Would it not be egregiously unjust to withhold such an
enabling faith/grace from sinners who are as equally depraved as
those who are elected? If God can deem one class as righteous merely
in terms of the righteousness of Christ, then is there not enough
“satisfaction” in the sacrifice to deem every depraved sinner as
though s/he were righteous, unless the righteousness of Christ is
insufficient to satisfy God for all men and He has to allocate it
because there is not enough to go around? Is the “satisfaction” in
virtue of the sacrifice is not potentially infinite? Apparently not. I
protest. Something else is going on.
Faith as a Cognitive Moral Principle
First, Paul establishes the moral principle that “the righteous man
shall live by faith” [Romans 1:17 ~O de. di,kaioj evk pi,stewj zh,setaiÅ].
We shall have to determine what this principle means. I suspect that
the prevailing understanding of what it means is shallow and
inconsistent. I often ask people in my classes what they think faith
is. They generally try to quote Hebrews 11:1— “Faith is the
substance of things hoped for and the evidence of things not seen.”
When I follow up by asking what this quotation means, there is a look
of puzzlement. Apparently, no one had explored this response any
more deeply. To prime the pump, I ask whether faith is something
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someone knows or is it some species of opinion or beneficial
ignorance. People will generally start to agree that faith is something
of the latter type, presumably because of the teaching that knowing
something means that one no longer needs faith.124 But then I follow
up with the question of how something of which we are ignorant can
have any salvific power. How can some species of ignorance have
the power to save sinners? Pursuing the notion of faith as merely an
epistemological notion presents severe problems, especially when we
consider the interface of ignorance as a religious value and the notion
of moral responsibility. How can one be held morally responsible for
things that one does not know or, perhaps, cannot know? It seems
one cannot. If, as the Reformers argue following Augustine’s lead,
people can only have faith in virtue of God’s gift and God gifts faith
only to those He arbitrarily selects according to His absolute and
inscrutable will, then He is unjust. If we are to avoid this entirely
blasphemous result, then Faith will have to be a cognitive moral
choice that people can freely make.
If Paul’s Gospel depends on a notion of faith as a species of
ignorance or mere opinion (and I refuse to believe that it does), then
it loses its moral import. If faith in virtue of which anyone is saved
is ignorance or mere opinion or the passionate holding of incoherent
dogmas,125 then any faith is as good as any other. The differences
between alternative faiths will have little to do with truth and
everything to do with how passionately one believes what s/he
believes. Presumably, beliefs less passionately held would, in some
sense, be less substantial than those more passionately held.
Consequently, Christianity would merely be one religion among all
of the others. Should Muslims, Hindus or Buddhists hold their
religious belief more passionately than a Christian does, then their

124
We owe this view to Plato’s Timaeus, which came into Christian
theology by means of Clement of Alexandria and Origen who studied neo-
Platonism in Plotinus and Porphyry. No Bible here.
125
By this I mean to refer to what is called the coherence theory of truth
the criterion of which requires that the elements of a system of thought be
internally consistent. That is to say that none of the doctrines are logically
inconsistent with any other, nor do they entail any conclusion that is
logically incompatible with other doctrines or any entailments that occur in
virtue of those doctrines or combinations of them. In short, there are no
internal contradictions, inconsistencies or incompatibilities.
121
belief is more substantial, notwithstanding the fact that the belief
dogmas themselves may be logically incompatible, as they clearly
are.
While many secularists, liberal Christians and even some
evangelicals would say such a thing, it is doubtful that Paul would
argue this way. There would be little reason to say that men are
without excuse [avnapologh,touj] in virtue of the fact, as Paul sees it,
that the attributes of God are plainly discernible in the created
universe. There would be little reason for Paul to substantiate the
claim that one may characterize the moral rebellion of men as
“suppressing the truth for the sake of unrighteousness” [Rom 1:18].
There would be no reason to persuade men to believe otherwise than
they do because persuasion is a cognitive process, unless it is
propagandistic in which case it emotively tricks people into believing
things.126 In pursuing emotive belief, one should follow the policy of
getting people to believe whatever they believe more passionately
than others believe their beliefs. This is not a cognitive process. This
may be the reason that contemporary Christianity is so focused on the
emotional and that fanatical Islam is focused on intimidation and
violence. Such faulty and fanatical faith must be planted and nurtured
in the nursery of the devotional, the dramatic and the musical. There
is apparently little consideration of the unintended consequence that
opposing passionately held views without any hope of cognitive
reconciliation based on cognitive moral reasoning can only resolve
their dogmatic conflicts with political and military tools and tactics.
In our world, we can ill afford making this strategic and fanatical
mistake, for it is a short step from there to terrorism as a theological
as well as a political tool.
Clearly, Paul’s entire post-conversion life was devoted to the
cognitive effort of persuading people that Jesus Christ is the only one
who can authorize anyone’s salvation and that He specifies the
conditions under which He is willing to do so. We shall have to do a
considerable amount of work on the notion of “faith” as Paul takes it
from the Old Testament. These reflections force us away from
considering faith as a species of ignorance or mere opinion or opinion
passionately held or gift arbitrarily imposed or granted. The result of
this study forces us toward faith as anyone’s voluntary moral choice

126
See 2 Corinthians 5:11 as well as Acts 17:1-4 and other places.
122
made with moral courage and full moral knowledge. Christian Faith
is not about feeling good, but about becoming as good as God
justifiably expects.
hn"Wma/ as Integrity, Honesty
When studying a concept, it is best to look for occurrences of a
term within relatively neutral contexts. This is especially helpful in
this study. It seems to me that there are at least nine such occurrences
of our term in the Old Testament. In Kings and Chronicles certain
men are described in terms of having such personal integrity that
there was no need for any auditors to supervise their handling monies.
They seem to be righteous.
1. NIV 2 Kings 12:15 “They did not require an accounting from
those to whom they gave the money to pay the workers,
because they acted with complete honesty.”
2. NIV 2 Kings 22:7 “But they need not account for the money
entrusted to them, because they are acting faithfully."
3. NIV 1 Chronicles 9:22 “Altogether, those chosen to be
gatekeepers at the thresholds numbered 212. They were
registered by genealogy in their villages. The gatekeepers had
been assigned to their positions of trust by David and Samuel
the seer.”
4. NIV 1 Chronicles 9:26 “But the four principal gatekeepers,
who were Levites, were entrusted with the responsibility for
the rooms and treasuries in the house of God.”
5. NIV 1 Chronicles 9:31 “A Levite named Mattithiah, the
firstborn son of Shallum the Korahite, was entrusted with the
responsibility for baking the offering bread.”
6. NIV 2 Chronicles 31:12 “Then they faithfully brought in the
contributions, tithes and dedicated gifts. Conaniah, a Levite,
was in charge of these things, and his brother Shimei was next
in rank.”
7. NIV 2 Chronicles 31:15 “Eden, Miniamin, Jeshua, Shemaiah,
Amariah and Shecaniah assisted him faithfully in the towns of
the priests, distributing to their fellow priests according to
their divisions, old and young alike.”
8. NIV 2 Chronicles 31:18 “They included all the little ones, the
wives, and the sons and daughters of the whole community

123
 listed in these genealogical records. For they were faithful in
consecrating themselves.”
9. NIV 2 Chronicles 34:12a “The men did the work faithfully.”
This seems to me to provide a good foundation for my thesis that
faith is grounded in righteousness, i.e., that it is primarily a moral
term. In each of these cases the LXX translators chose the Greek term
pi,stij for the Hebrew hn"Wma/. If the thesis that faith was some form
of beneficial ignorance or something against reason, it would
certainly be semantically inappropriate to use it to describe the
reliability of men to carry out their responsibilities faithfully and to
account for and use monies as they were directed to be used. Notice
that we have taken on this usage in identifying institutions with a
fiduciary responsibility. They are called Trusts or Trust Departments
and the people who work in them are called Trustees.
Nearly everyone is familiar with the activities of auditors. This
class of professionals has developed ways of checking accounts or
inventories with a view to discovering whether or not people have
exercised their responsibilities faithfully or truthfully. Such skilled
people are needed in order assure that unreliable or incompetent
people do not either misuse their fiduciary responsibility or
mistakenly misallocate funds. So, it is a remarkable commentary on
the character and competence of some people that there was no need
for anyone to audit their fiduciary activity. It brings to mind what
Jesus said about the Kingdom disciple that his “yes” was indeed yes,
and “no” was indeed no [Matthew 5:37]. The prime element in the
notion of faith is that one acts with righteous responsibility
independently of any external coercive influence either to do so or not
to do so. The righteous person needs no external watchdog to assure
that he does what is true, right and good.
The Proverbs also emphasize this notion of personal integrity.
1. NIV Proverbs 12:17 “A truthful witness gives honest
testimony, but a false witness tells lies.”
2. NIV Proverbs 12:22 “The LORD detests lying lips, but he
delights in men who are truthful.”127
Here the Proverbs contrast our term hn"Wma/ with the notion of
“false witness/lying”. Whereas, in the description of reliable men in

127
See also Proverbs 14:5 and 20:6
124
the nine references above the LXX translators chose the term pi,stij
/ /
[faith] for hn"Wma, in these latter two cases hn"Wma is rendered by the
Greek term avlhqei,a [truth]. Of course, it could be that something
entirely unrelated to personal integrity was intended, but this would
fly in the face of what the Greeks, or we, would have understood by
the notion of truth.
An interesting fact escapes notice for those whose only access to
the Bible is through English translations. The translators of the
Hebrew Bible into Greek did not always choose pi,stij/pisteu,w, i.e.,
“belief”, “to believe” or “to have faith”, as the term for hn"Wma/ and its
cognates. Statistically, these translators chose the Greek term
avlhqei,a, i.e., “truth”, more often than they chose pi,stij. This is
clearly important for anyone’s understanding what Paul means by
using the quotation from Habakkuk. “Faith” and “Truth” have very
different connotations to the English reader, and perhaps to anyone
who thinks within Western intellectual paradigms.
Due to Plato’s influence, especially in the dialogue Timaeus,
“Truth” has a connection to epistemological certainty, whereas the
term “Faith” does not. Truth cannot be false while opinion/belief can
be. Such a distinction does not obtain for people whose intellectual
paradigm is eastern, particularly Semitic. Faith is more than merely
epistemological. From a Semitic point of view, Faith is 1) knowing
what is righteous, i.e., it contains an epistemological component, and
2) doing what is righteous, i.e., a behavioral component, as well as 3)
becoming righteous, i.e., a character component.
The Central Idea—Habakkuk 2:4
Paul takes the thesis for “his” gospel from the obscure, minor
prophet Habakkuk. His quotation is his controlling moral principle:
NIV Romans 1:16-17 I am not ashamed of the gospel, because it is
the power of God for the salvation of everyone who believes [tw/|
pisteu,onti]128: first for the Jew, then for the Gentile. For in the

128
This word is a present active participle. Greek present tense implies
an ongoing action or process. So, Paul says that salvation is for the person
whose faith is ongoing and active. Some confusion arises due to the fact
that Paul uses some form of the Greek term pisti.j and that the translation
varies in the use of the English terms “faith” and “believing/belief”. One
125
 Gospel a righteousness from God is revealed, a righteousness that
is by faith from first to last, just as it is written: “The righteous
shall live by faith.” [hy<x.yI Atn"Wma/B, qyDIc;w>]
The first major exegetical observation to make is that Paul’s
notion of “faith” [hn"Wma is the term in Habakkuk] is cognitively
connected to the notion of “righteousness” [qyDIc; is Habakkuk’s
term]. Paul’s gospel is predicated on this connection. He says “in
the gospel a righteousness [dikaiosu,nh] that is from the first to the
last by faith [evk pi,stewj eivj pi,stin].” 129 Faith, both in its extent and
depth, begins with and ends in righteousness.130 Faith is, therefore,
primarily a moral notion, more precisely an aretaic moral notion.
This is confirmed in an examination of the Old Testament Hebrew
/
term hn"Wma and the cognates that the LXX translates with the Greek
term pi,stew,j in Habakkuk.
These facts will establish that we must abandon the notion of
Faith as a form of soteriologically beneficial ignorance or
“subjective-state-passionately-held.” Neither is it something in
virtue of which God enables people to believe. Instead, we must
adopt the view that:
Faith is knowing what is morally true, right and good and that
one continually chooses to progressively live one’s life according
to whatever the true, right and good dictates and to do so whether
one’s life goes well or ill.
It proceeds from one faith to another [evk pi,stewj eivj pi,stin] in both
extent and depth.
Critique and Clarification of Habakkuk 2:4
My argument here has been challenged. The challenge was based
on a denial of my claim that faith is primarily a cognitive moral

must always keep in mind that pisti.j generally lies behind both English
terms.
129
Note that the NIV has translated evk by the English “by”. Normally
the semantic equivalence for evk is that something originates out of
something. It is generally a notion of source. It is rarely construed as agency
or instrumentality. Such latter notions are generally reserved for the dative.
130
See: 1 Samuel 26:23 Atn"mua/-ta,w> Atq'd>ci-ta, vyail' byviy" hw"hyw:

126
notion. If it is not cognitively moral, I am not sure what it is, because
the denial of my thesis seems to me to have left faith as emotive, as
non-cognitive. The critic did not undertake to defend an emotivist
position. So, I am left to wonder what the notion of faith might mean
if it is neither cognitive nor emotive. As a part of the critique, the
challenge alleged that 1) I had maintained the “opposite” of what the
Habakkuk quotation maintained and 2) I had neglected to exegete
Habakkuk and Romans. It followed from these weaknesses that the
doctrine of faith for which I have argued is woefully defective,
perhaps blasphemous, entailing the opposite of Paul’s position. I will
now address these critiques.
First let us consider whether I have maintained a position that is
“opposite” to Paul’s. What does Paul say that is incompatible with
my arguments? If one supposes that Faith has nothing to do with
morality/holiness—or even that it is not primarily so— then will it
not follow that one can have saving faith without being righteous?
Would Paul argue this? I doubt it. The opposite of what is written
is “The righteous man does not live by faith.” I have said no such
thing, neither does any plain reading of the text say so or entail
anything like it. This cannot be the opposite for which I am being
criticized. Another contrary reading is “The unrighteous man shall
live by faith.” Neither have I said this, nor does the text say anything
akin to it. This would be the contrary of the argument Paul develops.
Is there another opposite reading I have missed? The “opposite”
of Paul’s intent must therefore be based on the supposition that my
critic disagrees with me over whether “faith” is or is not a cognitive
moral notion. Since my critic had not stated much less proved what
the alternative, i.e., the opposite, notion is, merely denying that my
account is on mark, is not at all a refutation. Denials are not
refutations. Assertions to the contrary are never refutations.
Refutations occur in virtue of an argument whose conclusion is the
logical contrary of or is logically incompatible with the claim it is
said to refute. Arguments must be valid, i.e., they must be such that
if the premises are true it is impossible for the conclusions to be false.
Further, the counterarguments must contain premises that are known
to be true. Merely believing the contrary is insufficient. The
obligation is to refute my arguments. Counter-assertions do not meet
this standard. This is the way theologians in history have dismissed
their opposition. Augustine, Luther and Calvin hardly ever refute,
they merely dismiss with derision and disdain.

127
 Have I made some error in my examination of the concept of
/
hn"Wma? The fact that Abram/Abraham had very probably sinned in
his past or future is compensated for by his passionate resolve to live
according to the principles of holiness. This is the broader thesis. So,
Genesis 15:6 says:
hq'd'c. AL h'bv, .x.Y:w: hw"hyB; !mia/h,w.
Of course, strictly speaking, this reference is not within the context
of sin vis-à-vis holiness but is about whether Abram would accept
God’s commitment to provide him with an heir. So Abram accepted
God’s promise about an heir based on God’s integrity, hence !mia/h,w.
So, is Paul distorting this Genesis passage when he argues using this
text in Romans 4:3, 9, 22 as well as in an argument in Galatians 3:6
(See also James 2:23)?
The discourse context in Romans is Paul’s defense of the
principle that “The righteous (morality?) man shall live by faith (as
holiness/morality?).” He argues further that God’s condemnation for
sin/unrighteousness is justified as is His wrath [VApokalu,ptetai ga.r
ovrgh. qeou/ (Romans 1:18)] in virtue of the willful suppression of the
truth for the purposes of unrighteousness. Man is left without excuse
[avnapologh,touj]. The enumeration of the rampant moral deviance
the consequences of which God leaves to moral rebels are all moral
deviances, i.e., sins (Romans 1:21-32). Antinomians are also left
without excuse [avnapologh,touj]. Further, Jews cannot hide behind
the Law for the Law identifies what sin is. So, anyone who appeals
to it in making moral judgments and who teaches others what their
moral responsibilities are in virtue of it are also left without excuse
(Romans 2:1-24). The context is about moral deviance which angers
a holy God. Am I wrong about this?
Paul adds another point. Those who argue the primacy of
circumcision, a liturgical aspect of the Law not a moral one, will not
save anyone from his disobedience to the moral dimension of the
Law. Further, when someone obeys the Law without having access
to it, rather by obeying the Law from the heart (Romans 2:26) will
not such a one be the real Jew? Paul asks rhetorically, “Will not his
uncircumcision be regarded as circumcision?” The expected
response is affirmative. “Of course it will.” When Paul is presented
with the objection that he cannot account for the “unfaithful” Jew
(Romans 3:3) without entailing that God is unfaithful, he responds

128
that the “faithfulness” of God is not compromised by the
“unfaithfulness” of anyone. The truth of the one is irrelevant to the
truth of the other. Is this not an expression of the difference between
man’s sin and God’s holiness a moral contrast? Is this not morality
and moral responsibility before a holy God? The faith of (not in—
See my argument in Chapter Seven on this matter) Jesus is the
expression of the righteousness of God apart from the law but not
inconsistently with it.131 What is faith if it is not related in some way
to sin and righteousness and is therefore primarily moral?
If there is some dimension to Faith other than this, Paul does not
regard it as germane to this discussion. If this notion is primary in
comprehending faith, then any other dimension, should there be any,
would be secondary to it. Admittedly, there are places where the faith
is specified in doctrinal terms. I know of nowhere where this sort of
faith is soteriologically primary, especially in view of James’
discussion of faith vis-à-vis works. So, I have come to the conclusion
that faith is the passionate resolve of a persistent believer [to.
euvagge,lion( du,namij ga.r qeou/ evstin eivj swthri,an panti. tw/|
pisteu,onti( VIoudai,w| te prw/ton kai. {EllhniÅ] as a commitment to
comply with God’s just holiness expectations until “we reach the
perfect man [eivj a;ndra te,leion] as is specified by the full measure
of the stature of Christ” [Ephesians 4:13] — as in the faith of Jesus
Christ.
There are commentators who argue a patently Option #3
interpretation of this fundamental statement. They argue that the
meaning of the text consists in God’s making people righteous.132
The argument maintains that the noun dikaiosu,nh is the
nominalization of the verb dikaio,w. The meaning of dikaio,w is “to
make righteous.” Some find this rendition too strong since men are
not righteous in virtue of having been made so. So, the argument
renders dikaio,w with “having been deemed as though righteous.”
Such a rendering allows one to maintain that man remains a sinner

131
Nuni. de. cwri.j no,mou dikaiosu,nh qeou/ pefane,rwtai marturoume,nh
u`po. tou/ no,mou kai. tw/n profhtw/n( dikaiosu,nh de. qeou/ dia. pi,stewj VIhsou/
Cristou/ eivj pa,ntaj tou.j pisteu,ontajÅ ouv ga,r evstin diastolh,( … (Romans
3:21-2).
132
See: Sanday & Headlam, Epistle to the Romans, “The word di,kaioj
and its cognates”, pg. 28-31, esp. 30.
129
and that the righteousness of God merely deems him/her righteous
notwithstanding that s/he remains a sinner. This, they claim, is the
basis for the power of the Gospel [to. euvagge,lion( du,namij ga.r qeou/
evstin eivj swthri,an panti. tw/| pisteu,onti( Romans 1:16].
I will concede that this interpretation is indeed “opposite” to mine
inasmuch as I reject any Option #3 interpretation on ontological
doctrine grounds. Of course, it is not sufficient for me to merely
reject it. I must establish that 1) such a rendering presupposes
propositions which are not true or else 2) there is at least one logical
incompatibility in Scripture entailing that Biblical inerrancy is a
falsified dogma or 3) the Option #3 reading is wrong. In other words,
if any Option #3 interpretation is necessary then inerrancy is
sufficiently falsified. If inerrancy is to be preserved, then the Option
#3 interpretation must be rejected.
Leon Morris in The Pillar New Testament Commentary: The
Epistle to the Romans says:
In this passage it is not completely certain whether we should
understand the expression [i.e., dikaiosu,nh qeou/] in the sense of
a quality or attribute of God or of a right standing which God
gives [my emphasis]. It makes good sense to say, “In the gospel
it is revealed that God is a righteous God.” But it also makes good
sense to say, “In the gospel it is revealed that people get a right
standing, a status of being right, from God.” The following
reference to faith seems to show that the righteousness that God
gives is primarily in mind, as does the quotation from Habakkuk.
Cranfield sees as decisive the further point that the argument of
the epistle as a whole supports this view. Up to 4:25 Paul is
concerned with the man who by faith is just (it is only after this
that he emphasizes that the just “will live”). Here Paul is saying
that in the gospel God has acted decisively for our salvation and
in a way that is right. The “rightness” of the way of salvation will
be further brought out in this epistle as Paul develops the concept
of justification. We should further notice that the righteousness
of God is here said to be “revealed” in the gospel. That is to say,
it is something new, not simply a repetition of Old Testament
truth (important as that is).133

133
Morris, L. The Epistle to the Romans. [Grand Rapids, MI; Leicester,
England: W.B. Eerdmans; Inter-Varsity Press: 1988], pg. 69.
130
 Assuredly, Morris is a reputable scholar. A commentary ought
to account for the text, not part of it. He merely dismisses one of the
interpretations of “the righteousness of God”, namely that “In the
gospel it is revealed that God is a righteous God.” It is an almost
cavalier dismissal, notwithstanding that he also says, “It makes good
sense to say [my emphasis] ‘In the gospel it is revealed that God is a
righteous God.’” He then avers the other so-called possible
interpretation, namely:
“In the gospel [to. euvagge,lion is antecedent to evn auvtw/|] it is
revealed [avpokalu,ptetai134] that people get a right standing, a
status of being right, from God.” The following reference to faith
seems to show that the righteousness that God gives is primarily
in mind, as does the quotation from Habakkuk.135
With all due respect, it neither overtly nor covertly entails any
such thing. There is no argument. Morris merely adduces Cranfield
as agreeing with him on the matter. That he sees the matter “as
decisive” does not settle anything. I am willing to stipulate that if one
is committed to Option #3 theologies, then any interpretation that
gives God the power [du,namij qeou/], or perhaps the right to
forensically clear someone from any guilt of sin would necessitate the
preferences of Morris and Cranfield. Obviously, it does not follow
from the fact that someone who is deemed righteous that such a one
is de facto morally innocent. If one were to grant for the sake of the
argument that man is morally impotent, as in Option #3 theologies,
the only way for anyone to become righteous is for God to either
“make” him righteous or to merely “declare” him so. Enabling
faith/grace or the effectual calling of the elect will do nicely. Those
who have salvific faith are those to whom God has given it. No one
voluntarily chooses it for him/herself, for s/he cannot do so in virtue
of depravity. No one can choose it for him/herself. So, the extent to
which there is logical incompatibility between Option #3 theologies
wherein man is morally impotent and Option #4 theologies wherein
man is morally responsible, my critic may justifiably claim that my
argument entails that my conclusion is the very opposite of his. So,

134
Note that the tense of the verb is present presupposing that the action
of the verb is ongoing. Further, it is passive voice, or very probably so since
there is a morphological ambiguity between reflexive and passive voices.
135
Ibid.
131
we are left with the question of which of these two logically
incompatible paradigms complies with the ontological doctrine.
Since, in Option #3 theologies, some among mankind are punished
for having a condition they in no sense had chosen or could have
chosen in any sense at all, while Option #4 theologies authorize
punishment only because of willful, unrepentant moral turpitude, it
follows that Option #4 theologies comply with the ontological
doctrine and are, therefore, soteriologically superior.
The phrase evn auvtw/| may be masculine or neuter. Morris
comments that “We should further notice that the righteousness of
God is here said to be ‘revealed’ in the gospel”. It is true that to.
euvagge,lion is neuter and as such allows one to connect to. euvagge,lion
with evn auvtw/| as the antecedent. He comments:
But we should notice that the word order is “righteousness of God
in it [my emphasis] is revealed from faith to faith.” This makes it
possible to take is revealed and faith together, with the meaning
that only faith apprehends the revelation. While this is true, it
does not appear that this is what Paul is saying. It is much more
likely that we should accept the sense of NIV and see a reference
to that righteousness or right standing which is ours by faith.136
Morris clearly connects evn auvtw/| to to. euvagge,lion. He further claims,
consistently with Option #3 theologies, that “only faith apprehends
the revelation.” How does one acquire this faith? If one receives
such faith from God, the Holy Spirit or whatever, inasmuch as God
makes sinners righteous or perhaps merely deems them so, then the
monumental problem occurs in the question, why do not all sinners
receive this effectual faith calling, this enabling grace? If one denies
that God “makes people righteous” through the power of the Gospel,
but rather advocates that God’s Gospel merely “regards them as
though they were righteous,” how does one explain that such a
universalistic view is compatible with the doctrines of depravity,
election and reprobation? If these doctrines are accurate
representations of the Scripture and God either makes men righteous
or merely deems them so, why is there a distinction between the elect
and the reprobate at all? I do not understand why this question does
not arise for Morris. Perhaps he ignores it because its answer creates
an undesirable consequence for his doctrine of God. By denying, or

136
Ibid., pg. 70.
132
as in his case, neglecting that a sinner must accept some range of
personal responsibility for sin, God becomes arbitrarily unjust,
violating the ontological doctrine.
Newman and Nida agree:
How God puts men right with himself represents the Greek
phrase “the righteousness of God.” In this context, however,
“the righteousness of God” does not refer to God’s own
righteous character, but to his saving activity whereby he puts
men in the right (as a judge declares a man innocent), or whereby
he puts men in a right relationship to himself. Both Goodspeed
(“God’s way of uprightness”) and the NEB (“God’s way of right
and wrong”) indicate that this is a description of God’s activity
rather than of his character, 137
The objections I raised against Morris are apropos here as well.
Barely scant attention is payed to the exegetical possibility that the
phrase dikaiosu,nh qeou/ means that righteousness is a primary
characteristic of God’s character such that He has provided for the
salvation of sinners provided they choose to become people of faith,
i.e., people who repent of sins and make the cognitive moral turn to
righteousness. God does not create changes or coerce changes in
people to which they have not or cannot voluntarily consent. Given
equally possible grammatical interpretations, a genuine semantical
ambiguity, a true exegete would seem to have to examine each
possibility equally seriously. The ultimate choice of the meaning
would have to allow for the author to make his meaning clear from
the arguments and illustrations he uses to clarify any potential
misunderstanding. Further, if there are genuine logical
incompatibilities that arise in virtue of an author’s inconsistencies,
the author must pay the price for such cognitive blunders.
Where an author may be read in any of a multiple number of
ways, the reading that should be preferred is the one which entails a
minimal degree of inconsistency or perhaps even a genuine cognitive
resolution. In this case, is it true that Paul argues in the epistle that
sinners are acted upon by God or does he aver that God expects men
to accept responsibility for repenting of sin and resolving to comply
with God’s holiness expectations? This goes back to the distinction

Newman, B. M., & Nida, E. A. A Handbook on Paul’s Letter to the
137

Romans [New York, NY: United Bible Societies, 1973], p. 20.
133
I made earlier between expiation and propitiation. There I argued,
based on the work of C. H. Dodd in his The Bible and the Greeks,
that propitiatory sacrifices are designed to change the God who is
offended and expiatory sacrifices are designed to change person who
offends God. I vociferously deny the propitiatory model as I
vociferously affirm the expiatory model.
The gospel is the ongoing revelation that the God Who is
essentially and self-determinedly righteous endeavors to motivate the
sinner to repent so that by so doing the righteousness of the righteous
God is ongoingly revealed in said gospel. The righteous God most
certainly has the power [du,namij qeou/] to design and implement
whatever soteriological plan He may choose. The plan He chose
reveals that He is willing to deem/regard repentant sinners as though
they were righteous as long as the sinner’s repentance/faith proceeds
in good faith in its length, beadth and depth. This is the Grace of God
revealed in God as Jesus’s death on the cross followed by the
resurrection. In summary, the positions of these commentators
reveal a muddled thinking which is based on trying to adhere to the
Option #3 soteriological paradigm given a text that is decidedly
compatible with the Option #4 paradigm. The problems created by
Option #3 theologies are resolved by discarding them and then
adopting the Option #4 ones.
Second, my critic said I had neglected to exegete Habakkuk and
Romans. In addressing this criticism, there will be overlapping of
arguments. I hope any redundancy will enhance rather than detract
from the whole of the argument. My critic assures me that the
grammar is not difficult. He is right. So, the problem is theological,
as I have pointed out above. Is the Option #4 paradigm theologically
superior to the Option #3 paradigm on ontological doctrine grounds?
I have already argued that it is. In my critic’s critique, he alleges that
I have apparently committed some grammatical errors such that my
interpretation is contrary to Paul’s intent. So, what grammatical
errors have I committed? The text of Romans 1:16-17 says:
16
Ouv ga.r evpaiscu,nomai to. euvagge,lion( du,namij ga.r qeou/ evstin
eivj swthri,an panti. tw/| pisteu,onti( VIoudai,w| te prw/ton kai.
{EllhniÅ 17 Dikaiosu,nh ga.r qeou/ evn auvtw/| avpokalu,ptetai evk
pi,stewj eivj pi,stin( kaqw.j ge,graptai( ~O de. di,kaioj evk pi,stewj
zh,setaiÅ

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 Is my mistake in the interpretation of first clause of Dikaiosu,nh
ga.r qeou/ evn auvtw/| avpokalu,ptetai evk pi,stewj eivj pi,stin? If the
mistake occurs here, one must be prepared to correct it by accepting
the proposition that Dikaiosu,nh ga.r qeou is not about God’s holiness,
for I regard it as precisely that. Nevertheless, as we have seen,
Sanday and Headlam and others detect some level of ambiguity in the
phrase. On the one hand, they say that it is the proclivity of God to
deem people of faith as though they were righteous. How sinners
became people of faith is nowhere addressed, something I find quite
odd. Either sinners were coerced into faith by the intervention of the
sovereign deity, a position which seems to be necessary if the
sovereignty of God is defined by the Westminsterian theology, an
Option #3 theology, or it is a voluntary choice a sinner makes when
presented with God’s offer to forgive his/her sins in exchange for
good faith repentance, an Option #4 theology. The sovereignty
doctrine coupled with the doctrines of foreordination and election
entail that God’s choice in the matter is limited to whatever He
decides before the foundation of the world and cannot (or perhaps
“will not”) be subsequently altered in any respect. If a sinner is to be
impregnated with salvific faith, that decision is resolute, unalterable
and permanent. Given such a paradigm, it is perhaps not surprising
that no further comment on how one receives faith is occurs to them.
On the other hand, the phrase may be construed as a description
of an attribute of the character of God Himself. I have no doubt that
God does not “make” people righteous, notwithstanding that many
claim that it does, if not here then in other contexts. It is a tenet of
Option #3 theologies. Indeed, the sovereignty doctrine requires it.
Sanday and Headlam deny that the philological evidence is in favor
of the “deeming” or “regarding as though” thesis. I must concur. My
denial does not question that God is unwilling to regard believers “as
though” they are righteous notwithstanding that they are, no doubt,
not actually so. Paul’s doctrine can be established independently of
this text, analyzing, e.g., Romans 4:4-6.
There is an ambiguity that consists in two words of clarification,
i.e., evn auvtw/|. In whom or in what is the righteousness of God being
revealed? The grammatical antercedent appears to be to. euvagge,lion,
the Gospel of which Paul is not ashamed inasmuch as “in it [evn auvtw/|]

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the Righteousness of God is being revealed.” 138 I am convinced that
the evn auvtw/| serves a redundant purpose. Upon considering what the
content of the Gospel is, one has to realize that Jesus proclaims God’s
willingness to forgive anyone who repents in good faith. Anyone
who believes in Jesus’ message to this effect and acknowledges the
extent to which Christ is willing to go in forcing sinners to face
themselves as sinners in order to provoke an existential response to
their sin may be characterized as one who “keeps on believing in
Jesus.”139 This is the gospel. So, it is both in Him that the
righteousness of God is being revealed and is derivatively revealed in
it, i.e., the gospel. I regard evn auvtw/| as referring primarily to Christ
and derivitatively to the gospel, for the gospel is about what Christ
has done, or perhaps the offer He makes.
The context justifies this inference and to claim that it is not
Christ but exclusively the gospel will require an exegetical argument
not a theological one. The gospel is what God the Father says and
does as Jesus the Son. Therefore, I accept the second of Sanday and
Headlam’s possibilities. The phrase “the righteousness of God”
refers to an attribute of God’s character which attribute is ongoingly
revealed “in/by Him.” Since Christ is the incarnation of God Father
as Jesus of Nazareth the Son, everything anyone needs to know about
the righteousness of God may be definitively discerned in its
revelation in/by Him. Christ is the model of what the nature of
righteousness is. The verb form of avpokalu,ptetai is present
indicative middle/passive—the Gospel is ongoingly being revealed
in/by Him/reveals itself in Him. The tense of the verb is not past or
future, but present. The aspect of the verb is progressive. The voice
of the verb is not active but middle/passive — “The righteousness
that is the essence of the Holy God is His revealing Himself in the
Gospel, i.e. as Jesus of Nazareth.” Therefore, “believing in Christ”
is to passionately resolve to become as righteous as He is as the model
of what righteousness is. This interfaces with Paul’s doctrine of the
perfect man especially in Ephesians 4:13 and Colossians 1:28. It also

138
avpokalu,ptetai Present tense middle/passive. The amibiguity of
these tenses in middle/passive voice allows the conventional “is continually
being revealed” as well as the “continually reveals itself”. In the latter case
God continually reveals Himself as righteous. Further, the righteous man
lives by faith.
139
The verb panti. tw/| pisteu,onti is a present active participle.
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interfaces with the doctrine that grace is God’s willingness to “regard
believers as though they were righteous” notwithstanding that at any
particular time the actions and attitudes of the believer will/may fall
short of the “perfect man” standard. It interfaces with the doctrine
that God will not accept disingenuous repentance, in which case God
implements His wrath policy [VApokalu,ptetai ga.r ovrgh. qeou/ avpV
ouvranou/ evpi. pa/san avse,beian kai. avdiki,an avnqrw,pwn tw/n th.n
avlh,qeian evn avdiki,a| kateco,ntwn Romans 1:18]. The difference
between God’s righteousness and His wrath surely consists in
whether people are of the faith, i.e., people who accept responsibility
for becoming as righteous as God justifiably expects or are people
who refuse to accept responsibility for becoming so. Indeed, they
continue to willfully suppress the truth for the purpose of ungodliness
(avse,beian)/unrighteousness (avdiki,an), the very antithesis of the
righteous man who lives according to faith.
We now come to evk pi,stewj eivj pi,stin. Interpreters seem to
agree that this expression indicates that genuine faith progresses both
in extent and intensity. Since Paul clarifies his meaning with regard
to the clause by saying kaqw.j ge,graptai we may regard the
clarification of evk pi,stewj eivj pi,stin as ~O de. di,kaioj evk pi,stewj
zh,setaiÅ Whatever the meaning of evk pi,stewj eivj pi,stin has is
clarified by or characterized by ~O de. di,kaioj evk pi,stewj zh,setai –
“Whosoever is deemed righteous in virtue of a faith that grows in
both depth and breadth continually lives out this commitment to the
righteousness of God in his righteous lifestyleÅ” So, now the
question becomes, if the latter is a clarification of the former, then
whatever the latter means is equivalent to what the former means.
The next hermeneutical question is related to the fact that Paul
has used Habakkuk 2:4 for this clarification. If he means it to be
taken as a literal justification of the principle that governs the entire
of “his” Gospel, we must exegete the passage in its context.
Habakkuk 2:4 says:
`hy<x.yI Atn"Wma/B, qyDIc;w> AB Avp.n: hr'v.y"-al{ hl'P.[u hNEhi
The theological structure of Habakkuk is predicated on two
complaints Habakkuk raises in virtue of his perception that God has
abandoned His people. The first complaint is that there is rampant
injustice and wrongdoing (1:1). These seem to be moral objections
to moral injustices. The people cry out “violence” [NIV & KJV] and
God seemingly lifts nary a finger to help. “The Law is paralyzed and

137
justice never prevails; the wicked (a term from within the semantic
domain of morality) hem in the righteous so that justice is perverted”
(1:4). God responds that He is preparing the punishment for the
violent, unrighteous and unjust (all of which are terms of morality).
He is raising up Babylonians. He uses a ruthless people to punish a
ruthless people. The complaint seems to be that a holy God ought to
do something about the people who engage in such oppressive
injustice. The complaint is that a holy God ought to hold such sinners
responsible for their wickedness in defense of those who are exploited
by such wickedness. Habakkuk cannot discern that God is doing His
job. God assures him that He is.
The second complaint reiterates the first. God is holy—He
cannot in virtue of His purity look upon evil, so why does God remain
silent or indifferent in the face of the wicked who “swallow up those
more righteous than themselves” (1:13)? He is also powerful. So far,
the complaint is about the rampant, perhaps institutionalized
wickedness that is oppressing people and that one may expect a holy
God to do something about it. The complaint is moral. The Lord’s
answer contains the quotation Paul uses for the thesis of his Gospel.
God says, “Write down the revelation so the herald may run with it.
The revelation awaits its appointed time” (2:2). “Wait for it”, i.e., be
patient. One must notice two things: 1) “the enemy is puffed up and
his desires are not upright” and 2) in contrast to this enemy who is
devoted to wickedness and injustice, the righteous man is devoted to
faithfulness, i.e., integrity based on holiness—hy<x.yI Atn"Wma/B, qyDIc;w>.
God apparently expects righteous people to remain steadfastly loyal
to the holy God and His principles of holy conduct notwithstanding
that life may not be going well. The righteous are being positively
oppressed and exploited. In such times the righteous man is to
persevere for evil is fundamentally opposed to righteousness. The
tyranny of the Babylonian hordes will bring little alleviation of the
suffering they are experiencing at the hands of their own countrymen.
The righteous person shall live according to this holiness
commitment whether his/her life goes well or ill, and especially so
when the times are evil. S/he is to remain faithful while God prepares
for implementing His righteous retribution. The righteous person will
be caught up in the retribution God brings. Nevertheless, s/he must
remain devoted to the lifestyle of holiness. Recall that Jesus warns
would-be disciples about this inevitable war between good and evil.
He says:

138
 “Blessed are those who are persecuted for righteousness’ sake,
for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven. Blessed are you when
people insult you, persecute you and falsely say all kinds of evil
against you because of me. Rejoice and be glad, because great
is your reward in heaven, for in the same way they persecuted
the prophets who were before you.” [Matthew 5:10-12]
Summary Conclusion
Josiah Royce once defined a lie as “the intentional misapplication
of an ontological predicate.” Mistakes or errors are not intentional,
but are inadvertent misapplications of ontological predicates, if you
will. The intentionality of deception is a sufficient condition to
constitute a breach of faith because it is a blatant disregard for what
is true both ontologically and morally.
I have heard people, particularly secular people, but not
exclusively so, say that integrity is “acting according one’s own
personal beliefs” or “being true to one’s own beliefs.” There is an
element of what we are looking for in this definition. But, it is
inadequate in some fundamental respects. First, a person can always
be said to act according to his personal beliefs. We all act out of that.
I recall Jean Paul Sartre in his Being and Nothingness on this point.
He argues that one may be so personally weak that he will rarely if
ever act on his own beliefs. When one allows others to influence how
s/he acts out his/her own responsibility to exercise his/her
responsibility to be free, then one acts in what Sartre calls “bad faith”.
This radicalizes integrity in terms of personal freedom. Sartre says
that existential fulfillment comes to those who act independently of
the coercive influences of any other person or institution. This seems
to be a very bad idea for any notion of normative ethics. It is,
however, consistent with descriptivist or meta-ethics. We may also
recall Nietzsche as advocating similar views.
The question is whether one’s personal beliefs are true, right and
good, i.e., holy. If they are not holy and one acts according to unholy
beliefs it seems crassly inappropriate to call this integrity. According
to such a connotation John Gotti or Usama bin Ladin or Sadaam
Hussein can be rightly said to act with integrity. Each person acts
according to his/her personal belief system. The problem is that the
belief system may be saturated with immorality. It may justify the
use of greed, extortion, murder and the perpetration of all manner of
other evils. If this is what integrity means it is a very insipid term.

139
Of course, transforming moral terms into insipid ones is a viable
strategy for those who would “suppress the truth in unrighteousness.”
We shall have to preserve the notion of integrity as acting according
to one’s moral duty to holiness, not as acting according to whatever
immoral ideas we may concoct.
Closer to the meaning I am advocating belongs to Immanuel
Kant. He argues that moral duty consists in a Good Will such that it
chooses to act according to the principles of the true, right and good
even though such actions may be contrary to one’s inclinations to do
otherwise. Kant argues for both an aretaic dimension and a
deontological one. Although he eschews any teleological dimension
in morality, which dimension he calls hypothetical, he advocates that
a Good Will is a necessary condition together with cognitive
deliberation on the dictates of the categorical imperative are sufficient
for integrity. I suspect he and Jesus would be in substantial
agreement, with Jesus arguing more vociferously for allowing some
teleological dimension. The righteous man will live life based on
righteousness integrity, i.e., faith. Its success will always be
compared to “the full measure of the stature of Christ.” The extent to
which one’s faith falls short of the full measure standard, God is
willing to compensate for it by extending His grace, provided the
justified sinner continues repentance in good faith. This shall be
filled out in the explication of Romans as follows.

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 Chapter Six—Thesis Two: “The Wrath of God is
Justified”— Romans 1:18-3:20

Thesis 2: Since people have the capacity for living according to
faith as a cognitive moral principle, God’s wrath against their
moral rebellion is morally justified. Morally rebellious men
who willfully suppress the truth for the express purpose of
engaging in unrighteousness are without excuse
[avnapologh,touj].
Inferring the Properties of God from the Properties of the Universe
NIV Romans 1:18 The wrath of God is being revealed from
heaven against all the godlessness and wickedness of men who
suppress the truth by their wickedness, 19 since what may be
known about God is plain to them, because God has made it plain
to them. 20 For since the creation of the world God's invisible
qualities-- his eternal power and divine nature-- have been clearly
seen, being understood from what has been made, so that men are
without excuse. 21 For although they knew God, they neither
glorified him as God nor gave thanks to him, but their thinking
became futile and their foolish hearts were darkened. 22 Although
they claimed to be wise, they became fools 23 and exchanged the
glory of the immortal God for images made to look like mortal
man and birds and animals and reptiles.
Paul opens his argument with the premise that everyone can infer
from the existence of the universe that God exists and that this God
must have specific properties. Paul says that everyone knows or can
come to know these properties due to the fact that God has implanted
them, particularly the moral ones, or the means for coming to know
them in the heart.140 Further, one suppresses this knowledge as a

140
Philosophers have argued over the status of a priori knowledge for
millennia. A priori knowledge, or perhaps the mechanism for arriving at it,
is said to exist independently of experience. A posteriori knowledge is said
to be knowledge in virtue of experience. Rationalists tend to say that some
knowledge, but not all knowledge, must be a priori. According to Immanuel
141
matter of conscious choice. The reason for man’s suppressing this
knowledge is that acknowledging God’s existence means that many
actions and attitudes become obviously immoral. From the
conclusion that some actions are immoral, it follows that, should a
God exist, He will be in a position to hold people morally responsible
for both their actions and the constitution of their character. This
conclusion makes it difficult to justify immoral actions.
If we are to keep to a basis in the Gospel for argument, we seem
to have to pursue a philosophical course. The denial of any
conclusion must be logically justified by objecting to the validity of
the arguments themselves or else denying the truth of one or more of
the premises of an argument. Paul’s initial claim is that one can
conclude that God exists, and that this God has specific ontological
properties among which are moral ones. Very many of the arguments
concluding that the proposition “God exists is true” have appeared
throughout history. Interestingly, many of them predate the Christian
era. I do not intend to trace these metaphysical speculations. I will,
however, point out that they fall into four major classes of arguments
and that each of them has definite characteristics.
Cosmological Arguments
First, the so-called cosmological type of argument argues the
conclusion that a necessary being must cause a contingent universe
to exist. Cosmological style arguments reason from certain a
posteriori premises, namely that the universe is populated with
contingent entities, that some necessary being is logically and
metaphysically necessary since no contingent being can be the cause
of itself. Aquinas separates his cosmological arguments into three
sub-types141: 1) the argument from motion, an argument he borrowed
from Aristotle, 2) the argument from efficient cause—an argument
that requires the truth of the proposition that no existing thing can be
the efficient cause of itself; so, something that cannot not-exist is the
necessary efficient cause of the existence of all things that can not-

Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, a priori is the condition necessary for
the processing of a posteriori or sensibilities/sensory inputs. Empiricists
tend to argue that all knowledge is nothing more than some species of a
posteriori, i.e., sense based, knowledge.
141
Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica Pt I: “Treatise on God”,
Question 2—"The Existence of God”, Article 2—"Whether It Can be
Demonstrated That God Exists”
142
exist, and 3) the argument from actuality—that in order for anything
to become actual from mere potentiality it is necessary for something
itself to be actual on the ground that nothing merely potential can
produce any actual thing.
One response to this type of argument is to argue that Natural
Law merely exists, and that the origin of the universe is due solely to
the operation of these Natural Laws. It is peculiar that in arguing for
the origin of the universe, those with the prevalent naturalistic bias
do not permit any religious person to merely posit the existence of a
necessary being while others with a scientific proclivity may posit the
mere existence of necessary nature. Whether one argues for the
ultimate reality as a conscious deliberative being or an impersonal
reality or set of logically consistent necessary forces, the result is the
same. At some point in the argument, one must arrive at a notion of
basic being or mere being, something immune to further analysis. To
choose between these clearly incompatible positions on this basic
being-ness requires an argument itself. Such an argument cannot
establish a deductively certain conclusion for or against one or the
other because the premises involved are a posteriori and as such can
never justify anything but a provisional conclusion. This is a
consequence of the logical fact that one can never arrive at universal
conclusions from arguments containing provisional premises.142
Consequently, the decision comes to be based on which is the more
probable in terms of either the standard of the preponderance of the
evidence or evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.143 One potential
problem arises in virtue of the fact that “more probable than not” or
even “predonderance of the evidence” has a significant psychological
component, namely any person may choose to give various weights
to premises or arguments in a subjective or arbitrary fashion such that
the same evidence may psychologically justify contrary conclusions.
Since the premises are a posteriori, and we have the problem of
induction, there is no way to rationally compel a psychological

142
See: David Hume A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to
Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects Edited
by L. A. Selby-Bigge [Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1888 (Reprinted 1975)]
See: Book I, Section 6: “Of the Inference from the Impression to the Idea”,
pg. 86 ff.
143
See for example: Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God [Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1979 (2004)].
143
acceptance since the process is an emotive matter and not merely
cognitive. I believe this is a major reason for why Paul characterizes
wickedness as a willful suppression of the truth.
Teleological Arguments
A second argument type one may consider is the Teleological
type144 of argument. It reasons that a belief that God exists is
epistemologically justified since one cannot explain the existence of
meaning, purpose, intention and order in the universe apart from the
existence of God as a rational Being. One response to this type of
argument is to reason that any teleological explanation is insufficient
to establish the existence of a necessary God since no argument that
contains a posteriori premises may validly arrive at a universal,
necessary conclusion. Recall that earlier I cited David Hume’s
Dialogues on Natural Religion wherein Hume argues through
Cleanthes that empirical evidence cannot establish necessary
conclusions. Cleanthes also argues that since if the contrary of some
proposition is conceivable, it cannot follow that the proposition is
necessarily true, i.e., the contrary of every necessary truth is
impossible to conceive. The proposition that God necessarily exists
is a proposition the contrary of which is conceivable, so the
proposition “God exists” cannot be necessarily true. Further to
proffer that God is necessarily rational and orderly seems to be
vulnerable to the same reasoning. If one can conceive of God as non-
rational, or even irrational, at least some of the time, then it follows
that the concept of God as a necessary Being is defective, or perhaps
meaningless, at least according to those postmodernists with a logical
positivist proclivity.
Another objection would disallow teleological reasoning because
it resorts to explanations of purpose presupposing a mind-based agent
whose purposes are expressed in the existence and operation of the

144
Teleological type arguments conclude from certain a posteriori
premises, namely that there is order, design, purpose, meaning and
intentionality in the universe that a necessary being exists and that the
intentional properties of God are justifiably inferred from these properties of
the universe. Bishop Paley popularized this form of argument, but David
Hume in his Dialogues on Natural Theology had already formulated his now
famous response that the teleological argument does not justify the
conclusion that a necessary being exists but that only a sufficiently capable
being may.
144
universe. According to this type of objection, purpose explanations
ought to be replaced with merely descriptive explanations. One needs
no purpose explanations for what can be merely described. Adequate
explanations need only describe the phenomena themselves. Such an
objection may commit the fallacy of petitio principii or begging the
question, since one must resort to the principle of order in offering
the explanation for order. Further, it seems to me that it does not
follow from the fact that some merely descriptive explanation may
satisfy a results-only explanatory requirement that there therefore
c/would be no agent whose purposes, intentions, etc. are capable of
merely descriptive analysis.
However, why it should be a priori preferable for explanations to
be descriptive as opposed to teleological is, so far as I know, left
unexamined. That one may have a preference (and this is a
psychological matter, not a philosophical one) for one type of
explanation over another is more a matter of personal preference than
of philosophical necessity. Personal choice preferences are not true
or adequate merely because someone may prefer them. Their
adequacy must be established independently of any personal
preference and be based on some more objective standard, perhaps
even the principle of Ockham’s razor. Ockham’s razor, named for
William of Ockham (1287-1347), requires that in deciding between
competing explanations, other things being equal, the simpler and
more elegant explanation is preferable.145 “It is a sentiment that
virtually all philosophers, medieval or otherwise, would accept; no
one wants a needlessly bloated ontology. The question, of course, is
which entities are needed and which are not.” Richard Swinburne
adopts this principle in his arguments for the existence of God as
being more probable than not. But Ockham’s principle does not
justify leaving out principles if they are logically necessary or
sufficiently justified. However, it should be noted that it does not
follow from the fact that some explanation is simpler or more elegant
that it is more satisfactory. Karl Popper observes:
The world as we know it, is highly complex; and although it may
possess structural aspects which are simple in some sense or
other, the simplicity of some of our theories—which [simplicity]

145
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ockham/#4.1
145
 is of our own making—does not entail the intrinsic simplicity of
the world.146
Axiological Arguments
A third argument type is the axiological argument for the
existence of God. Whether there is moral order in the universe or that
people have knowledge of or have the capacity to reason to what the
set of normative moral principles must necessarily be has long been
a source of philosophical contention. The chief fact in favor of the
Rationalist view that a priori knowledge exists is mathematics and
logic.147 Some philosophers have argued that moral principles should
also be included in the category of disciplines that use a priori
knowledge. Immanuel Kant proposed his Categorical Imperative (in
two forms) as an a priori maxim. He argued that every rational being
has the moral duty to think about whether or not in acting on certain
maxims he could make those maxims universal without such actions
entailing logical contradictions. Kant required of every rational
being that s/he has the duty to deliberate on whether his/her action
would violate this universalization test and/or his rational being test
which requires that no rational being may be used as a means to some
end (i.e., every rational being must be treated as an end in itself)
before undertaking such an action or prior to formulating any moral
rule.148 Of course, if the knowledge of moral principles or the
capacity to deduce them is available independently of experience, i.e.,

146
Sir Karl R. Popper The Open Universe: An Argument for
Indeterminism, [New Yorl, NY: Routledge, 1988 (1995)], pg. 43.
147
For an account of the attack on the mathematical sciences that
occurred in virtue of the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries, see Ernst
Cassirer The Problem of Knowledge: History, Science, and Philosophy since
Hegel as well as Brand Blanshard Reason and Analysis. The crisis for
epistemology consisted in the apparent undermining of the view that
mathematics and geometry provided unique answers to specific problems.
Since, in virtue of non-Euclidean geometries, space could now be
mathematically characterized with theorems that were logically
incompatible, even contradictory; some considered the viability of the
proposition that space itself was not real. A further consequence was the
psychologization of Logic and Mathematics, the view that Logic and
Mathematics are not applicable to things in a real world, but merely
descriptions of how the mind necessarily functions.
148
Immanuel Kant Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals [1788].
146
a priori, then Paul is right that men are without excuse whenever they
violate any of these moral principles. That a priori knowledge exists
at whatever level is consistent with the existence of God since it
becomes difficult to explain its necessity and universality otherwise.
To deny the conclusion that God exists means that the advocates must
defend with an almost fanatical fervor their alternative epistemology,
namely that all knowledge depends on experience and is, therefore,
knowledge a posteriori. This is the chief threat that non-cognitivism
in all of its forms presents to the Faith. Engaging in actions that
violate normative moral principles is inherently related to social and
psychological problems and such dysfunction would be dramatically
reduced in virtue of complying with normative moral prescriptions.
Paul says that the properties of God may be inferred from the
properties of the universe. They may also be inferred from the
properties of human beings.149 The way to argue against this thesis
or these conclusions is to deny that human beings have any special
ontological status in the universe. Carl Henry called this idea the
“Doctrine of the Total Animality of Man.”150 Once one denies the
doctrine of the uniqueness of man in the universe certain results
follow. First, man can be reduced to one species among all other
animal species, and so man is subject to the same explanatory
principles that are used to explain the rest of the animal kingdom.
Second, one elevates the status of animals and perhaps other elements
of the world as well. This consequence shows itself in the de facto
deification of various species, the environment and even of the

149
One ought to consider the arguments of the existential
phenomenologist Martin Heidegger in his Being and Time inasmuch as he
says that the understanding of Being, Sein, must begin with an existential
understanding of Dasein, Heidegger’s euphemism for humanity. There had
been some discussion on whether Heidegger was a theist or atheist, an issue
on which he would not publicly comment. Many scholars would hold that
Heidegger was atheist. But I wonder why he would be since man’s
uniqueness in the universe seems to occupy such a fundamentally important
role for him. But then even geniuses are not always correct or consistent.
150
Carl Henry, The Remaking of the Modern Mind [Joplin, MO: The
College Press, reprinted]. For other compelling reasons for advocating that
Man has special and unique place in the hierarchy of being. See also:
Giovanni Pico della Mirandola Oration on the Dignity of Man, Brand
Blanshard, Reason and Analysis as well as Mortimer Adler The Difference
of Man and the Difference it Makes.
147
universe itself.151 Paul foresaw this consequence perhaps less as a
matter of prophecy than as a matter of logically inevitable extensions
of the principles of an atheistic paradigm. Paul was indubitably
familiar with the pantheism of the Greeks from Thales to Parmenides,
no doubt taking the opportunity to dispute it in carrying out his
evangelism. He had confronted it when in Athens.152
Inferring God’s Moral Properties from the Universal Moral Order
There are further indications of man’s being without excuse
[avnapologh,toj] for denying God’s existence and for defying the
natural moral order of the universe. Paul discusses the two tests to
expose the moral culpability of humans. He uses these two tests to
establish the premise that all men know or can come to know the
difference between good and evil. Indeed, it seems that he thinks this
knowledge is what some philosophers have called self-evident, clear
and distinct or known or knowable a priori. Either this knowledge is
“hardwired” in the genetic code, and, therefore, the brain cannot but
use it, or it has the capacity to deduce what these “hardwired” moral
properties are and the brain cannot but use it. In either event, the
brain cannot but use this moral reasoning.153 In either event, Paul’s

151
As, for example, in animal rights advocacy groups and
environmentalist advocacy groups. In addition, this consequence occurs in
very old religions, particularly those who focus on a monistic metaphysic as
in the Presocratic as well as the Hindu Upanishads, at least the pantheistic
interpretation of them in Sankara. See: Charles Hartshorne & William L.
Reese Philosophers Speak of God [Chicago, IL: Phoenix Books, 1953],
“Chapter IV: Classical Pantheism” pp. 165-210.
152
Acts 17: 16 ff. It would not be much of a stretch to also be familiar
with the claims of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics wherein Aristotle
concedes that man differs from other sentient creatures in virtue of his
capacity for using reason.
153
See: Richard Swinburne Mind, Brain and Free-will [Oxford, UK:
Clarendon Press, 2013]. It occurs to me that one might conclude that some
form of determinism is true if this moral capacity is “hardwired”. I think
that this result is not that humans are determined in virtue of this capacity
being “hardwired” except to say that they are “hardwired” such that they are
free to use or ignore this capacity. Further, that they are morally culpable
when they choose to “over-ride” the default settings, to use a metaphor from
computer technology. In fact, it seems to be true that the default setting of
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claim is incompatible with the claim of the Westminster Confession
that “By this sin they fell from their original righteousness, and
communion with God, and so became dead in sin, and wholly defiled
in all the faculties and parts of soul and body” [Emphasis added].
Paul’s doctrine is that human beings cannot but think morally, the
logical contrary of the dogmas of original sin and total depravity.
They cannot but default to universal moral values, particularly when
their own interests are involved. Paul provides two tests, 1) the
passing judgment test and 2) the teaching test, to illustrate the truth
of this point.
The Passing Judgment Test—
[NIV] Romans 2:1 You, therefore, have no excuse, you who pass
judgment on someone else, for at whatever point you judge the
other, you are condemning yourself, because you who pass
judgment do the same things. 2 Now we know that God's
judgment against those who do such things is based on truth. 3 So
when you, a mere man, pass judgment on them and yet do the
same things, do you think you will escape God's judgment? 4 Or
do you show contempt for the riches of his kindness, tolerance
and patience, not realizing that God's kindness leads you toward
repentance? 5 But because of your stubbornness and your
unrepentant heart, you are storing up wrath against yourself for
the day of God's wrath, when his righteous judgment will be
revealed. 6 God "will give to each person according to what he
has done." 7 To those who by persistence in doing good seek
glory, honor and immortality, he will give eternal life. 8 But for
those who are self-seeking and who reject the truth and follow
evil, there will be wrath and anger. 9 There will be trouble and
distress for every human being who does evil: first for the Jew,
then for the Gentile; 10 but glory, honor and peace for everyone
who does good: first for the Jew, then for the Gentile. 11 For God
does not show favoritism.
There are two minimal conditions for moral responsibility. The
first is the Knowledge Condition—knowing in virtue of what the true,
right and good consists or determining the valid processes by which

moral understanding is exposed when one criticizes anyone who violates
these moral expectations.
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a morally accountable agent can make such decisions.154 I have
thought in the past that this knowledge is of what specific actions or
action-types are morally obligatory. I doubt this now in virtue of
thinking about Immanuel Kant’s views. Kant thought that the
knowledge of morality was a priori. By this he meant that it was a
condition which was necessary for moral decision-making at all. A
rational person had to consider whether or not the decision s/he might
make was such that every rational being in the universe could be
supposed to will to make the same decision. If the answer was in the
affirmative, everyone was obligated to take the action. If the answer
was in the negative, then one was morally obligated to eschew it. This
capacity exists independently of experience and as so is a priori. The
same test(s) can be applied to any situation whatsoever. This is
especially important due to the potential for new and different
situations arising within the texture of a sufficiently open universe. I
think he is correct. So, on this view, the possibility for meeting the
knowledge condition is that one knows how to determine what the
true, right and good is.155
The other condition is the Compliance Condition—being able to
comply with the known or knowable moral principle(s) and to act on
those rational moral deliberations. If one does not know or cannot
know what true, right and good is then it seems obvious that such a
one cannot be held morally accountable for either complying or not
complying. But, if one can know what true, right and good is but
cannot comply with its standards for whatever reason, such a one
cannot justly be held morally responsible. So, Paul must address the
extent to which these two conditions are met. If they are met, then
God’s wrath is justified. If not, then God would be unjust if He were
to condemn anyone who either cannot know them or cannot comply
with them. It is true that this knowledge principle entails another
truth in order to establish man’s moral inexcusability [avnapologh,toj]
namely, every “ought” implies a “can.”

154
E.g., perhaps something like Henry Sidgwick’s Ethical Intuitionism,
a utilitarian standard [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sidgwick/] or
perhaps W. D. Ross’s prima facie goods, a deontological standard.
155
See: Immanuel Kant The Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals,
edited & translated by Allen W. Wood, [New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 2002]
150
 The argument I have been making depends on the truth of the
premise that the knowledge of moral truth is a priori in some sense.
First, Paul argues that the requisite knowledge of moral principles
exists by arguing that no one can appeal to right or fair treatment
without logically presupposing what right/fair treatment is. Since one
would accept principles of righteousness in one’s own case, it follows
that not applying them in the case of others means that one has acted
immorally, i.e., sinfully. Kant would no doubt say that such actions
are irrational for such actions are logically incompatible with each
other. Both cannot be true or right at the same time. If one does in
fact know that some action has unjustly caused him/her harm, then
s/he who has acted unrighteously can be held morally accountable for
perpetrating this sin.
Second, Paul argues that insofar as one teaches another person
what is right and wrong, s/he exposes this requisite moral knowledge
in him/herself and can, therefore, be held morally responsible for
his/her sin. Someone may object to this claim about the teaching test
on empiricist, non-cognitive grounds. Anyone one can teach
anything whatsoever and it would not follow that whatever was
taught was true a priori. It would follow that someone might have
grounds to challenge another of an inconsistent application of his/her
own putative moral principles. But, even in this case, one might not
be vulnerable to a charge of normative inconsistency since morality
would be deemed to be merely an emotive, non-cognitive response.
However, this is neither my claim, nor is it Paul’s argument. The
claim is that if holiness is universally, objectively and necessarily true
and someone taught it as universally, objectively and necessarily true,
then s/he who taught it would ipso facto know it. The fact that people
do in fact engage in making these kinds of judgments goes a long way
to establishing that the requisite knowledge for making them exists.
If anyone is able to pass judgment on someone else for the violation
of some moral imperative, then the very act of passing judgment
reveals that sufficient moral knowledge is present. Since these
judgments are nearly universally made, the first condition necessary
for moral responsibility is satisfied.
Teaching is not, by itself, sufficient to establish what the a priori
content is or that any particular application of an a priori process
would be correct. That would depend on the validity of the argument
forms as well as knowing that the premises of the argument were true
either a posteriori, a priori or as the conclusion of deductively sound

151
arguments. What it does seem to establish is that the fairness
principle is applied in the form of a person’s defending oneself
against unjust treatment. If this is true, then anyone who teaches
anything that is logically incompatible with the fairness one expects
from others is ipso facto immoral. The just treatment principle is
logically prior to the teaching principle.
If one uses a universal moral principle of just treatment to judge
another’s treatment of him/herself, then whenever s/he violates this
principle of universal moral treatment s/he is necessarily in violation
of that principle. Invoking a principle of just treatment entails that
one is morally obligated to be subject to that same universal moral
principle. That one invokes a moral principle to make a moral
judgment logically presupposes156 the truth of the moral proposition
that s/he uses in making the moral judgment. One’s invoking a moral
principle entails the truth of the proposition that s/he knows the moral
principle s/he invokes. If fairness is morally necessary and one
teaches that it is, s/he cannot expect to escape just condemnation for
unfairness apart from repentance.
Consider the possibilities. Either the moral judgments one makes
on the actions of others are personal and subjective or else they are
universal and objective. If such judgments are personal and
subjective, then making a moral judgment on the actions of others
amounts to saying no more than, “I disagree with what someone has
done, but that is just because his/her values are different than my
own.” Bertrand Russell reduced all moral judgments to this notion.
It amounts to taking the view that there is no equivalence in moral
reasoning to the laws of excluded middle and non-contradiction in
logic. In logic, the Law of Excluded Middle requires that every truth
functional proposition be either true or false. The Law of Non-
contradiction requires that no truth functional proposition may be
both true and false in the same argument. In ethics, it seems there
should be equivalent notions. The moral law of excluded middle
would require that actions be either right or wrong and the moral law

156
A logical presupposition is the condition that must be true in order
for the proposition itself to be either true or false. Answering the question
“Do you still beat your wife?” requires that the proposition “You have
beaten your wife” is true. This is the logical presupposition. The moral
equivalent would be a moral presupposition, namely the moral condition that
must be true if the moral judgment is to have any moral viability.
152
of non-contradiction would require that no action is both right and
wrong. According to the descriptivist position, and indeed the
teleological normative position as well,157 an action may be both right
and wrong at the same time, as well as some may be neither right nor
wrong.
Paul would argue that this is not what people mean to say when
passing moral judgment on the actions of others. When someone
protests the actions of another on moral grounds, he is arguing that
there is something objectively wrong, not that there is merely a
subjective disagreement in the choice of personal values. What is
meant is that anyone who may be morally judged has violated not
merely some personal moral value but a necessary, universal and
objective moral value which is not merely his own. In the very act of
passing judgment on another, one must accept the consequence that
if any person, including oneself, acts in violation of some necessary,
universal and objective moral value then everyone who acts in the
same way will have violated the same moral value, for the same
action may not be both morally right and morally wrong. A moral
action must be either right or wrong and may not be both right and
wrong. We have not yet argued that these disagreements are in fact
universal or even that they are necessarily objective normative moral

157
I must mention this fact. Since, in a teleological theory, the criterion
for whether any action is moral is whether it produces the greater balance of
pleasure over pain in the universe [See: G. E. Moore Ethics (1912) for a
meta-ethicist’s analytic account of utilitarianism], then one could make the
case that the same action could meet this standard at one time and fail to
meet it at another time. In this case a utilitarian could question the propriety
of my claim that there should be a moral law of non-contradiction. My
response would be that, as a theory, utilitarianism or any teleological theory
is inadequate on at least three grounds. First, it permits clearly immoral
means to achieve putatively good ends, as, for example, the use of medical
experimentation on minority groups (recall the Tuskegee syphilis studies),
on the ground that the majority group would experience greater pleasure than
the minority group would experience pain. Second, they must appeal to the
results of an action or an action-type and since the evaluation of the results
of an action are not available until after the action is taken and since time is
metaphysically unidirectional making the reversal of the action impossible,
the standard cannot be a guide to actions but only an evaluation of actions.
Third, the criterion is often purely subjective, since there is no objective way
of measuring the sum of effects over the universe of space-time.
153
judgments, like Kant’s categorical imperative.158 Rather we are
saying that in the act of judging another’s action one is taking more
than a subjectivist position with regard to moral values. The act of
passing moral judgment commits the one who makes the judgment to
adhere to whatever moral principle from which that judgment
logically follows.
The second minimal condition for moral responsibility is that one
must be able to comply with known or knowable moral imperatives.
The act of making a moral judgment logically presupposes both the
known/knowable condition and the compliance condition, i.e., that
one is capable of complying with the known/ knowable condition.
Consider the alternative, namely that one can make a moral judgment
about someone’s actions and also not expect that the person who is
the subject of that judgment could not have complied with the moral
imperative. Consider a case in which a person makes a moral
judgment against some action of another when that person could not
have done otherwise. In such a case it is quite obvious that any such
moral judgment is unjustified, whether it is a judgment of praise or
blame. A justified moral judgment requires that both the
“known/knowable condition” and “the compliance condition” be
satisfied. For example, say that a person is driving his/her car
responsibly in a residential neighborhood and a child darts from
between parked cars into the path of his car. The child is struck and
killed. The parents of the child, in virtue of their understandable grief
at such a tragedy, blame the driver of the car for their child’s death.

158
Kant’s theory is called “Deontological.” Since utilitarian theories
fail to provide a guide to moral action by referring to consequences or results
of an action, the determination of right and wrong would have to conform to
some other standard. Deciding what actions are right or wrong is a function
of factors other than merely consequential ones. Immanuel Kant’s
deontology, developed in his Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals,
argues that such a standard does exist and that it is an a priori standard
making it objective, necessary and universal. He differentiated his criterion,
which he called the “categorical imperative”, from teleological criteria or
“hypothetical imperatives” as he called them,. His categorical imperative
requires that one can will that his/her action should become a universal law
of moral obligation without entailing any concepts that are logical
contradictories to it. Further, he has a second standard for the categorical
imperative, namely, that one is morally obligated to treat rational beings as
ends in themselves and never as means to an end.
154
But is the driver morally blamable for this tragic death?
Notwithstanding the parent’s accusations, the driver is not morally
responsible since although s/he will have known that, in general,
killing a child is morally wrong [i.e., passes the known/knowable
condition], s/he could not have done otherwise [i.e., fails the
compliance condition]. The circumstance would have been different
had the driver neglected to consider or was indifferent to the
possibility that children could be present and that their actions are
sometimes unpredictable and that drivers should anticipate to the best
of their ability that children might come unexpectedly into their path.
Further, if the driver had been driving under the influence of
alcohol or drugs, both the known/knowable condition and compliance
condition would still have been satisfied but for a different reason.
The driver will have had within his/her control whether s/he had
ingested drugs or alcohol and, so, having done so would have created
a condition of not being able to control his actions. A drugged or
drunken driver’s not being able to control his/her actions would not
have vitiated the compliance condition. The driver would have been
morally responsible in virtue of the fact that his/her inability to
control matters was affected by other antecedent conditions that s/he
could have controlled. His/her moral or legal defense in this case
could not be that s/he is neither morally or legally responsible since
because s/he was under the influence of such substances s/he could
not have acted otherwise.
Now consider the non-cognitivist position on moral values,
namely that moral values are merely personal and subjective or are
merely conventional in virtue of aggregations of constituencies that
have the same or similar emotive proclivities. If moral values were
reducible to merely personal emotive states, one could conceive of a
circumstance in which the first driver would be morally responsible
in his own mind and the second driver would not have been morally
responsible in his own mind. But this, in spite of the feelings of
personal remorse or the lack thereof, such events would not be cases
of moral responsibility. This reveals a significant weakness in the
non-cognitivist position, namely the psychologization of morality. If
feelings of guilt are sufficient to establish guilt, then the first driver
was morally guilty of killing the child. In the same way, if the second
driver experienced no feelings of guilt then he bears no moral guilt in
the death of the child. Of course, if these consequences were
acceptable, it would follow that any legal process of holding people

155
responsible for their actions would have no logical or moral
connection to the acts themselves. Valid connections would be
merely psychological. The legal process could only assign legal
culpability on the basis of a person’s feelings about his/her actions.
This would entail that sociopaths and psychopaths are never legally
or morally guilty of anything merely because they either feel no guilt
or they feel that their actions are justified by whatever twisted logic
their minds may concoct. Therefore, passing moral judgments
presupposes that the person who is the subject of the judgment both
knows a universal moral principle or at least that s/he regards his/her
judgment as universal enough to apply the condemnation and that the
person under judgment is capable of complying with the moral
imperative the judgment presupposes. In any event, in virtue of such
absurdities, moral judgments cannot be reduced to merely personal
subjective values.
Golden Rule Test
If it is true that the knowledge of moral truth is a priori and it
exists a priori due to the God’s creative activity, i.e., God’s creating
man in His image, then the fact that people make moral judgments on
the actions of others is significant. It is revealed in what may be
called the Golden Rule Test. The Golden Rule, as Jesus states it, is:
“You are morally obliged to treat people the way you expect to be
treated.” This rule is a proactive rule of moral obligation. It requires
that whether or not others actually do act justly toward you, you
remain morally obligated to act justly toward them because that is the
expectation you have of them with regard to you. The Golden Rule
is a principle of proactive justice. It is very unlike the so-called Silver
Rule, which is a rule of prohibition, requiring that one be prohibited
from doing to others what one would not tolerate being done to
oneself. This formulation prohibits doing malice to another on the
ground that no one would tolerate being treated with malice.
The Golden Rule requires that a person act toward others in their
beneficial interest whether or not s/he is so treated.159 It retains its

159
See: John Locke in his “Second Treatise on Civil Government”
wherein he cites Richard Hooker’s argument in his Ecclesiastical Polity the
argument that the maxim of Equality is self-evident and “beyond all
question”. Two Treatises of Government [New York, NY: Signet Classics,
1965], Authorized reprint by Cambridge University Press 1960. Locke’s
quotation from Hooker cites in part: “… my desire therefore to be lov’d of
156
positive force in justice even on the occasions of being treated with
injustice.
So, inasmuch as one knows what just treatment is in one’s own
case, one ipso facto knows what it is to treat another justly.
Conversely, inasmuch as one knows what it is to be treated
unjustly in one’s own case, one ipso facto knows what it is to treat
another unjustly.
So, the application of the Golden Rule Test certifies the moral
universals that everyone existentially presupposes. It is the
existential condition necessary for anyone to pass moral judgment on
someone who may treat him/her unjustly.
There is another dimension to the use of this Golden Rule Test.
If I know that a third party is being treated unjustly and make a
judgment on the one who is treating another in this way, I know
enough to be held morally responsible for treating anyone else in that
way. If I expect a third party to come to my aid when I am in danger
and cry out for help, I morally obligate myself to come to the aid of
another in his/her distress. Since this is an existential condition, it is
a straightforward extension of the principle of justice that my
treatment of anyone else in a way against which I would protest as an
injustice is ipso facto unjust and I condemn myself in acting with any
injustice or indifference towards any other. God is, therefore,
perfectly justified in passing moral judgment on anyone who actually
uses or would use moral judgments to defend his/her own moral
interests. It is not God’s arbitrary judgment on someone, but God’s
using the very moral principles that one would in fact use in
defending himself against any form of injustice or would appeal to
another for assistance in a time of distress. It is one’s being
inconsistent in the application of the moral principles one would use
in defending oneself against injustice that each person condemns
him/herself. God merely applies the standards of just treatment that

my equals in nature, as much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural
Duty of bearing to themward, fully the like affection; From which relation
of equality between our selves and them, …, natural reason hath drawn for
direction of Life, no Man is ignorant.” “The Second Treatise of Civil
Government: An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of
Civil Government”, Chapter II section 5, pg. 310.
157
everyone already presupposes and expects from others. God does so
consistently.
The Teaching Test—
[NIV] Romans 2: 11 For God does not show favoritism. 12 All who
sin apart from the law will also perish apart from the law, and all
who sin under the law will be judged by the law. 13 For it is not
those who hear the law who are righteous in God's sight, but it is
those who obey the law who will be declared righteous. 14
(Indeed, when Gentiles, who do not have the law, do by nature
things required by the law, they are a law for themselves, even
though they do not have the law, 15 since they show that the
requirements of the law are written on their hearts, their
consciences also bearing witness, and their thoughts now
accusing, now even defending them.) 16 This will take place on
the day when God will judge men's secrets through Jesus Christ,
as my gospel declares.17 Now you, if you call yourself a Jew; if
you rely on the law and brag about your relationship to God; 18 if
you know his will and approve of what is superior because you
are instructed by the law; 19 if you are convinced that you are a
guide for the blind, a light for those who are in the dark, 20 an
instructor of the foolish, a teacher of infants, because you have in
the law the embodiment of knowledge and truth-- 21 you, then,
who teach others, do you not teach yourself? You who preach
against stealing, do you steal? 22 You who say that people should
not commit adultery, do you commit adultery? You who abhor
idols, do you rob temples? 23 You who brag about the law, do you
dishonor God by breaking the law? 24 As it is written: "God's
name is blasphemed among the Gentiles because of you." 25
Circumcision has value if you observe the law, but if you break
the law, you have become as though you had not been
circumcised. 26 If those who are not circumcised keep the law's
requirements, will they not be regarded as though they were
circumcised? 27 The one who is not circumcised physically and
yet obeys the law will condemn you who, even though you have
the written code and circumcision, are a lawbreaker. 28 A man is
not a Jew if he is only one outwardly, nor is circumcision merely
outward and physical. 29 No, a man is a Jew if he is one inwardly;
and circumcision is circumcision of the heart, by the Spirit, not
by the written code. Such a man's praise is not from men, but
from God.

158
 There is a particularly blatant form of hypocrisy. It occurs when
someone brags about having the divinely delivered Law and
presumes to teach others about what it requires of them, and then
fails, neglects or refuses to comply with that selfsame Law.
If one presumes to teach another what s/he is morally obligated
to do, then one obligates oneself to comply with the same moral
principle.
That one invokes a moral principle in order to teach another what
one ought to do entails the truth of the proposition that s/he knows
the moral principle s/he teaches [Romans 2:17-24]. The anger of God
is justified against this hypocrisy because it allows others to subject
God Himself to blasphemous mockery. Paul argues, perhaps to blunt
this potential counterattack, that it does not follow that God’s holiness
demands are diminished in virtue of the hypocrisy of those who call
themselves His chosen people. Indeed, it is not true, as Jews tended
to portray it, that there are only two classes of people, Jews and
Gentiles, the former being God’s chosen people and the latter being
all the rest. It is not true that there are merely “the people of the scar”
and those who are not. There are two classes of people, but the
classes do not exist in virtue of “the scar”. They exist in terms of
whether they comply with the morality of the Law itself.
Paul is particularly interested in exposing what we may describe
as the Deontic Fallacy. This fallacy consists in the presumption that
compliance with the Law extends exclusively to behavioral
compliance. Paul argues that even if someone were to comply with
the behavioral demands of the Law, it would not follow that one
complies with the spirit of the Law. Indeed, this is the point of Jesus’
argument in His Sermon on the Mount [Matthew 5:20]. This is Paul’s
point in Romans 2:14-15. Paul presupposes that there are people who
have no access to the Law at all and who nevertheless comply or
strive to comply with its spirit and that such people are more
genuinely Jewish than those who require strict behavioral adherence
to the Law. This opens the door for including people in the Kingdom
on the ground that they are righteous people of faith, very much in
the character of Abraham.
Paul appeals to circumcision to make his case. Abraham was
circumcised and was directed to have all of his offspring circumcised
as a sign of God’s promise to him. Circumcision expresses a
relationship of a certain kind of person with God, an Abrahamic type
of person. Abraham’s devotion preceded the fleshly sign of the
159
Covenant. It was the quality of his faith that made Abraham the
choice for the blessing of the nations. “Abraham believed God and
that was credited to him as righteousness”, as Paul describes it.160
But, what does the appropriately placed scar guarantee? Does it
guarantee that the one who bears it in his body has the same character
as Father Abraham? Paul puts the question slightly unexpectedly.
Paul asks, “If a Gentile, who hasn’t the scar, complies with the Law
in its spirit apart from having the Law, will this Gentile be regarded
as a Jew even though he hasn’t the scar?” He asks additionally,
“What is the status of a Jew if he, who has the scar, does not comply
with the Law?” Will he not be the same as a Gentile who has not the
Law? In other words, is the scar the sine qua non of compliance?
Paul’s answer is a resounding “No!”161 When any Gentile who does
not have the Law, does by nature [fu,sei ta. tou/ no,mou poiw/sin, i.e.,
does so in virtue of one’s disposition toward holiness], the things the
Law requires, s/he shows that his/her compliance is from the heart.162
In so doing s/he displays that the Law is written on his/her heart.
Some Jews are not Jews and some Gentiles are. The standard for
whether one is a genuine child of Abraham is whether s/he does the
works of the Law by nature from the heart in good faith.163 This
includes the fact that anyone who earnestly desires holiness
experiences existential distress when s/he discovers that s/he has
fallen short of it and redoubles his/her efforts to bring him/herself into
character compliance.
This entire argument is devoted to holding men accountable for
deviating from the moral demands of a righteous God. The argument
centers on all the reasons Paul gives for the premise that every sinner
is without excuse [avnapolo,ghtoj]. Therefore, any implication that

160
Genesis 15:6; Paul conducts an extended discussion of this principle
in Romans 4.
161
Paul makes this same point in Colossians 2:11-15. Baptism is to
Christians what circumcision is to the Jews.
162
oi[tinej evndei,knuntai to. e;rgon tou/ no,mou grapto.n evn tai/j kardi,aij
auvtw/n( summarturou,shj auvtw/n th/j suneidh,sewj kai. metaxu. avllh,lwn tw/n
logismw/n kathgorou,ntwn h' kai. avpologoume,nwn(
163
to. e;rgon tou/ no,mou grapto.n evn tai/j kardi,aij auvtw/n /
summarturou,shj auvtw/n th/j suneidh,sewj See also: Romans 9:6 Ouvc oi-on de.
o[ti evkpe,ptwken o` lo,goj tou/ qeou/Å ouv ga.r pa,ntej oi` evx VIsrah.l ou-toi
VIsrah,l\
160
men are sinners by nature is entirely inconsistent with Paul’s
argument here. If anything, their nature already contains the dictates
of holiness and is only tainted by the conscious suppression of the
truth for the sake of unrighteousness [Romans 1:18]. Indeed, a major
premise in Paul’s argument is that there are some Gentiles who do
not have access to the Law to which Jews do have access and yet they
obey its dictates from the heart and in good faith. The natural moral
law is “written on their hearts” and, when they comply, their
compliance is clearly superior to that of the Jews who comply, to the
extent they do, merely because they are coerced under penalty of law
to do so. They study it. They teach it. God is in a position, in virtue
of His righteousness, to hold every person accountable, whether s/he
has the Law or not, whether s/he is a Jew or not. God is no respecter
of persons and His legitimate holiness expectations are justified
whether one has the Law/Bible or not, for it is already written on their
hearts, in their conscience.

161
 Chapter Seven—Thesis Three: “A Righteousness Apart
from the Law”— Romans 3:21-31

Thesis 3: Jesus Christ is the embodiment of what Faith is and
His expression of this Faith occurs independently of the Law
and the Prophets, and is not incompatible with either of them.

Consider what may be a misunderstanding of this phrase based
on a dubious translation of Romans 3:21-26. According to the NIV,
Paul says:
Romans 3:21 But now a righteousness from God, apart from law,
has been made known, to which the Law and the Prophets
testify. 22 This righteousness from God comes through faith in
Jesus Christ to all who believe. There is no difference, 23 for all
have sinned and fall short of the glory of God, 24 and are justified
freely by his grace through the redemption that came by Christ
Jesus. 25 God presented him as a sacrifice of atonement, through
faith in his blood. He did this to demonstrate his justice, because
in his forbearance he had left the sins committed beforehand
unpunished-26 he did it to demonstrate his justice at the present
time, so as to be just and the one who justifies those who have
faith in Jesus.
One may justifiably raise two issues with this translation. The
first is an objection to the translation itself. The second objection is
to the traditional understanding of the theology of “justification by
faith apart from the Law”.
Romans 3:22-26—Translation of Genitives and Datives, etc.
Interestingly enough, the KJV in Romans 3:22, perhaps because
it follows a more formal correspondence translation methodology
than the dynamic equivalence of more recent translations, translates
the Greek genitive dia. pi,stewj VIhsou/ Cristou as an English genitive
“through the faith of Jesus Christ”. However, it takes the to.n evk
pi,stewj VIhsou of 3:26 as though it were a dative. The preposition evk
generally suggests source rather than agency or spatially as motion

162
away from a point of origination. Consider the following translation
issues. The Greek text contains no verb corresponding to the English
“comes” in Romans 3:22. Second, the NIV translates the Greek
genitive construction, dia. pi,stewj VIhsou/ Cristou/ in Romans 3:22,
as though it was a dative by saying, "comes through faith in Jesus
Christ”. Third, the NIV translates to.n evk pi,stewj VIhsou in Romans
3:26 with “those who have faith in Jesus”. What is the justification
for such hermeneutical liberties? Is Paul saying that the righteousness
of God comes through faith in Jesus Christ? It seems not, for
linguistic as well as theological reasons. The translation reveals more
of a meta-theological orientation than an attempt to present the
thought of Paul.
The translation of dia. pi,stewj VIhsou/ Cristou [Romans 3:22]
would normally be "through the faith of [not “in”] Jesus Christ".
Some scholars have argued that since pi,stewj VIhsou/ Cristou is
ambiguous between subjective and objective genitive, that it makes
more sense to take it as objective genitive, making VIhsou/ Cristou
the object of the verbal noun pi,stewj. The English equivalent to a
Koine dative construction “belief in Jesus Christ” is chosen to
represent the objective genitive, as opposed to the subjective genitive
idea. However, it seems to be quite straightforward for Paul to have
used a dative construction if he had meant to say “belief in Jesus.”
This alone seems to provide adequate grounds for considering a
subjective genitive interpretation. The NIV implies that faith is not
something that Jesus has but that people have “in Jesus”; perhaps that
a believer believes in something Jesus has said or done. In contrast,
the KJV renders the construction as subjective genitive translating the
Greek genitive as English genitive, “which is by faith of Jesus Christ.”
The syntactic subject referred to is not “believers” but to God’s
righteousness [dikaiosu,nh qeou/].
Further, the verb "comes" in NIV, where the KJV inserts the
italicized “which is” is absent from the Koine. What justification is
there for importing a verb that is alien to the discourse when a
perfectly good verb is already available? Strict translation protocol
would require the use of a concept already in the discourse because a
writer has chosen to eliminate the repetition of a term already present
[i.e., an ellipsis, a redundancy the readers of the discourse can readily
identify]. If it is necessary to supply a verb, the likely candidate is
pefane,rwtai [“has been revealed/manifested”] from Romans 3:21.
Compare this to Romans 1:17 where a semantically similar
163
construction also appears—Dikaiosu,nh ga.r qeou/ evn auvtw/|
avpokalu,ptetai. Here in Romans 3:21 the term of revelation is in
perfect tense, middle/passive voice [pefane,rwtai] rather than in
present tense, active voice from earlier. One would expect that a verb
like “has been revealed” would be completed by indicating to whom
the content of the revelation had been made. This occurs with the
addition of eivj pa,ntaj tou.j pisteu,ontaj.
The personal integrity standard, i.e., the faith of Jesus Christ
Himself, replaces the secondary revelatory medium for the
revelation of holiness, namely the Law and the prophets.
The fulfillment of the holiness standard of the Law and the
prophets occurs in the person of Jesus Christ who has made the
objective Law a living existential reality as a man, not merely as God.
Further, this primary righteousness, i.e., the character of Jesus Christ
(indicated by dia. with the genitive denoting primary agency) “has
been and continues to be revealed” [pefane,rwtai is perfect tense] to
/
those who have hn"Wma, (eivj pa,ntaj tou.j pisteu,ontaj, [Taking note
of the present active participle]). If Paul means to conceptually
/
connect pi,stewj to the notion of hn"Wma of Habakkuk 2:4, as I have
already argued, and, so, to connect it to the notion of holiness as
integrity or as one’s accepting moral responsibility for becoming as
holy as God justifiably expects, then the sentence would mean
something like:
"For those who pursue having moral/holiness integrity, the
righteousness of God as the moral/holiness integrity standard
that God as Jesus Christ has established in the incarnation, is
expressed independently of, but not incompatibly with, the
secondary and non-primary medium of the Law and the
Prophets."
Accordingly, Paul would be saying,
“Just as the righteousness of God has been and continues to be
revealed apart from the Law and the Prophets, it has been and
continues to be revealed through the faith of [not “in”] Jesus
Christ to all of those who keep on accepting the moral
responsibility for becoming as holy as God justifiably expects.”
Thus, this interpretation has more to do with the character of the
person who continually follows Christ's model of holiness integrity
than it has to do with merely believing certain Biblical doctrines or
164
facts about Jesus’ redemptive activity. Jewish ears would experience
monumental difficulty with this idea, as do those with Reformed
Christian ears. It is not a doctrinal matter but a matter of holiness
integrity, the standard of which is Jesus Christ.
Justification by Faith as God’s Free Gift
Perhaps no verse in the Bible is as important in the theological
turn from Judaism to Christianity as is Romans 3:24. It follows on
the heels of perhaps the most quoted verse in characterizing the
Heidelbergian/Westminsterian anthropology, Romans 3:23. We
cannot neglect noticing the fact that this dependent clause, 3:23, is
part of a single sentence that runs from 3:21 through the end of 3:26
(Paul is well known for long, theologically dense sentences). Grace
meets sin in this sentence. Sentences convey a singular idea and this
sentence conveys a very important one. The idea is that God deals
with sinners without partiality and potentially with grace, while
balancing these elements with justice.
Since Paul presents the idea that God makes no distinctions
among men, [Romans 3:22 — ouv ga,r evstin diastolh,] one must ask,
“no distinction with regard to what?” The answer is that the
distinction that was so important to the Jewish religion, namely the
distinction between Jew and Gentile, is irrelevant to God, extending
Paul’s point about compliant Gentiles from Romans 2:25-29. Rather,
the important distinction is based on morality — Paul’s term is
“righteousness”. Whatever other attributes a person may have, they
are irrelevant to his/her status as a sinner. The Apostle to the Gentiles
makes this distinction central because without it the Jewish
exclusivity that was a stumbling block to so many would have
continued in Christianity. Consistent with Peter’s vision preparing
him to meet with Cornelius in Acts 10:34-35,164 Paul modifies the
onerous Jewish interpretation of “the chosen people.” The
universality of Christianity would require that soteriological
distinctions have nothing to do with secondary, accidental
distinctions such as ethnicity [neither Jew nor Greek], gender [neither
male nor female] or socio-economic status [neither slave nor free], as

164
Pe,troj .… ei=pen( VEpV avlhqei,aj katalamba,nomai o[ti ouvk e;stin
proswpolh,mpthj o` qeo,j( 35 avllV evn panti. e;qnei o` fobou,menoj auvto.n kai.
evrgazo,menoj dikaiosu,nhn dekto.j auvtw/| evstinÅ
165
Paul says in his Galatian Epistle [Galatians 3:28].165 So, Paul says,
“There is no partiality [ouv ga,r evstin diastolh,(] because everyone is
a sinner as a matter of fact, not as a matter of nature [h[marton is aorist
tense, the tense of facticity], sinners that continually fall short
[u`sterou/ntai is present tense] of God’s glory.” Whether He is dealing
with Jew or Gentile, God’s concern is over sin and righteousness, and
little else. The line of demarcation between sin and faith is the faith
of Jesus Christ, it is the righteousness apart from/independently of
[cwri.j] the Law, but nevertheless consistent with it. It is not Jewish-
ness, gender-ness or socio-economic status. The criterion is entirely
moral.
Since God regards all non-moral distinctions as soteriologically
irrelevant, it follows that God will distinguish between people based
solely on moral integrity since faith is “accepting the responsibility
for becoming as holy as God justifiably expects”. So, it would seem
that there are two kinds of sinners. On the one hand, there are sinners
who refuse to accept responsibility for becoming holy as distinct from
sinners who accept responsibility for becoming holy, on the other.166
The former kind of sinner cannot expect to receive grace from a just
God no matter how much God may love him/her, no matter what
his/her ethnicity, gender or socio-economic status may be. The latter
kind of sinner may rest assured that God will make His grace freely
available to him/her without distinction as to secondary things like
ethnicity, gender or socio-economic status. What is left for us to
discover is how dikaiou,menoi dwrea.n th/| auvtou/ ca,riti dia. th/j
avpolutrw,sewj th/j evn Cristw/| VIhsou/ works.
Let me revisit a point I made earlier. Recall that I argued that the
redemptive activity of Christ plays an important role in the gift of
grace and someone’s “being made right” or “Being deemed as though
right” or even perhaps “making oneself right” [dikaiou,menoi].167 Paul

165
ouvk e;ni VIoudai/oj ouvde. {Ellhn( ouvk e;ni dou/loj ouvde. evleu,qeroj( ouvk
e;ni a;rsen kai. qh/lu\ pa,ntej ga.r u`mei/j ei-j evste evn Cristw/| VIhsou/Å
166
Kierkegaard made a similar observation in his Sickness unto Death.
He said that there were two types of sinners. There are those who are despair
but do not realize that they are, and those who are in despair and know it.
167
I must point out that dikaiou,menoi is an occurrence of a
middle/passive, present tense participle raising the question I have raised
elsewhere about whether to translate such forms as passive, i.e., “being made
right” or as reflexive, i.e., “making oneself right”. The former is compatible
166
connects the answer to this question in the relative clause that follows
in 3:25-26.168 The antecedent of the accusative masculine relative
pronoun o]n is most certainly Cristw/| VIhsou/.
As an expression of His faith in the power of the sacrificial death
of the quintessential innocent man [dia. Îth/jÐ pi,stewj evn tw/| auvtou/
ai[mati],169 God has put Himself forward as Jesus [proe,qeto o`
qeo.j] as the sacrifice [i`lasth,rion] that displays publicly [eivj
e;ndeixin] that God is both just and the justifier of those whose sins
He is, under morally appropriate circumstances, willing to
disregard [th/j dikaiosu,nhj auvtou/ dia. th.n pa,resin tw/n
progegono,twn a`marthma,twn evn th/| avnoch/| tou/ qeou/( pro.j th.n
e;ndeixin th/j dikaiosu,nhj auvtou/ evn tw/| nu/n kairw/|( eivj to. ei=nai
auvto.n di,kaion kai. dikaiou/nta], those the basis of whose faith is
the faith of Jesus [to.n evk pi,stewj VIhsou/Å].
On the Atonement
There has been considerable discussion about what the atonement
means in Christianity. There is also considerable controversy over
the meaning of i`lasth,rion. The English translations generally
choose between the terms “expiation” and “propitiation” neither of
which terms have any particular meaning to general English readers.
Even the phrase “atoning sacrifice” does not carry enough semantic
content to convey any non-platitudinous meaning. For theologians

with the Augustinian paradigm, and enjoys nearly universal, although
uncritical acceptance. The latter choice is compatible with the Option #4
paradigm for which I am arguing. Of course, since the Augustinian Option
#3 paradigm is so fundamentally flawed, the reflexive must be given due
consideration.
168
o]n proe,qeto o` qeo.j i`lasth,rion dia. Îth/jÐ pi,stewj evn tw/| auvtou/ ai[mati
eivj e;ndeixin th/j dikaiosu,nhj auvtou/ dia. th.n pa,resin tw/n progegono,twn
a`marthma,twn. evn th/| avnoch/| tou/ qeou/( pro.j th.n e;ndeixin th/j dikaiosu,nhj
auvtou/ evn tw/| nu/n kairw/|( eivj to. ei=nai auvto.n di,kaion kai. dikaiou/nta to.n evk
pi,stewj VIhsou/Å
169
Jesus told a parable [Matthew 21:23-46] that could be construed as
a justification for this view. In the parable of the wicked tenants, the landlord
sends his agents to collect the rent. The tenants refused to pay. After
sending many more, all of whom were abused and some killed, the landlord
reasons that sending his son to collect what is rightfully his due will be
sufficient to get them to do what is right. Of course, it was not. But, it was
worth a try. It exposes the repentant and the rebel in the starkest relief.
167
these are technical terms with highly specialized meanings. Even
among them, they take little note about how the terms are used. Since
none of them has any particular meaning for the general population,
we should perhaps choose another term, phrase or description that is
clear about what God does in the sacrifice of Jesus. Let us embark
on this project.
The notion of “sacrifice” is varied. It can mean “to give up
something to gain an advantage for another person or project”.
Anything that someone is willing to give up in order to attain a higher,
nobler purpose could properly be construed as a sacrifice. For
example, a parent may buy a cheaper, less luxurious car in order to
save money for a child’s college education. Within the context of
religious practices, “sacrifice” generally means the same thing as
“offering.” In Jewish practice, as in most religions, there are
distinctions between offerings expressing thanks for blessings
received [thank-offerings] and offerings that are required because of
sins committed [sin offerings]. There are also offerings to influence
God or the gods to be beneficent to a people. Generally, these
sacrifices are designed to favorably dispose the gods or God to
vanquish enemies, or provide a bountiful crop, or make a people
fecund. A religion may also use sacrifice to placate or assuage the
anger of God or the gods. In such cases, the religion makes some
judgment about what is costly to those of whom the sacrifice is
required and what the God or gods may find appealing.
Let’s think about these major types of sacrificial offerings. In
general, we may distinguish between:
1) Propitiation — sacrifices the purpose of which is to appease
or placate God or the gods whose wrath sinners have incurred
— sacrifices designed to change God’s mind.
2) Expiation — sacrifices the purpose of which is to reconcile
people to God or the gods — sacrifices to change the mind
of the sinner.170

170
See: C. H. Dodd The Bible and the Greeks [London: Hodder &
Stoughton, 1935 (3rd impression 1964)], Chapter V: Atonement” – “Thus
Hellenistic Judaism, as represented by the LXX, does not regard the cultus
as a means of pacifying the displeasure of the Deity, but as a means of
delivering man from sin, and it looks in the last resort to God himself to
make that deliverance, thus evolving a meaning of i`la,skesqai strange to
168
 The idea of appeasement or placation, as in propitiation, is
morally and, therefore, soteriologically deficient. One seeks to
appease or placate someone when the person being placated or
appeased is angry with the one offering the placation. There seems
to be no indication on whether the anger of God or the gods is
justified. Justification for the anger is, therefore, neutral in
appeasement/placation. If the anger is capricious or unrelated to any
moral violations, then the appeasement/placation must appeal to the
appetites of the one who is wroth. There is certainly no question that
the sacrificial orientations in many religions have this feature. But,
if God’s wrath were capricious, such a concept of God fails the
ontological standard. Conceive of two notions of God such that, on
the one hand, God’s anger is represented as capricious and, on the
other, one whose wrath is represented as justified due to willful
violations of justified moral expectations. The latter God would, in
the Anselmian/Cartesian sense, be the greater God, i.e., the morally
perfect God. Even if the God that required appeasement or placation
were angry about moral violations, the sacrifice designed to change
God’s anger will be something approaching a bribe if initiated by the
perpetrator, or extortion if initiated by the God. In other words, the
payment of the sacrifice may have little to do with a change in the
character or even the practice of the perpetrator. If the sacrifice meets
certain pragmatic conditions, God’s wrath may dissipate. But there
is no guarantee that the sinner has done any more than “bought God
off” for a while. Therefore, we may object to the notion of sacrificial
appeasement on moral grounds. That is to say that appeasement or
placation sacrificial paradigms commit the ontological fallacy.
This leaves us with the notion of sacrifice as a strategy in the
interest of reconciliation of the offender to the non-offender. How
can a sacrifice attain reconciliation? As I have argued earlier,
reconciliation presupposes alienation. I argued that if the alienation
that is due to a violation of moral principle is to be reconciled, then
either the one who first abandons the moral principle creating the
alienation must return to the moral standard or else the one who had
not abandoned the moral principle must deviate from it. Even this is

Biblical Greek.” (pg. 93). With regard to Romans 3:25: “[T]he meaning
conveyed (in accordance with LXX usage, which is constantly determinative
for Paul), is that of expiation, not that of propitiation. Most translators and
commentators are wrong.” (pg. 94)
169
not enough to create reconciliation. There is no guarantee that
adopting a value standard that is not holy achieves compatibility with
another non-holy value standard. So, unless the God who desires at-
one-ment with someone who has become morally alienated is
prepared to abandon holiness, something He cannot do without
abandoning holiness in itself, He cannot have at-one-ment with
anyone who is morally alienated apart from that one’s voluntarily
returning to holiness. On the one hand, if God should abandon
holiness in order to have at-one-ment with morally deviant people,
He violates the ontological standard. On the other hand, if God
requires morally deviant people to repent, then He can maintain His
personal integrity as well as the moral standard of holiness. So, what
kind of sacrifice has the best chance of producing a voluntary moral
change in a sinner’s character? God’s problem now becomes a
problem of choosing what strategies could motivate someone to
return to holiness.
The logically possible choices are varied. But certain features
circumscribe all of them.
1. The sacrificial method must be predicated on moral
considerations. It must expose the sinfulness of sin in
contrast to holiness.
2. The sinner’s moral change in virtue of the sacrifice must be
voluntary. God may not directly cause any change in the
sinner’s character nor may He coerce the sinner’s change.
3. In virtue of the sacrifice, the sinner’s sinful character must be
exposed insofar as the sinner will voluntarily engage in moral
self-assessment.
4. In virtue of the sacrifice, the sinner must engage in the
process of existential transformation, i.e., i) accept
responsibility for his/her own sin, ii) experience remorse at
his/her having chosen to become a sinner and iii) repudiate
sin in both the aretaic and deontic dimensions.
5. In virtue of the sacrifice, the sinner must iv) resolve to
become as holy as God justifiably expects.
Boasting, Grace and Law
NIV Romans 3:27 Where, then, is boasting? It is excluded. On
what principle? On that of observing the law? No, but on that of
faith. 28 For we maintain that a man is justified by faith apart

170
 from observing the law.171
What is the response of someone who receives something of
value for free when s/he had no legal or moral right to it? This is the
nature of a gift. If gifts were required by the demands of legal or
moral obligation, the very character of the gift itself disappears.
Unfortunately, the character of a gift has become seriously distorted,
since if when birthdays, anniversaries and holidays arrive and one
receives no “gift” appropriate to the occasion and/or the relationship,
there will be instantaneous deleterious consequences for the
negligent. But the fact that the notion of “gift” has been thusly
prostituted serves to make Paul’s point all the more striking.
Consider another dimension, the phenomenon of sibling rivalry.
“Mom (or Dad) loves me more than you.” Children may make an
observation like this, particularly when the objective is to put down a
sibling. Often pointing out that one has some privilege or “gift” that
the others do not have defends the claim. Now, of course, a parent
may have given this message to one child rather than another because
the one is regarded more privileged or more valuable than another is.
The child with the privileged status will soon become spoiled,
arrogant and irresponsible; the child will become a brat. Even then,
the child may be so privileged that the parent may not care.
Ultimately, the privileges are transformed into boasting. “Mom (or
Dad) loves me more than you.” As undesirable as this is for children,
when such children become adults they bring this arrogance to the
world with much more devastating power. Arrogance is hardly a
moral virtue and so should not be the basis for any justifiable
soteriology. It violates the notion of faith as accepting responsibility
for becoming as holy as God justifiably expects. Paul asks on what
principle is boasting excluded. He answers, “On the basis of faith”,
i.e., on the resolve to live life according to God’s just holiness
expectations whether one’s life goes well or ill.
The analogy that gets at Paul’s meaning is not in terms of the
quasi-obligatory gifts between friends, family and lovers or gifts from
doting parents creating spoiled children but a gift from someone

171
GNT Romans 3:27 Pou/ ou=n h` kau,chsijÈ evxeklei,sqhÅ dia. poi,ou
no,mouÈ tw/n e;rgwnÈ ouvci,( avlla. dia. no,mou pi,stewjÅ 28 logizo,meqa ga.r
dikaiou/sqai pi,stei a;nqrwpon cwri.j e;rgwn no,mouÅ

171
whose gift is “out of the blue”; someone whose gift is out of sheer
delight in giving it, independently of any obligation. The one giving
the gift feels no obligation, is under no external compulsion and the
relationship itself does not obligate the giver. Such a gift is “free” in
the sense Paul intends here [dwrea.n th/| auvtou/ ca,riti]. Paul’s point
is really quite simple. If someone receives something in virtue of
some obligation, then the thing so received is ipso facto not a “gift
freely given”.
Jesus’ parable of the Prodigal Son/Waiting Father has this at its
core. The father does not run after the soon to be profligate son. The
son’s choice to deviate from the father’s values carries with it its own
consequences, consequences that ultimately carried him to tending
swine and eating their swill. Jesus says of the son that “when he came
to himself” [Luke 15:17 eivj e`auto.n de. evlqw.n], he said “do not the
servants in my father’s house have it better than me? I will go to my
father and ask to become a servant in his household.” Jesus has the
repentant profligate son acknowledge that his choice to leave his
father has voided any obligation on the father’s part. In the absence
of any moral or legal obligation to do anything for him, the son must
rely on some modicum of grace that he must hope that his father may
yet have. To his surprise, the son finds that the father is awaiting his
return.172 His father is overjoyed to find him coming home. He runs
to him with open arms and abundant gifts. The father throws a party
to celebrate his return. If the father were under a moral or legal
obligation to accept the returning son, the point of the parable itself
would be lost. The father’s reaction to his son’s repentance is more
gracious than the son could have or should have conceived. It is
inconceivable that a right-minded son would boast in anything but the
grace his father shows him. The father owes the son nothing for
returning to virtue from vice. If the son’s return were hypocritical or
manipulative, the response of the father would be no less gracious.
But the son’s return would have been disingenuous and would have
certainly blasphemed the grace itself. But the grace would still confer
no obligation on the father. The son may boast that he had deceived
his father, but he still will have created no obligation.

172
See Helmut Thielicke The Waiting Father: Sermons on the Parables
of Jesus Translated by John W. Doberstein [New York, NY: Harper &
Brothers, 1959] for this particular insight.
172
 Let us consider one further matter. Consider that should God be
under some obligation to forgive or extend grace to someone and He
then withholds Himself from honoring that obligation. Since His
power would be sufficient to guarantee that no one who would,
hypothetically, “deserve” this gift would get it, it would make God’s
withholding the gift an act of injustice. God would be under
obligation whether He honored that obligation or not. In fact, it
would make more sense to say that God was under obligation to
extend grace to those who complied with God’s just holiness
expectations than to say that He is obligated to any who violates His
just holiness expectations. But, once those just holiness expectations
are violated in any respect, God is under no obligation at all. He does
take on an obligation once He chooses between Bureaucratic and
Grace-faith based soteriological paradigms. He places Himself under
obligation to some paradigm when He chooses to act according to the
demands of the paradigm itself. Should God fail or refuse to follow
His chosen paradigm He may compromise His own integrity.
Against this no sinner could have any possible remedy since no power
in the universe could alter God’s choice to go back on His own
promise. So, God is under obligation to His own word, and to nothing
else.
But this is not to be confused with compliance or repentance
creating an obligation. If one is morally obligated to comply with
holiness and does comply, there is nothing that creates a moral
obligation for God, for one has merely done what is required by the
nature of righteousness itself. Jesus told a parable about this [Luke
17:5-10]. If one is already morally obligated to comply with holiness
and does not comply, no obligation is created since the sinner fails to
honor righteousness. Neither does one create an obligation if s/he is
morally obligated to comply with holiness and subsequently repents
of his/her non-compliance, since s/he only returns to the morally
required state of righteousness.
Since God acknowledges no non-moral distinction between
people, and since He is under no moral or legal obligation to grant
any privilege to people who are sinners and since He may choose to
grant or refuse to grant a privilege based on the character of a person’s
accepting personal responsibility for becoming as holy as He
justifiably expects, any gift God freely gives cannot be the basis for
any pride [h` kau,chsij] on the part of the recipient. If someone had
“deserved” God’s “free gift,” then God would have been under

173
obligation and the gift would no longer be free. If God was under
moral or legal obligation with regard to the so-called gift, the
relationship of men to God will have been transformed into a
bureaucratic one; a relationship in which all transactions are based
solely on legally defined duties and obligations. Consider the fact
that in dealing with bureaucrats there is no accommodation to
anything but the demands of the law. Indeed, if a bureaucrat were to
treat someone in a way that is inconsistent with the law, s/he would
be in violation of the Law. In such a system of transactions, there is
no room for Grace whatsoever. In fact, Grace becomes illegal. For
Jewish or any other type of legalism to view God in terms of legal
obligation, especially trying to put God under legal obligation, is to
blasphemously cheapen God’s grace.
Of course, there is no moral violation in God’s choosing to adopt
a grace-based as opposed to a bureaucratic-based theological
paradigm in dealing with moral rebels. In other words, God would
violate no moral principle even if He had chosen a bureaucratic
soteriology. In this case, sinners would be dealt with solely on the
basis of whether or not they are in legal-moral compliance with God’s
just holiness expectations, i.e., He would have chosen either an
Option #1 or an Option #2 paradigm. However, if the soteriological
model were bureaucratic, and God were to classify sinners according
to some arbitrary criteria and then use this arbitrary standard to deal
differently with sinners of the same kind, i.e., an Option #3 paradigm,
using distinctions that have nothing to do with their moral status (as
for example their gender, ethnic or socio-economic character), then
God would be ipso facto unjust in the same way that a bureaucrat
would be legally culpable for treating applicants of equal legal
standing according to extra-legal considerations like friendship or
party affiliation. Even in the case of political officials that violate the
law but have the political will and power to avoid being held
accountable, s/he would not be morally or legally vindicated in virtue
of his/her power to be insulated from accountability. So, it seems that
if God is to maintain His moral integrity, He must abandon a
bureaucratic soteriological model in favor of a grace-based
soteriology or else He must discard the faith-based grace paradigm.
But, neither may the grace-based soteriological paradigm distinguish
between sinners on any basis other than whether or not their faith as
“accepting responsibility for becoming as holy as God justifiably

174
expects” is or is not persistently present.173 God does not morally
allow Himself to distinguish between sinners on any other grounds
than moral grounds, i.e., the presence or absence of faith as the
resolve to accept the responsibility for becoming as perfect as the
Father in Heaven is; “for purifying oneself just as He (Christ) is pure”
[1 John 3:3].
While God’s adopting either of the two paradigms violates no
moral principle, the paradigms are mutually exclusive. Since God is
under no moral obligation to choose one or the other paradigm,
whatever choice He makes is not a function of His obligation to
sinners. Therefore, sinners cannot boast about whatever decision
God makes, inasmuch as they had nothing to do with His making it.
Their boasting is excluded on the principle of faith [avlla. dia. no,mou
pi,stewj]174 since whatever works they may perform under the Law
they have already violated do not obligate God in any choice it is
God’s prerogative to make. Sinners do, however, become obligated
in virtue of whatever choices God makes. If God chooses a
bureaucratic soteriology, sinners are obligated to comply with the
Law. If God chooses a Grace/Faith-based soteriology, complying
with the law without also complying with the demands of faith will
do no good.
God becomes obligated by the choices He makes, not by the
choices of those for whom He makes them.
The logical connection between the Law-based bureaucratic
paradigm and the grace-faith based paradigm is broken. They are
logically incompatible, and God cannot (or, if you prefer, will not; I
will not quibble.) allow logically incompatible realities to co-exist.
But does this require that the grace/faith paradigm has no relationship
whatever to the Law? What does Paul mean by “for we maintain that
a man is justified by faith apart from [independently of] observing the
law” [Romans 3:28—logizo,meqa ga.r dikaiou/sqai pi,stei a;nqrwpon
cwri.j e;rgwn no,mou]? Is it logically and morally possible to reconcile
the obedience to the moral demands of the Law such that God may
also extend His Grace without tacitly authorizing sin? The answer to

173
Paul uses present participles to regularly describe those for whom
the grace-based paradigm is designed.
174
Dia. no,mou here perhaps should be understood as “through the
principle of faith”
175
this dilemma requires us to comprehend the distinction between
“works of the Law” [e;rgwn no,mou] and “to be justified by faith”
[dikaiou/sqai pi,stei]. Is it possible to behaviorally comply with the
Law and also be justified by faith such that the former is independent
of the latter?
Recall that we have discussed that intentions, motivations and
purposes have some bearing on whether an action taken is morally
worthwhile. Recall that Immanuel Kant had brought this
consideration to the fore when he proffered his view that an action is
morally worthwhile when it is undertaken against one’s natural
inclinations to act otherwise. Although this definition is much too
broad, there is an important truth contained within it. No action is by
itself morally autonomous. Its moral worth is inherently connected
to the moral character of the agent (Kant called it the “Good Will”),
notwithstanding the inconsistency it creates within his argument.
Jesus has already made a better argument. Jesus argues, “Unless
one’s righteousness surpasses that of the Scribes and Pharisees, s/he
can never enter the Kingdom of Heaven.”175 The Sermon on the
Mount makes clear distinctions between behaviors like murder,
adultery, taking vows and character traits like anger versus self-
control, lustfulness versus fidelity and deception versus truthfulness.
Jesus argued that people who do the right things like giving alms,
fasting and praying in order to receive the praise of people will
receive no praise from God.
In general, Jesus argues that although doing the right things is
morally necessary for entry into the Kingdom of Heaven, it is not
morally sufficient.
As He says, “Do not begin to think that I have come to abolish
the Law and the Prophets; I have not come to abolish them, but to
fulfill them.” The moral fulfillment of the Law is not accomplished
in virtue of the mere behavioral compliance with the Law’s

175
Matthewhew 5:20 le,gw ga.r u`mi/n o[ti eva.n mh. perisseu,sh| u`mw/n h`
dikaiosu,nh plei/on tw/n grammate,wn kai. Farisai,wn( ouv mh. eivse,lqhte eivj
th.n basilei,an tw/n ouvranw/nÅ See my: The Surpassing Righteousness: The
Sermon of the Mount for Would-be Disciples [Bloomington, IN: Xlibris,
2013]
176
commandments. Rather it is fulfilled aretaically,176 i.e., in a character
fulfillment that guarantees the behavioral compliance. Paul follows
Jesus’ lead in taking this position. Faith includes the character
commitment to be a person of virtue, someone whose character will
come to guarantee compliance in behavior. “The righteous man shall
live by faith”, as Paul puts it (by the way, the Stoics agree with this).
Of course, failure to comply behaviorally with the moral
requirements of the Law tends to indicate an unwillingness to comply
the character demands.
Consider that the following table expresses the four resulting
categories and that they fall into a rather intuitively natural moral
ranking.

NO FAITH/NO
FAITH/GRACE
GRACE

Character Compliance Character Non-compliance

Behavioral I. RIGHTEOUSNESS III. HYPOCRISY
Compliance

Behavioral II. GRACE/FAITH IV. EVIL/WICKEDNESS
Non-
compliance

• Character and Behavioral Compliance—This category
designates the symmetry between a person’s character and
his behavior in the interest of righteousness. This type of
person complies with Law not because the Law may reward
him for complying or may punish him for failing, refusing or
neglecting to comply. Rather this person will comply
because of holiness in itself. This person will do what is true,
right and good even should there be the prospect of his being
punished, belittled or persecuted for doing so. Category I

176
Recall the distinction in ethics between theories according to whether
the focus is on the results of an action, teleological theories, on the duty of
an action independently of results, deontological theories, and developing
people with the requisite virtues as opposed to vices, aretaic theories.
177
 compliance is grounded in character, independently of the
externality of Law’s coercive dynamic. For example, the
State of Illinois, as do all of the other states, has a law against
murder. But, that law, although it prescribes a good in that it
proscribes an evil, is irrelevant for very many including me.
The State needs no law to protect the citizens of Illinois from
me. The righteous man needs no Law. The righteous man
complies with the Law such that the Law is not even
necessary. 177 Jesus has met this standard of compliance. In
this, faith is fully actualized. This is why I have argued above
for “the faith of Jesus Christ” not “faith in Jesus Christ.”
• Character compliance with Behavioral non-compliance—
This is a lesser status. It allows for someone who is devoted
to becoming as holy as God justifiably expects, but
incompletely sees or understands what this entails. God in
virtue of grace allows latitude in tolerance for behavioral
non-compliance since Faith is not yet fully actualized. He is
tolerant as faith moves from one level to another, i.e.,
becomes more fully internalized and integrated. Paul argues
in another place that this is the tutorial role that the Law plays
in the evolution of faith [Galatians 3:24]. As long as one is
in this tutorial mode, God accepts a sinner’s commitment to
comply with the demands of holiness in lieu of deficits in
actual performance compliance. This is Faith “on the way”
to actualization [Recall Romans 1:17 evk pi,stewj eivj pi,stin].
Grace is God’s concession to this process.
• Behavioral compliance with Character non-compliance—
This type of compliance carries the name of “hypocrisy”
inasmuch as the sinner intends/uses his behavior to mislead
the world about his underlying character. The asymmetry of
this category is unlike the asymmetry of Category II. The
Category II asymmetry has to do with an imperfect
understanding of the true, right and good and people who
when they discover the right thing to do will strive to comply
in good faith. The Category III asymmetry has to do with
people who use right behavior as a disguise for a character
that is flawed and in whom there is no desire for or intention

177
See Paul’s argument to Timothy, 1 Timothy 1:8-12
178
 of correcting the character flaw. Jesus characterizes these
people as those who wash only the outside of the cup or
whitewash tombs to disguise the internal decadence [See
Matthew 23:24-39]. The Category III person believes that it
is morally sufficient to display the appearance of holiness
rather than to become holy. The Category II person believes
that it is more important to become holy than to merely
display the look of holiness. In this, becoming holy is the
more likely result over the long-term since the asymmetry
dissipates with discipleship growth. In the Category III case,
the asymmetry becomes more pronounced over time because
there is a disconnect between being/becoming holy and
appearing holy. This is hypocrisy and is no faith at all.
• Behavioral and Character non-compliance—There is
symmetry in this category. Behavior and character are in
synch. They are synchronized in the interest of evil,
wickedness and sin. The character of such people contains
vice traits with no commitment to do anything to transform
the vices into virtues. This is no faith at all; it is wickedness.
In fact, few will even try to maintain this state since the
transparency between character and behavior would allow
people to see the evil and, so, the evil could not succeed in its
purposes. The only possible exception to this is someone
who has the power to exercise evil openly because no one
could do anything about the evils s/he may perpetrate.
The mistake of antinomianism is to maintain that grace inasmuch
as it is available to people in Category II is, therefore, available for
all people who are in any condition of asymmetry. But this belief can
be true if and only if there are only two soteriological categories,
namely the category of behavioral compliers and the category of
behavioral non-compliers. This is too simple a model. The four
categories we have just analyzed account better for our intuitively
viable distinctions. When Paul concludes, “we maintain that a man
is justified by faith apart from observing the law” [logizo,meqa ga.r
dikaiou/sqai pi,stei a;nqrwpon cwri.j e;rgwn no,mou], he does not
advocate that anyone could be righteous even if he contradicted the
Law, but that holiness is becoming or has become so internalized in
character that an external code is redundant and is, therefore,
irrelevant.

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Faith and Gentiles
NIV Romans 3:29 Is God the God of Jews only? Is he not the
God of Gentiles too? Yes, of Gentiles too, 30 since there is only
one God, who will justify the circumcised by faith and the
uncircumcised through that same faith. 31 Do we, then, nullify
the law by this faith? Not at all! Rather, we uphold the law.
Now the hard part comes. Some, indeed many, Christians have
interpreted Paul as saying that “faith” means “faith in Jesus”. This is
said to mean that one must believe certain historical facts or
theological dogmas about Jesus, e.g., that Jesus is God’s Son or that
Jesus died for our sins, etc. While this becomes a part of the Faith,
our argument so far entails that even if one should believe these
requisite dogma-facts, it would not entail that this dogma-fact based
faith will have sufficient salvific value. For example, James argues
this point by saying that if this is all that faith is, then demons qualify
as believing [James 2:19]. This conclusion is so obviously absurd
that it should be hardly worth mentioning. To argue this way would
entail the truth of the proposition that faith has nothing whatever to
do with holiness or righteousness. This is at odds with what both Paul
and Jesus say and what any ontological doctrine morality should
require. Someone who believes the orthodox facts and dogmas about
Christ would not be saved by faith when they fall into either Category
III--Hypocrisy or Category IV--Evil. So, one should perhaps argue
that believing the dogma-facts about Jesus may be necessary for
anyone to be saved, but it would be flawed to argue that believing the
dogma-facts about Jesus would be sufficient for anyone to be saved.
That is, it could be true to say that no one could be saved without
believing these a posteriori dogma-facts (as Paul seems to argue in
Romans 2:17-29), but it would not follow that merely believing such
dogma-facts would guarantee salvation, since one could hold the
requisite dogma-fact beliefs, i.e., believe that they were ontologically
true, without accepting responsibility for complying with the a priori
requirements of holiness. If this were the Christian or Pauline
position on these matters, then this would be sufficient reason to
reject such a soteriology without further ado.
But there is another serious problem. If faith consists in merely
believing the requisite dogma-facts, one is required to believe based
on what philosophers call a posteriori knowledge. This would
require that anyone who is to be saved must be privy to the requisite
dogma-facts, and since some cannot have had access to this
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information, then such people will ipso facto be condemned. But,
they will have been condemned for not having the requisite a
posteriori knowledge, knowledge that they could not have acquired,
perhaps because people who have the knowledge to give them are too
busy with choir practice or with worship services or with prayer
meetings and Bible studies. But this would mean that their
condemnation would be unjust on the principle that one can only be
justly condemned for failure to meet conditions that they can know
and with which they can comply. It is patently unjust for God or
anyone else to condemn anyone for being ignorant of dogma-facts
when the people who have the responsibility for publishing these
dogma-facts do not meet their responsibilities. If an elementary
school teacher fails to teach his/her students the principles of
arithmetic, it is wrong to hold the ignorant students responsible for
their ignorance. The teacher has failed to exercise his/her
responsibility. Therefore, the blame for the ignorance rests with the
teacher.
How can Christianity in general, or Paul in particular, avoid
committing this soteriological blunder? Although “the Faith” may
include the dogma-facts about Jesus’ soteriological purpose and
activity and the commands that are unique to the Christian system,
which things are a posteriori knowledge, “Faith” will have to be
based on a priori moral knowledge. Paul’s point is, “since there is
only one God, who will justify the circumcised by faith and the
uncircumcised through that same faith” [Romans 3:30], in order to
be based on something just, one has to regard pi,stewj as a priori
moral knowledge and whether one accepts responsibility for meeting
the moral demands the Holy God justifiably expects. If the Gentile
meets this minimal condition of Faith he will be just as eligible for
God’s grace as any Jew who meets the minimal condition of Faith,
namely Category II. The accidents of history should not and would
not impede God’s righteous judgment, recalling Romans 2:26-29.
Those who object to this argument will argue that if it is sound,
then the need for evangelism is vitiated. In fact, it will, they say, be
soteriologically detrimental to people who do not have the a
posteriori knowledge to bring them this a posteriori good news. The
fallacy in this objection consists in that while God may extend His
grace to people who strive for complying with the a priori moral
demands of holiness, knowledge God has “written on the hearts of
men,” it is not logically or morally necessary that God should extend

181
any Grace of any kind. Also, not all men may be driven by the desire
for holiness. In fact, Paul has argued that few people will be so driven
[See: Romans 3:10-18]. Some, indeed, many people will have to be
prodded and persuaded to consider that unless they repent of their sin,
they will be subject to the justifiable wrath of God, and that Jesus is
that God who “has a deal for them.” Condemnation is deducible from
the Law. But, that Grace is available to those who choose faith and
condemnation for those who do not is delivered through God’s
historical incarnation as the man Jesus of Nazareth and subsequently
through the discipleship activities of disciplined disciples. It is not,
as we have just argued, either logically or morally necessary for God
to have chosen a Grace-Faith paradigm. So, people will have to be
advised that He has done so. This is Good News. Although God is
under no moral or legal obligation to extend Grace to those who
choose Faith, He has indeed chosen to do so. It matters not whether
one is Jew or Gentile. The only thing that matters is whether or not
people choose Faith as a holiness lifestyle.
In this sense, Jesus is the only one who is in a position to certify
that anyone is to be saved. Consider this question. If Jesus is God
and Jesus authorizes someone’s salvation when my theology, or
someone else’s, denies or would have denied that Jesus would
authorize it, would it be true to say that Jesus was mistaken, or that
He had committed an error in authorizing that salvation? What is the
status of any argument we might design for the purpose of convincing
Jesus that He had erred? Shall we accuse Him of some illicit
deviation from His own stated soteriological parameters? Shall Jesus
be declared a heretic?
Let me illustrate my point. Once a friend of mine and I were
engaged in a vociferous discussion one night over whether Jesus was
God or merely God’s Son. It was a discussion over which
Christology was reflected in the Biblical evidence. Neither of us
could formulate arguments that would alter the views of the other. I
was getting tired and tired of our ceaseless debate, for neither of us
would accept the counter arguments of the other, the refutations and
the disputes over whether our uses of Scripture were relevant to our
arguments. I wanted to go to bed. So, I asserted: “One of us is going
to go to hell!” He asked, “What do you mean?” I said that since we
each believed our position to be “the Biblical” one, and since the
Bible cannot violate the logical laws of excluded middle, non-
contradiction and identity of indiscernibles in virtue of the principle

182
of inerrancy, then it follows that one of our positions was in fact non-
biblical, indeed it is logically possible that we had both made some
error. Further, if it is true that Jesus would only authorize the
salvation of those whose theological position is “Biblical”, and
Athanasianism is logically incompatible with Arianism, i.e., both
cannot be true at the same time, it follows that one of us has the wrong
theology/Christology. It is also true that everyone will go either to
heaven or hell. Ergo, one of us is going to hell. Of course, this is a
reductio ad absurdum argument. At least, I hope it is.
I think my friend would concede that neither of us will go to hell,
at least not because we hold to incompatible Christologies. But it
does raise the question of how Jesus really does determine who will
be saved. Let me offer an explanation. I think that Jesus has given
us the Gospel plan. According to Paul, this plan used to be a mystery,
but is no longer [See: Colossians 1:24-27]. Having been given this
revealed mystery, it is incumbent upon the Church to disseminate it.
Although the Bible says that only those who believe in Christ will be
saved, or many interpret it as saying this, as we have seen, Paul seems
to admit the possibility that some “Gentiles” may follow “the Law
writ on their hearts” and that these have a soteriologically higher
standing than those Jews who have the Law but distort it or refuse to
follow it. They have, as a matter of fact, suppressed the truth of the
written Law or the Gospel. Although Christians are commissioned to
disseminate this Gospel, it may be too much to say that Jesus will
only authorize the salvation of those who have a Bible and understand
and accept its provisions, notwithstanding the logically diverse
interpretations of the same document. In any event, we can certainly
say that no Christian whatsoever is in a position to authorize the
salvation of anyone who has not followed the Biblical requirements,
or his/her version of it. I think Christians are authorized to say that
anyone who violates the requirements of holiness cannot be assured
of any grace from Christ. But, from this it does not follow that Jesus
is not in a position to authorize the salvation of people who have not
followed the non-moral biblical requirements. This means that there
are some soteriological sine qua non requirements, namely the
holiness requirements, which Jesus expects to be honored
independently of other non-moral requirements, like liturgical
practices, for example. My argument, and I maintain that this is
Paul’s argument as well, is that these holiness requirements are
known or knowable a priori. Once one comes to know about a

183
posteriori commands, i.e., commands that one can only know in
virtue of having a Bible, then any refusal to honor those commands
becomes an issue of defiance. Anyone who acts in this way will have
to be made aware of the potential consequences of such defiance,
since Jesus is the final judge.
It is assumed, quite incorrectly, that Jesus is authorized to
authenticate the salvation of only those people whom Christians can
also authenticate as saved. Since the authority of Christ is
substantially greater than that of any Christian or constituencies of
them, it would seem to follow that Jesus is not at all bound by any of
our so-called authentications. He may save whomever He wills
(Duh!). Surely our belief that our arguments for our version of
Christian theology is true and valid is not at all logically sufficient for
concluding that it is true merely because we believe it to be. Nothing
is true because someone believes it, or so I tell my Introduction to
Philosophy students. This is a principle of epistemology as well as
logic. This is true because false beliefs are possible while false
knowledge is impossible. That is why I am committed to the
development of arguments with regard to Christian theology,
arguments that depend on premises that are indubitably true when
they can be found or are more likely than not to be true when
indubitable ones cannot be found. Further, I want these arguments to
be logically valid as well. That is to say, I want arguments to be such
that their form will never allow any set of true premises to entail any
false conclusions. If these two conditions are met, then we will have
developed sound arguments. It does not follow from my belief that I
have succeeded in this endeavor that I have succeeded in fact.178 This
is the role of epistemological humility in theology. This is how I have
come to understand the Restoration Principle, “We are not the only
Christians, but Christians only.”
I do not know where the Gentiles who obey holiness by faith from
the heart may be; I do not know where they may be. I do want to
inform them of the love of God and of His grace. I want them to
realize that He undertook to offer forgiveness to those of faith. But
if the accidents of circumstance and history do not allow for the
presentation of these facts to them, I will defer to the wisdom of Jesus

178
I take comfort in Paul’s assurances in 1 Corinthians 3:10-15.
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in deciding whether they will be invited to the Kingdom.179 In other
words, I choose to eschew blasphemy. I will not, by presumption or
by accident, arrogate to myself any prerogative which is exclusively
God’s! The awarding of salvation is His exclusive prerogative and
His alone.

179
C. S. Lewis opened my eyes on this matter. I was surprised and
provoked when in The Last Battle [New York, NY: Scholastic Inc. 1956
(1988)], pp. 164-165. Aslan surprises a Calormene soldier by inviting him
to enter the New Narnia. The soldier asked how this could be since he fought
in the Calormene army in apparent allegiance to Tash, the vile and terrible
god of the Calormenes, and so the soldier, whose name was Emeth, was
consciously opposed to Aslan. Emeth, the soldier whose name in Hebrew is
“Truth/Faith,” is surprised to find himself invited to the New Narnia. He
asks how it is possible for someone whose allegiance is to a god whose
character is exactly opposite to Aslan’s could be accepted by him. Aslan
responds by saying that his values reveal that his allegiance was misdirected.
Aslan examines the emeth in the man. If he had known of Aslan, he would
not have fought against him. Are there those of whom Jesus could say, “If
you had known me, you would have accepted me”? The question has
haunted me and I can see no answer, given the ontological doctrine, than this
one.
185
 Chapter Eight—Theses Four & Five: “Faith Credited to
Him as Righteousness”—Romans 4:1-25

Thesis 4: Abraham is the example of how God deals with people
who resolve to comply with God’s just holiness expectations.
God extends His grace to those who, like Abraham, choose
faith, i.e., moral integrity, as the basis for their lifestyle.
Thesis 5: Grace is God’s disposition to accept a person’s
resolve to become as holy as He justifiably expects, in lieu of
his/her de facto failure to comply with the moral requirements
of Faith.

These two theses need to be considered together since they are so
intricately intertwined in Paul’s argument here. As much as we might
like a clear line of demarcation in his argument, Paul does not provide
us one. Rather, his presentation flows into and out of these concepts
in order to paint a three-dimensional picture rather than presenting a
strictly structured deductive treatise. First we shall exegete the
passage.
“Reckoned Righteous in Virtue of Faith”— hn"Wma/
Abraham now comes into Paul’s argument. Abraham is not
Jesus. Abraham is a paradigm for sinners who decide to become
people of faith, i.e., he becomes the paradigm for people having the
inner drive, the passionate resolve, to become as holy as God
justifiably expects. Consider that Paul opposes the primary tenet of
Pharisees that acts of righteousness are both necessary and sufficient
for salvation and that anyone who keeps them in effect puts God
under obligation. It had not occurred to them that God includes the
quality of the character of a person as crucial in assessing the status
of that person’s faith, recalling Romans 2:25-29. Paul pulls the
crucial Old Testament quotation from Genesis 15:6, “Abraham

186
believed God, and it was credited to him as righteousness”.180 The
notion “was credited” [evlogi,sqh] is the point of contention. Luther,
in his commentary on Romans describes this notion of believing God
as “to trust Him always and everywhere.” 181
The Apostle here explains the quoted passage (Genesis 15:4-6)
to conclude and prove from it that justification is by faith and
not by works. This he does first of all by explaining the meaning
of the words “it is counted unto him for righteousness.” These
words explain that God receives sinners by grace and not
because of their works.182
Paul does argue that boasting is excluded on the principle of faith.
He cites Abraham as an example of this principle predicated on God’s
promise to give him a son to inherit his house. God promises further
that his descendants will surpass the number of stars, a promise which
He had already made in Chapter 12 except for using sand as opposed
to stars as indicating the number of his descendants. As difficult as
this was to comprehend given everything Abraham knew about
procreation, he nevertheless believed God’s promise because God is
faithful. But Paul cites another Old Testament argument taken from
David in Psalm 32.
Blessed are they whose transgressions are forgiven, whose sins
are covered.
Blessed is the one whose sin the Lord does not count against
them and in whose spirit is no deceit. [Psalm 32:1,2]
From this citing Paul makes his point clear vis-à-vis those Jewish
scholars who argued that Abraham’s faith was due to his righteous
merit. Sanday & Headlam say that according to Jewish tradition:
Abraham was the only righteous man of his generation;
therefore he was chosen to be the ancestor of the Holy People.
He kept all of the precepts of the Law which he knew beforehand
by a kind of intuition. He was the first of seven righteous men
whose merit brought back the Shekinah which had retired into

180
Genesis 15:6 `hq'd'c. AL h'b,v.x.Y:w: hw"hyB; !mia/h,w >
181
Martin Luther Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans abridged
translation by J. Thomas Mueller [Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing
House, 1968 (1954)], pg. 66.
182
Ibid.
187
 the seventh heaven, so that in the days of Moses it would take
up its abode in the Tabernacle. According to the Jews the
original righteousness of Abraham, who began to serve God at
the age of three was perfected (1) by his circumcision, (2) by his
anticipatory fulfillment of the Law. But the Jews also (on the
strength of Gen. xv. 6) attached a special importance to
Abraham’s faith, as constituting merit.183
The use of evlogi,sqh is properly within the domain of keeping
accounts. If a person such as Abraham focuses on being the kind of
person God can respect in terms of his devotion to integrity, then
whatever sin may occur will not be reckoned [evlogi,sqh] against him.
Such a man is therefore blessed. Indeed, the integrity itself will be
sufficient for God “to reckon”, “to regard as though”, “to deem
notwithstanding”, “to stipulate a person as righteous despite some
sins occur here and there.” Further, Paul continues to argue that
circumcision cannot be the basis of his being “reckoned” righteous,
for the record of Genesis 15:6 recounted “reckoned righteous” before
his having been circumcised, the event recorded in Genesis 17:9 ff.
Abraham’s being “reckoned righteous” was not in virtue of
circumcision, and certainly not in virtue of the Law which would not
be given until Moses. Paul also makes this point in Galatians 3:17.
Another exegetical comment seems necessary. In Romans 4:13
the NIV has “It was not through law that Abraham and his offspring
received the promise that he would be heir of the world, but through
the righteousness that comes by faith.” The phrase “but through the
righteousness that comes by faith” renders avlla. dia. dikaiosu,nhj
pi,stewj. The question I have is why does the NIV introduce “that
comes by” when the straightforward translation would be “in virtue
of [dia.] a [the noun is anarthrous] righteousness of faith [as opposed
to other kinds of righteousness]”? The NIV leaves room for the
interpretation that one’s righteousness depends on faith having been
bestowed on someone, consistently with Option #3 theologies. When
dia. occurs with the genitive the usual understanding is “by means
of”. The promise God makes to Abraham and everyone else whose
righteousness is predicated on holiness integrity rather than on merit

183
William Sanday & Arthur C. Headlam Critical and Exegetical
Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans [Edinburgh, Scotland: T & T
Clark, 1968 (5th edition 1902)], pg.100-101.
188
(mere acts of righteousness), whether such people be circumcised or
not or whether they have access to the Law, the Torah, or not, does
not put God under any obligation at all! Quite to the contrary, God’s
offer of the promise is purely a gift freely given [Romans 4:16].
Another point deserves discussion. Paul argues that Abraham
believed God’s promise that he would have an heir notwithstanding
the age of him or his wife. Abraham obeyed the directive of God to
sacrifice his only begotten son, Isaac, notwithstanding he was the son
of promise. Notwithstanding this odd command to sacrifice this son
of promise, Abraham believed that God’s integrity is always intact.
So, as the Hebrew author (Paul?) argues, that Abraham believed that
the only way that complying with the directive to sacrifice Isaac
would not vitiate God’s promise that this son would be the heir
through whose seed the whole world would come to be blessed was
that God would raise his son from the dead [Hebrews 11:17-19]. The
same promise Abraham believed is the promise Christians have
because of the resurrection of Jesus. This is not merely a matter of
doctrine. It is inherently connected to the “righteousness of faith” or
“the righteousness in terms of which people live out their resurrection
lives whether their lives go well or ill.” Faith remains a matter of
/
holiness integrity — hn"Wma. God has it; He expects it as well as
rewards it with His grace.
An Insight from Kierkegaard
Let me set this argument up by discussing some philosophical
approaches to becoming ethical. Soren Kierkegaard may have
provided significant insight into the Abrahamic paradigm of what it
is to be a person of faith in virtue of which God regards him/her as
though s/he were righteous. In his Either/Or and Fear and
Trembling, Kierkegaard dialectically184 contrasts three types of

184
Dialectic as an argument technique, although first used by Fichte,
was a major instrument for G. W. F. Hegel and subsequently Karl Marx for
presenting the development of philosophical ideas. The first presentation of
an explanation will occur as a naïve thesis. In virtue of its naivete the thesis
comes to be criticized by placing an antithesis over against it. This antithesis
will offer an explanation that both refutes and improves on the thesis. But
the antithesis has its own philosophical inadequacies. So, the antithesis is
itself criticized and the result is a synthesis that preserves the truth of both
the thesis and the antithesis while discarding the fallacious elements. Of
189
morality. Kierkegaard posits three types of moral orientation for the
individual. He refers to them as the Aesthetic, the Ethical and the
Knight of Faith. First, the aesthetic orientation is unreflective; it is
action based on appetites. It is really not strictly an ethical orientation
at all. In it one merely follows the appetites, wherever they lead.
There is little or no consideration for whether one ought to act
otherwise than how the appetites dictate. There is only the desire to
satisfy whatever appetite presently occurs. If there is any role for
Reason in the aesthetic orientation it is merely to devise the most
effective strategy for satisfying the appetites.185 Paradoxically, this
unreflective activity is conditioned by intensive rational, strategic
planning. Yet, the aesthetic never substitutes the condition of the “is”
for any consideration of an “ought”. This is dialectically inadequate
because all is-ness should be ought-ness according to the Judge
(Hegel again?). However, the peculiarity of the Judge’s arguments is
that the ethical orientation is really more aesthetic. This is surely not
true since for some actions and attitudes is-ness ought-not-to-be.
Cordelia, in “The Diary of the Seducer” is a person and ought not to
be reduced to a challenge, a conquest. That is to say that some actions
do in fact occur, but they are clearly incompatible with the actions
that ought to have occurred.
Even Epicurus, the so-called philosopher of pleasure as the
primary good, would contend that the pleasure desired is not always
worthy of being desired. This, he says, follows the path of swine.
Epicurus argues that one must distinguish between sensual pleasures
and intellectual pleasures. Sensual pleasures are clearly secondary to
intellectual pleasures since the former can be denied and cause

course, the synthesis becomes a thesis for the next cycle of philosophical
development, criticism and refinement.
185
See: Soren Kierkegaard Either/Or—Volume I Translated by David
Swenson & Lillian Marvin Swenson [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press,1971]. This is the basis of the critique of Don Giovanni’s womanizing.
But I also wonder if Kierkegaard’s disdain for Hegel did not also include his
womanizing reputation around Berlin when Kierkegaard was writing “The
Diary of the Seducer” [pp. 297 ff.]. See also: David Hume An Enquiry
Concerning the Principles of Morals [Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books,
2004—Reprint of 1777] argues that this is the role of Reason inasmuch as
he argues that Reason is not primary in morality. Reason is the servant of
Sentiment for Hume.
190
discomfort or pain, while the latter cannot be denied. No one can
deny another his/her values or his/her intelligence or his/her capacity
to think, even in the most Spartan or unjust of circumstances.
Epicureanism is often identified with egoistic hedonism, the view that
the primary moral reality is the satisfaction of purely personal,
sensual appetites, purely personal pleasure independently of the
impact of their causing a potential future pain on the self or others.
But this is a mistake in interpreting Epicurus himself, although one
could criticize his pseudo-disciples for taking his views in this
direction. Kierkegaard, no doubt, means to identify the aesthetic
orientation with egoistic yet deliberative hedonism.
The inadequacy of the aesthetic leads one to identify and codify
ought-ness in an objective external standard, in Law, if you will. This
is what Kierkegaard refers to as the “Ethical”. It is embodied in the
dialogue with the Judge. He strives to correct the flaws of the
aesthetic by prescribing or proscribing actions according to what the
Judge considers an objective legal standard. Whether someone feels
like doing something or not cannot become the standard for whether
or not one ought to do something that is incompatible with how one
feels. The Judge errs strategically by tacitly conceding ground to the
aesthete. He argues that to follow such legal prescriptions is to raise
the aesthetic experience to a higher level.
I wonder whether Kierkegaard may have had in mind Thomas
Hobbes or David Hume in formulating his analysis and critique of the
Ethical orientation of the Judge. Hobbes, for example, argues that in
the so-called Natural State, men are nothing but individualists striving
only for the satisfaction of personal appetites. This course
precipitates a “perpetual state of war” in which every person may
secure his/her wants by any means necessary. Since this is the focus
of every person, it allows every person to pursue his/her appetites and
defend him/herself against the actions of others following theirs.
Hobbes argues that if, as he obviously believes it should, this
condition is to be eliminated, some sovereign will have to be given
the authority to impose civil order on this natural chaos. 186 The

186
It is peculiar and revealing to notice that Hobbes apparently makes
this recommendation on the basis of the moral value that the conditions that
mark the natural state ought not exist! From this it seems to follow that some
moral value exists prior to and independently of the civil state and its
191
sovereign becomes the chief agent in what Hobbes called the Civil
State.187 In his/her capacity as sovereign s/he makes Law and the Law
defines what is moral. What is legal is what is moral and what is
moral is what is legal. Hobbes further argues that the sovereign is
authorized to impose the harshest sanctions against the slightest
violation of the Law on the ground that if citizens of the civil state do
not comply with the Law, there will be an immediate and catastrophic
return to the unacceptable Natural State. Hobbes thinks that any
opinion contrary to the sovereign’s laws must be kept so private as to
be non-existent. Indeed, once one agrees, overtly or tacitly, to be a
part of civil society one relinquishes personal opinion and submits
entirely to the civil authority.188 This argument pragmatically
justifies the tyranny of the sovereign. Morality is no longer
subjective; it is now objective, wholly external to the individual.
David Hume’s account is similar and yet somewhat different.
Hume argues that the basis of morality is either Reason or Sentiment.
According to Hume, although throughout history philosophers have
tried to defend the view that morality is reason-based, their views are
easily shown to be flawed. So, since morality is not based on Reason,
it is, therefore, based on Sentiment. Through a circuitous reasoning

sovereign. This inconsistency reveals that the Law cannot be the sole basis
of morality.
187
Hobbes allows that this sovereign may be what he calls an assembly.
However, it is clear that he prefers that a single sovereign authority is
preferable to an assembly for the latter cannot guarantee unanimity of civil
policy.
188
Hobbes’ views contain at least three problems. First, he presents the
Natural State as somehow morally inferior to the Civil State. Yet he argues
that morality comes to exist in virtue of the sovereign’s laws, i.e., that
morality does not exist until Law exists. If morality does not exist until the
Civil State exists, then one cannot argue that the Natural State is in any sense
immoral or morally inferior to the civil state. Secondly, Hobbes is not clear
on whether the sovereign is subject to the law-based morality. Is the
sovereign under the aegis of the Natural State or the Civil State? If the
former, then no action he takes is immoral even if illegal because no morality
exists in the Natural State. If the latter is true, then he is not a sovereign.
Third, Hobbes’ account leaves no room for an unjust law since justice is
defined legally. But there are clearly unjust laws. So, his account of things
is seriously flawed.
192
process Hume concludes by saying that morality is whatever most
people say it is. He says:
The hypothesis which we embrace is plain. It maintains that
morality is determined by sentiment. It defines virtue to be
whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the
pleasing sentiment of approbation; and vice the contrary.189
To discover what people regard as ethical, one must poll the
sentiments of the population. Obviously, this does not necessarily
correspond to the law. So, law must accommodate to the ebb and
flow of societal norms, to these “sentiments of approbation and
disapprobation”. What was moral at one time may become immoral
at another, and vice versa. Democratic institutions exist to adjust the
law to this ebb and flow. However, the problem is that the adage, “a
million Frenchmen, i.e., Jacobins, cannot be wrong” is false.
Atrocities can be perpetrated in the name of liberty, fraternity and
equality, and they repeatedly have been.
The standard of morality is no less objective in Hume than in
Hobbes. In Hobbes, the externality of the ethical is whatever a
political authority says it is. In Hume it is whatever the majority of a
population or public consensus says it is. In neither case, however, is
there any guarantee that the law or popular consensus is moral? In
the former case, Nazism would have become morally defensible had
Germany defeated the Allies. If Hobbes is right, then had the Nazis
won the Second World War their policy of genocide would have been
rendered moral in virtue of the ability of a Sovereign to establish and
implement genocide as the civil state policy. In the latter case,
American racial segregation would be justified merely because it was
legally sanctioned. If Hume is right about the pleasing sentiment of
approbation, then the policy of Segregation was moral until the
popular consensus forced political institutions to change the Law.
Both Hobbes and Hume allow for the institutionalization of
immorality and injustice. There is no guarantee that Law embodies
morality, clearly showing that holiness must exist independently of
law and is logically prior to it. So, Paul says in Romans 3:21, “The
righteousness of God is revealed apart from the Law and being
witnessed to by the Law and the Prophets” [Nuni. de. cwri.j no,mou

189
David Hume An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
[Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2004 (reprinted from 1777)], pg. 129.
193
dikaiosu,nh qeou/ pefane,rwtai marturoume,nh u`po. tou/ no,mou kai. tw/n
profhtw/n(].
One cannot blithely accept the premise that the law qua law is
just or moral. But neither can one accept the view that keeping the
Law even though it may express what is moral is sufficient for a
person’s being what Kierkegaard calls a Knight of Faith.
Even supposing that God has delivered a Law that is just in every
respect, it still would not follow that a person who perfectly kept
such a Law would be righteous in the sense that Faith requires.
To argue that it would requires for someone to maintain that
morality, or Faith, consists merely in right behavior, and that the inner
moral traits of the rightly behaving person are morally irrelevant.
Such a position is, however, prima facie absurd. Kierkegaard argues,
quite rightly, that the external imposition of morality, even if, perhaps
especially if, the law codifies what is indeed normatively moral, is
not sufficient to characterize someone as a person of faith like
Abraham. It is easy to show that even should someone act according
to the objective standards of the Ethical, s/he is not yet a moral person.
This is the basis for Kierkegaard’s distinguishing between the Ethical
and the moral, between the Judge and the Knight of Faith. One may
completely comply with the external standards of the true, right and
good, should those be codified ecclesiastically, politically or
philosophically, but fail to attain to the standard of Faith and certainly
not to the full measure of the stature of Christ.
The Ethical, while an improvement over aesthetic/ethical
hedonism, is still far from the moral ideal. The moral ideal, the
Knight of Faith, consists in one’s holding the true, right and good as
internalized in character not merely as behavioral compliance with
one’s duty to obey some coercive external standard. This is one of
Kierkegaard’s points in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript.
Unfortunately, Christians, in particular, have criticized Kierkegaard
for advocating the subjectivization of truth.190 Kierkegaard does

190
See: Soren Kierkegaard Concluding Unscientific Postscript
Translated by David F Swenson & Walter Lowrie [Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press,1971] In this case it seems to me that those who criticize
Kierkegaard for his so-called subjectivization or existentialization of Truth
have illegitimately lumped him together with other Existentialists who
subscribe to the doctrine that all truth is merely subjective and so one truth
is as good as another. The Atheist branch of existential thinkers, such as
194
indeed have a chapter in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript
entitled “Truth as Subjectivity”. But a careful reading of Kierkegaard
reveals that he does not mean that truth is merely a subjective matter,
or that it exists in virtue of an individual’s feelings about it, as indeed
some existentialists, like Jean Paul Sartre, for example, advocate.
Kierkegaard’s point is quite different. Kierkegaard, no doubt with his
nemesis Hegel in mind, argues that even if one could arrive at
unambiguous Objective Truth, unless what is true as an objective fact
becomes a subjective reality in one’s character, the objectivity by
itself will be inadequate to make someone a Knight of Faith.
Hegel,191 and perhaps Kant as well, was so focused on establishing
the objectivity of knowledge of all kinds that he failed to go far
enough morally.
Kierkegaard asked sardonically of his students in Berlin whether
Hegel had yet finished the “System”. The answer was always, “No,
not yet.” Kierkegaard then wonders, somewhat facetiously, whether
he can suspend the business of living until Hegel gets finished. His
conclusion is that he cannot, and so he must leap across Lessing’s
“big ugly ditch”. There will never be enough objective knowledge to
achieve the epistemological critical mass to move from Knowing
through Doing to Being. Epistemological certainty is unavailable to
any but God. This is why Kierkegaard cannot wait around for Hegel
to finish “the System.” Therefore, we must make our decisions on
how to be without the luxury of epistemological indubitability.

Jean Paul Sartre for example, has staked out this position. Kierkegaard
believes that behaving ethically is certainly necessary but not at all sufficient
for someone’s being a Knight of Faith. Kierkegaard had to accept some
responsibility for this ambiguity. He wrote a little book, The Point of View
of My Work as an Author, in which he revealed that he wrote as he did to get
people to think through the issues of taking existential responsibility for who
they are, not just for what they do. His Attack Upon “Christendom” 1854-
1855 [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,1991]also makes this point,
often with embarrassing candor.
191
George Wilhelm Fredrick Hegel The Phenomenology of Mind
Translated by J. B. Baillie [New York, NY: Harper Colophon Books, 1967].
Hegel wanted to make sure that our knowledge of everything was
objectively certain. Unfortunately, his patronage to the Prussian King led
him to conclude that this objective reality was embodied in the Prussian
State, a conclusion not unlike the one at which Hobbes also arrived. See
also: Hegel’s Philosophy of Right [1821].
195
Whether ethics is universal and necessary as it is for Kant who says
Reason is the a priori of the “Transcendental Aesthetic” and
“Transcendental Analytic” in epistemology or it is his “Categorical
Imperative” in ethics, or it is eviscerated by Hume’s thoroughgoing
skepticism, or it is for Hegel the process of history objectifying
knowledge especially ethical knowledge as “whatever is, is right”,
ethical reasoning is left as a merely objective phenomenon.
Kierkegaard argues that this is insufficient to characterize an
individual as moral, as the Knight of Faith. This is why Abraham
experiences the “teleological suspension of the ethical”. Kierkegaard
argues that unless and until the ethical-as-objectivity becomes
existentially internalized, one is not yet moral, one is not yet a Knight
of Faith. One must choose to become existentially moral according
to the objectivity of the ethical, not of the epistemological, for there
is never enough knowledge for the certitude most strive to establish
in epistemology. So, the objectivity of the Ethical is a necessary but
not sufficient condition for characterizing someone as a Knight of
Faith. One may perform good acts. But it is more important to “be
good” than to merely “act good”.192 This is Kierkegaard’s Knight of
Faith. This is Abrahamic paradigm.
Faith vis-à-vis Works
Let us continue the argument by noticing that Jesus becomes for
Paul the superior standard of righteousness because He does not
follow the Law because the Law is primary [Recall our exegesis of
Romans 3:21 ff. above]. Rather Jesus embodies the Law in His
holiness.
The Law reveals objectively what is true, right and good, but does
not become fulfilled until it becomes integrated in the character
of God and those created in His image.
Abraham wants this more than anything. Through fits and starts,
he craves being as holy as God wants him to become and God accepts
this craving in lieu of Abraham’s de facto failure to always
behaviorally comply or even to merely comply behaviorally. It is in

192
Recall that Jesus argues this point in the Sermon on the Mount. The
Pharisees, Sadducees, lawyers and scribes regard “acts of righteousness” as
morally sufficient. Jesus requires a “surpassing righteousness” apart from
which no one can see or enter the Kingdom of God [Matthew 5:20]. Such
righteousness is akin to Kierkegaard’s Knight of Faith.
196
this sense one must understand Genesis 15:6.193 God is holy and
expects His people to also be [Leviticus 19:2]. This is no doubt why
Kierkegaard so compellingly describes the existential angst Abraham
experiences in virtue of God’s demand that he must sacrifice Isaac,
the son of promise.194
The other great Reformation principle, in addition to sola
Scriptura, is sola Fide. “Justification by Faith alone” was apparently
as difficult a concept to comprehend for those to whom Paul
preached, as it was for those captivated by legalistic Catholic dogma.
Given the Jewish orientation around the primacy of Law, Judaism
received Paul’s proclamation of the primacy of Faith over works of
the Law with vociferous resistance. Hegel’s dialectical methodology
may help to analyze this perpetual debate because the thesis of Jewish
legalism and the antithesis of Greek antinomianism requiring a
synthesis. Paul, following Jesus’ theological lead, articulates this
synthesis. However, this synthesis is difficult to hear for those whose
paradigms control them. It continues to be a synthesis fraught with
confusion and antipathy. Perhaps our soteriological model can help
to eliminate the confusion.
The thesis has its genesis in Moses as the Lawgiver in Judaism.195
The early antipathy to the Way was based on superficial
interpretations of the Christian message, and not necessarily on any
ambiguity in what Christians were actually saying. Jewish leaders
and those agents who reported to them about the Way believed that
this new religion undermined the Torah and the Jewish institutions
that depended on the Torah, the Talmuds, the Midrashes, and the
Mishnah. This is legalism. The new Christian doctrine was not
legalistic.

193
`hq'd'c. AL h'bv, .x.Yw: : hw"hyB; !mia/h,w>
194
See Soren Kierkegaard Fear and Trembling [1843] and Sickness
Unto Death [1849] Translated by Walter Lowrie [Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1974]
195
It is perhaps more appropriate to characterize Moses as, not the Law-
giver, but as the Law-receiver. Everyone will concede the point that the Law
was not Moses’, i.e., it is not the Law of Moses, but is God’s who is its Giver,
and that Moses’ role is to deliver God’s Law to the children of Israel. When
stated explicitly, none would, no doubt, concede to a correction of this
confusing phraseology.
197
 The antithesis to legalism is antinomianism, the view that since
God dispenses His grace independently of the Law, it does not matter
whether one complies or does not comply with the Law’s dictates.196
Antinomianism is the functional equivalent of our Option #2
paradigm. Neither Jesus nor Paul argued such a position. It was,
however, easy to take what they did say out of context—to portray
them as saying that once one becomes a Christian one needed to no
longer follow the Law. Jews especially objected to the emphasis
Christianity made on issues of character that entailed minimizing the
import of the merely liturgical dimension. What one ate or drank or
whether males had the appropriate scar or whether the scar was
created in a timely fashion or not is, from the Christian point of view,
unimportant, even trivial, when one is focused on developing the
holiness virtues. This “Christian” interpretation became anathema to
Judaism, since, for it, the Law was primary. Anyone who advocated
anything that could be interpreted as antinomian was taking an anti-
Law position. This was, from the Jewish point of view, intolerably
blasphemous. It struck at the heart of Jewish theology and its
institutions. Those who advocated an antinomian position needed to
be pursued and persecuted. Saul, the zealous Pharisee, understood
this logic and followed it assiduously.
One must take note of the fact that Luke records that in the growth
of the church many of its early converts to the Way were priests and
Pharisees. From his comments, it seems legitimate to conclude that
a significant number of Jews regarded these arguments about the Law
as not incompatible with the Old Testament. Perhaps Nicodemus, for
example, came to this conclusion after his discussions with Jesus [See
John 3]. This factor may even help us to better exegete Jesus’
comments to him. This phenomenon would also account for the fact
that the Judaizing controversy followed Paul throughout his
missionary efforts notwithstanding the rulings of the councils that had

196
This occurs as well in the Gnostic heresies inasmuch as they adopted
the metaphysical dualism that drew a radical distinction between flesh and
spirit. Flesh was Evil in virtue of its physicality. Spirit is Good in virtue of
its non-corporeality. So, they concluded, acts of sin are functions of the
body, the flesh, while goodness resides exclusively in the realm of non-
corporeal. The doctrine of grace was interpreted such that actions of the
body do not matter. Sin as much as you like for such actions are morally
irrelevant.
198
concluded that Peter was correct in the case of Cornelius [Acts 11]
and that Paul’s Gospel was consistent with the message the Apostles
had received from Christ Himself [Acts 15 and Galatians 1].
Neither Judaism nor Christianity ever tolerated antinomianism.
The Jewish mistake was to suppose that any rejection of the Jewish
paradigm entailed antinomianism. Jesus argued constantly and
consistently that the Jewish error consisted in making behavioral
compliance with the Law, or lack thereof, as both necessary and
sufficient for inclusion, or exclusion, as the case may be, in the
Kingdom of God. Jesus argues that although compliance with the
Law is necessary, it is not sufficient for the surpassing compliance
He advocates and requires.197 He requires a surpassing
righteousness. Herein lies the crux of the conflict between Judaism
and Christianity.
Paul rejects any interpretation of the Gospel that would entail an
affirmative answer to the question, “Shall we continue in sin that
grace may abound?”198 Clearly, the potential for fallaciously
interpreting the Gospel message was as real among Gentiles as it was
among Jews. In Romans, Paul tenders “his” Gospel to the church at
Rome (presumably to assuage any doubts about him or his gospel in
preparation for his planned visit [Romans 1:11-12]). In Romans, he
systematically recounts what his Gospel argument is. Since he
operates in a context in which both Jews and Gentiles were in his
audiences, he recounts the objections each group tends to raise, at the
points in the argument they tend to occur and what his responses to
those objections are.199 He knows that Jews will object that his
Gospel is antinomian and, if it were, they should rightfully reject it.
He knows that Gentiles will tend to see an antinomian interpretation
within it and construe it as a license to maintain their licentiousness.
He cannot and does not allow the argument to proceed without

197
Matthewhew 5:20 — le,gw ga.r u`mi/n o[ti eva.n mh. perisseu,sh| u`mw/n
h` dikaiosu,nh plei/on tw/n grammate,wn kai. Farisai,wn( ouv mh. eivse,lqhte eivj
th.n basilei,an tw/n ouvranw/nÅ
198
Romans 6:1 Ti, ou=n evrou/menÈ evpime,nwmen th/| a`marti,a|( i[na h` ca,rij
pleona,sh|È mh. ge,noitoÅ See also Romans 3:1-8.
199
Paul tends to couch his responses to Jewish objections in terms of
Old Testament arguments. Realizing that this strategy will be unacceptable
to Gentiles, i.e., non-Jewish audiences, he responds to Gentile objections in
non-Old Testament terms.
199
handling these fallacious interpretations. The problem is that neither
the legalistic nor the antinomian positions were accurate
representations of the Christian view. A synthesis needed to be
developed and articulated.
Jesus had anticipated this confusion. He continually emphasized
that His view of the Law did not abrogate it. The Sermon on the
Mount is a representation of the ideas Jesus had articulated on nearly
every occasion, in every city, village or gathering. 200 He argued that
complying with the Law was necessary but not sufficient for
becoming a citizen of God’s Kingdom. For example, it is necessary
for Kingdom disciples to eschew adultery. However, merely not
committing adultery is not sufficient since one could have never
committed adultery but could still be sexually unholy for any of a
number of reasons. I often illustrate this by calling attention to the
fact that someone may be so ugly or fetid that not even a prostitute
would take his money; or, one may be so obnoxious that no one
would find him suitable for an affair; or, someone eschews adultery
because should his wife find out she would divorce him, if not do him
bodily harm. Consider that incarcerated rapists do not become moral
in virtue of their inability to sexually assault people. In such cases,
not committing adultery is hardly morally laudable. On the other
hand, another would not commit adultery because it is incompatible
with his/her character. S/he becomes dispositionally averse to it. It
would violate the principles of avgaph..201 What is both necessary and
sufficient for the holiness God requires is that one refrain from
committing adultery due to the fact that one has chosen to eschew the
character trait of lustfulness and to adopt the trait of monogamous
heterosexual fidelity. Paul requires of leaders in the church that they
have the trait of being one-woman-men [1 Timothy 3:2 mia/j
gunaiko.j a;ndra]. Consider another of Jesus’ examples. Jesus
sanctions the Law’s prohibiting murder. Not actually murdering
anyone is necessary, for no one who murders another complies with
the Law. However, it is not sufficient for entry to God’s Kingdom
since one may still be angry, hateful or hurtful toward others. This

200
See: Charles R Davis The Surpassing Righteousness: The Sermon on
the Mount for Would-be Disciples of the Kingdom [Bloomington, IN: Xlibris
Corporation, 2013].
201
Recall the discussion of the objective character of avga,ph from
Chapter Two: “Repentance: The Necessary Conditions.”
200
disqualifies one from citizenship in God’s Kingdom. In fact, I would
argue and have done so, that some who have actually murdered
another may in fact and character no longer be murderers since they
have become dispositionally averse to the act because it is no longer
a component of their character. It is no longer in them to kill.
The fulfillment of this Kingdom requirement entails loving one’s
neighbor as oneself, even, or perhaps especially, one’s enemies.202 In
other words, there are two ways of complying with the Law. On the
one hand, one merely complies by not doing what the Law prohibits,
or by scrupulously performing its obligations. This is mere
behavioral compliance. On the other hand, one complies by
becoming the kind of person for whom the Law is unnecessary
because it would never occur to him/her to engage in its prohibitions
or refuse to engage in its proscriptions. This is character compliance.
For example, the State of Illinois needs no law to prohibit me from
murdering people, because it is not “in me” to commit murder. Jesus
requires that a genuine disciple become such a person. It should be
quite clear that of the two types of people, the second is qualitatively
superior to the first. The discipleship objective is for disciples to
commit to becoming a person who is dispositionally averse to any
form of evil, and to continue this striving until, in Paul’s words, “we
are no longer babes, becoming the perfect man [eivj a;ndra te,leion],
attaining to the full measure of the stature of Christ.”203 The
confusion and disagreement occur in virtue of Judaism’s refusal to
acknowledge that Jesus’ moral standard is qualitatively superior.
Once clearly articulated, the difference is clear and distinct. The
righteous man needs no law. As Paul reminds Timothy, “the law is
not made for the righteous man but for those that are lawless and

202
Matthewhew 543 VHkou,sate o[ti evrre,qh( VAgaph,seij to.n plhsi,on sou
kai. mish,seij to.n evcqro,n souÅ 44 evgw. de. le,gw u`mi/n( avgapa/te tou.j evcqrou.j
u`mw/n kai. proseu,cesqe u`pe.r tw/n diwko,ntwn u`ma/j(
203
Ephesians 4:13-14 See: also Colossians 1:28 “We proclaim Him
admonishing and teaching everyone with all wisdom, so that we may present
everyone perfect in Christ.”—o]n h`mei/j katagge,llomen nouqetou/ntej pa,nta
a;nqrwpon kai. dida,skontej pa,nta a;nqrwpon evn pa,sh| sofi,a|( i[na
parasth,swmen pa,nta a;nqrwpon te,leion evn Cristw/|\
201
rebellious”204 or, as in Romans he says, “The righteous man shall live
by faith.”205
Consider now the Reformed Merit argument. I reproduce it here
for our analysis.
P1: If anyone is to be saved, it can only be due either to man’s
doing something to merit this salvation, putting God under
obligation, or else he does not, or as Luther says, cannot do
anything to merit it.
P2: If man cannot merit salvation, then it is God’s grace alone
that is the means of his salvation.
P3: Man can do nothing to merit salvation.
C1: Therefore, God’s grace alone is the only means of man’s
salvation.
I can find no reasons to object to the argument’s validity. I do find
considerable objection to the soundness of the argument. The
conclusion of a sound argument is not guaranteed to be true, unless
the form of the argument is valid and the premises are known to be
true. The premises in this argument are open to objection.
Apparently, the point of the argument is designed to nullify man’s
hubris vis-à-vis God’s sovereignty. The argument is semantically
sloppy. It uses the term “merit” in a way that implies that salvation
could be something someone earns. Normally, when one works the
employer owes the laborer his/her wages. One’s work has merit.
Paul acknowledges this [Romans 4:4]. This is economic merit, if you
will. The argument now assumes that soteriological merit is
semantically parallel to economic merit. One dictionary defines
“merit” as “spiritual credit granted for good works.”206 So, since
employers owe workers their wages in exchange for their work, it
must follow that God would owe sinners salvation in virtue of their
good works.

204
1 Timothy 1:8-12 eivdw.j tou/to( o[ti dikai,w| no,moj ouv kei/tai( avno,moij
de. kai. avnupota,ktoij( avsebe,si kai. a`martwloi/j( avnosi,oij kai. bebh,loij(
patrolw,|aij kai. mhtrolw,|aij( avndrofo,noij
205
Romans 1:17 dikaiosu,nh ga.r qeou/ evn auvtw/| avpokalu,ptetai evk
pi,stewj eivj pi,stin( kaqw.j ge,graptai( ~O de. di,kaioj evk pi,stewj zh,setaiÅ
206
Webster’s II New College Dictionary [New York: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1995], pg. 686.
202
 The Reformers justifiably reject this reasoning but seem to
require that the argument may only be framed in this sense. Yet, this
is not the exclusive or even the best semantic notion of merit. I have
to disagree with the doctrine against meritorious salvation if it is
construed to mean, as I think Reformers do, that the sinner is
converted not by his/her choice to repent and to subsequently comply
with God’s holiness expectations, but only by having been granted
the power to do something in virtue of God’s enabling grace. I am
going to argue that Grace is not a power God uses207 but a disposition
God has.
I can agree only provisionally with this employer/employee
analogy. I agree that once we sin, we nullify any expectation that we
can compensate for the sin we have committed by any number of so-
called “good deeds”. For example, an employee ought to be fired and
prosecuted for embezzling company funds, notwithstanding long
years of faithful and productive service. Legalistically, our
soteriological status is not a matter of keeping track of sin behaviors
as an accountant keeps track of dollars and cents. No number of days
of compliance with timeliness requirements, or productive
competency, etc. would compensate for the embezzlement of
company funds, for embezzlement entails a loss of trust. One case of
embezzlement nullifies numerous other cases of good employment
citizenship. In fact, compliance with expected employment activities
may be a necessary condition for obtaining the trust necessary for
gaining access to the funds one wants to embezzle. The act of
embezzlement vitiates the good will in terms of which the
relationship itself had existed. It is a violation of good faith. Very
good and productive employees will have to be fired for sexually
harassing others in the workplace notwithstanding their otherwise
reliability, productivity or competence for the very same reason.

207
I might have to engage in a proviso on this point. God, in my view,
has the power in the sense of having the moral authority to dispense His
grace at His discretion according to His disposition. But this is not the sense
in which Reformers normally use “Grace” as an “enabling power”. The old
hymn Wonderful Grace of Jesus has the line “Wonderful grace of Jesus,
greater than all my sin, by its transforming power, making me God’s dear
child.” This is consistent with the theology with which I am taking
exception.
203
 Consider another analogy. A more consistent analogy would be
to consider that once someone commits a crime, s/he cannot, in virtue
of any number of good works, compensate for the damage the crime
has done. I recall that some years ago a woman who was active in
the anti-Vietnam War movement had committed a crime in order to
finance anti-war activities. As I recall, a police officer was killed
during a bank robbery in which she participated. I do not recall
whether she actually killed him. In any event, she escaped arrest until
some twenty years later. Upon her arrest, there was a public outcry
against the defense argument that she should be dealt with leniently
since she had “led an exemplary life” for those twenty years. She had
raised a family, been active in the community, and generally been a
law-abiding citizen. The public apparently agreed with the
prosecution that these subsequent events were not relevant to the fact
that she participated in criminal activities that caused the death of a
police officer.
My recollections may suffer from the effects of time. But, even
if my recollections are somewhat factually defective, I can still make
my point by converting my account to an altogether plausible
illustration. As a hypothetical, it is entirely conceivable. The woman
could do nothing to compensate for her actions, the dead police
officer cannot be resurrected, nor his family’s grief assuaged.
Further, nothing “worthwhile” could compel the prosecutor to drop
the charges. If her post-criminal actions were sufficient to cancel the
criminal action, then we could say that her post-criminal actions had
merit vis-à-vis her criminal actions. But, legally, she deserves to be
convicted, i.e., she merits conviction not a dismissal of the charges.
However, the judge, even after a trial jury convicts her, is
empowered, perhaps enabled, to extend legal grace to her. The judge
may take into consideration her subsequent life, her expressions of
remorse, the present state of her character, etc. But, these cannot be
construed in the sense the merit argument requires, for she does not
deserve to be granted this grace. The judge may, at his/her judicial
discretion, consider these factors in sentencing and grant her the
court’s grace. The judge may “impute” these factors as
righteousness, in lieu of her justified conviction. In the same way,
what someone does as a person may affect the way God decides to
deal with him/her as a sinner. It does not, however, obligate God to